Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 23TRCV03351, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Glen Franklin Beringer Jr., and Jeffrey A. Beringer

MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Quash Defendants’ Subpoenas for Production of Business Records; Request for $2,500.00 in Sanctions Against Defendants Glen Franklin Beringer Jr. and Jeffrey A. Beringer

Tentative Rulings: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Subpoenas for the Production of Business Records is GRANTED. The Request for Sanctions is DENIED.

This action arises out of an auto versus auto versus auto collision that occurred on October 5, 2021, when Plaintiff Ryan Hamilton (“Plaintiff” or “Hamilton”) alleges he was injured as a result of the negligence of Defendants Glen Franklin Beringer Jr. (“Glen”) and Jeffrey A. Beringer (“Jeffrey”) (collectively “Defendants”). On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging a general negligence cause of action and praying for compensatory damages in an amount according to proof at trial. On May 31, 2024, Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint.

On June 10, 2024, Defense Counsel issued eleven deposition subpoenas, calling for the production of Plaintiff’s medical history, but without limitation in scope to Plaintiff’s personal injury claims arising from the underlying action. (Benji Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) The subpoenas seek production from the following eleven medical entities:

On September 16, 2024[1], Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Quash Subpoenas for the Production of Business Records (“Mot.”), along with the Declaration of Plaintiff’s attorney, Daniel Benji (“Benji Decl.”); a Separate Statement; and a Proposed Order. Plaintiff also requested sanctions in the amount of $2,500.00.

On September 13, 2024, Defendants filed their Opposition (“Opp.”) which includes an attached Declaration of Kathryn Saldana (“Saldana Decl.,”). Defendants also filed Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement. On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff Hamilton filed his Reply.

On June 10, 2024, Defense Counsel Saldana issued the relevant eleven deposition subpoenas calling for production of the entirety of Plaintiff’s medical record history, absent any limitation in scope to Plaintiff’s personal injury claims. (Benji Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.)

On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel, Daniel Benji, sent a Meet and Confer letter along with an objection in an attempt to resolve the subpoena disputes. (Id. at ¶ 6, Exs. 2-3.) In said meet and confer letter, Plaintiff’s Counsel explained that because Plaintiff suffered injuries to his head, upper back, mid back, lower back, shoulders, and neck—Defendant’s subpoenas should be limited according to those body parts that have been put at issue in the subject action. (Id. at ¶ 7, Exs. 2-3.) Counsel Benji further set forth a June 21, 2024, deadline to either amend or withdraw the subpoenas. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

On June 19, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel received a meet and confer letter from Defense counsel, agreeing to limit the subpoenas to records dated ten (10) years before the incident to the present, but disagreeing with Plaintiff’s other proposed limitations regarding Plaintiff’s specific body parts. (Benji. Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 4.) Plaintiff contends Defendants did not amend or withdraw their subpoenas. (Id.)

On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel sent another meet and confer letter to Defendant’s Counsel, requesting that they amend or withdraw their subpoenas by June 24, 2024, or Plaintiff would be forced to file a Motion to Quash. (Id. at ¶ 10, Ex. 5.)

When Plaintiff received no response back to discuss the subpoenas in question, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.)[2]

As a preliminary matter, despite Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants “refused to respond back whatsoever to discuss the subpoenas in question,” Defendants did amend and serve the revised subpoenas on Plaintiff. (Benji Decl., ¶ 11; Opp., pg. 3.) Defendants provide that subpoenas were originally issued in this case on June 10, 2024, with a production date of July 10, 2024. (Saldana Decl., ¶ 2.) Defense Counsel then responded to the initial meet and confer letter received from Plaintiff’s counsel and agreed to limit the subpoenas to 10 years pre-accident but explained that the subpoenas could not be limited by body parts for various reasons. (Saldana Decl., Ex. A.) Thus, all eleven (11) subpoenas were amended on June 27, 2024, to limit the timeframe of requested records to ten (10) years pre-accident to current (i.e., 10/28/2011 – Present). (Saldana Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. C.) Plaintiff’s Counsel was then served with the amended subpoenas on June 27, 2024, by both email and mail service. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Counsel also attached the amended subpoenas to the motion. (Opp., pgs. 3-4.)

Defense Counsel further provides that Defendants sent another meet and confer letter to Plaintiff’s Counsel on July 10, 2024, explaining the reasons that the subpoenas could not be limited by body parts. (Saldana Decl., Ex. D.) Defense Counsel noted that Plaintiff had produced records pre-litigation involving other body parts and that these records suggested alternative explanations for the pain complained of by Plaintiff with respect to the accident. (Id. at Ex. D.)

Thus, the Court finds both Plaintiff and Defendants’ meet and confer efforts satisfactory.

Multiple motions cannot be combined into a single filing. (See Govt. Code § 70617(a)(4) (setting forth the required filing fee for each motion, application, or any other paper or request requiring a hearing); see also Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, [8:1140.1] at 8F-60 (The Rutter Group 2011) (“Motions to compel compliance with separate discovery requests ordinarily should be filed separately.”)

Here, Plaintiff has improperly combined eleven motions to quash subpoenas into one single motion per Government Code Section 70617(a)(4). Nonetheless, Defendants oppose the motion on the merits. As such, the Court will exercise its discretion and rule on the merits below.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1987.1(a), “[i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1(a).)¿¿However, “[n]othing in this section shall require any person to move to quash, modify, or condition any subpoena duces tecum of personal records of any consumer served under paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 1985.3 or employment records of any employee served under paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 1985.6.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1(c).)

For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.¿(Gonzalez v. Superior Court¿(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)¿¿Generally, all unprivileged information that is relevant to the subject matter of the action is discoverable if it would itself be admissible evidence at trial or if it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010;¿Schnabel v. Superior Court¿(1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 711.)¿¿¿¿

The right of privacy of individuals is protected by the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 1.) The framework for evaluating invasions of privacy in discovery have been clarified in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.¿There, the California Supreme Court held that, generally, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.¿The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.¿ A court must then balance these competing considerations.”¿(Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 533, citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)¿ The Williams court rejected the cases which held that the party seeking protected information must always show a compelling need or interest.¿ (Id. at p. 557.)¿ Instead, the court held, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.”¿ (Id.)¿

Here, although the Court finds Defendants did respond to Plaintiff’s meet and confer efforts and subsequently amended the relevant timeframe of the eleven subpoenas, Defendants did not limit the scope of the subpoenas to the four distinct body parts set forth by Plaintiff—head, neck, shoulders, and back. An excerpt from the subpoena reads as follows:

Party Name: Ryan Richard Hamilton Party DOB: *********
Dates: 10/28/2011 – Present

Any and all records, reports, charts, histories, including but not limited to sign-in sheets, doctor's notes, nurses' notes, SOAP notes, emergency room records, correspondence, memorandum, insurance records, worker's compensation records, pharmacy/prescription records, photographs, physical therapy records, radiology reports, laboratory reports, statements, patient information sheets, and all other records pertaining to Ryan Richard Hamilton for all dates. (Def’s Resp. Sep. State., pg. 3.)

Plaintiff argues that it is Defendants’ burden—not Plaintiff’s—to establish that they are entitled to records sought in discovery. (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1009, 1017; see also Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App.4th 216, 223 (noting that “ burden rests upon the party seeking the discovery to provide evidence from which the court may determine these conditions are met”). Defendant has the burden to demonstrate that:

1. The information/records sought are directly relevant to the issues in this case;

2. There is “a compelling need for discovery, and that compelling need [is] so strong as to outweigh the privacy right when these two competing interests are carefully balanced,”;

4. The information is not available from other sources or by less intrusive means.

Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal. App.4th 1839, 1853-1854; Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525; Allen v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 453.

Defendants maintain that the production of Plaintiff’s medical records should not be limited to specific body parts because discovery is a broad standard. (Opp., pg. 5.) Defendants argue that other body parts are relevant to assess alternative sources of causation and alternative explanations for a plaintiff’s complaints. (Id.) Moreover, Defendants argue that evidence of prior incidents and injuries is admissible to show that a plaintiff’s alleged injuries were actually caused by some origin other than the incident being litigated. (Id.) Further, Defense Counsel specifically notes that Plaintiff produced records pre-litigation involving other body parts and that these records suggested alternative explanations for the pain complained by Plaintiff with respect to the accident. (Opp., pg. 4, Ex. D.)

In this case, the Court finds that the language of the subpoenas overbroad and the ten-year time period to be unreasonable. While it is true that injuries to other parts of Plaintiff’s body may tend in reason to demonstrate that subjective complaints such as pain or restriction in range of motion, the Court is troubled by the absence of any effort by the defense to narrow the scope of the subpoenas in any substantive way, i.e., for records showing complaints or treatment for pain, range of motion, or similar issues of which Plaintiff complains here. Balancing defendant’s right to reasonable discovery against Plaintiff’s right of medical privacy, including the absence of any effort int eh meet-and-confer process to impose any restriction on the breadth of the requested discovery, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash (the eleven) Subpoenas, without prejudice to more narrowly tailored SDTs.

Code of Civil Procedure, § 2023.030 also states in pertinent part that: “The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.”

Furthermore, Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010 identifies “misuse of the discovery process” as: (a)Persisting, over objection and without substantial justification, in an attempt to obtain information or materials that are outside the scope of permissible discovery (b)Using a discovery method in a manner that does not comply with its specified procedures. (c)Employing a discovery method in a manner or to an extent that causes unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. . . [and](i) Failing to confer in person, by telephone, or by letter with an opposing party or attorney in a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve informally any dispute concerning discovery, if the section governing a particular discovery motion requires the filing of a declaration stating facts showing that an attempt at informal resolution has been made. (CCP § 2023.010.) Code of Civil Procedure, § 2023.030(a) states “if a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction . . .” ( CCP § 2023.030(a).)

Motions to Quash medical records subpoenas are an uncertain and inexact science. The Court is tasked with balancing competing rights and interests of the parties, and here the defense did agree to narrow the time period but not the scope of the SDTs. Each side acted with substantial justification, meaning that the Court in its discretion finds that an award of monetary sanctions is not required on the facts presented here.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motions to Quash Subpoenas for the Production of Business Records is GRANTED without prejudice to the defense re-drafting the ambit of the subpoenas to fit the discoverable need versus the privacy interest of the Plaintiff.

[1] It appears the MTQ was served, but not filed, until after Defendant served its opposition papers.