Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 23TRCV03390, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV03390, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23TRCV03390 Hearing Date: November 13, 2024 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling

HEARING DATE: November 13, 2024

CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV03390

CASE NAME: Rashamid Mateen, et al. v. Ho Chung, et al.

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Lyft, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Rashamid Mateen, Arielle Staley, and Christopher Moreneau

TRIAL DATE: Not Set.

MOTION: (1) Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED as to Lyft, ARGUE as to Lyft’s co-defendant Chung Oh. If the Notice of Related Case in the earlier-filed case pending is Torrance is corrected and re-filed, Judge Tanaka will rule on, and if he grants the NORC he will manage the issue of potentially conflicting rulings. The Court will set an arbitration status conference approximately 9 months out.

Does Lyft’s co-defendant Chung Oh take a position on this motion? Does Plaintiff seek to have the case against Chung Oh stayed or to proceed on parallel tracks against the two separate defendants?

I. BACKGROUND¿

A. Factual¿

¿¿

On October 12, 2023, Plaintiffs, Rashamid Mateen, Arielle Staley, and Christopher Moreneau (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants, Ho Chung, Lyft, Inc., and DOES 1 through 100. The complaint alleges one cause of action for: (1) Negligence/ Negligence Per Se.

Defendant, Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”) now files a Motion to Compel Arbitration.

B. Procedural

On October 11, 2024, Defendant Lyft filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration. On November 1, 20234, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief. On November 5, 2024, Lyft filed a reply brief.

II. ANALYSIS ¿

A. Legal Standard

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) states that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-72.)

California law states that “[o]n petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….” (Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1281.2, generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2)¿the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting¿rulings on common issues.

When seeking to compel arbitration, the initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by preponderance of evidence. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.) It is sufficient for the moving party to produce a copy of the arbitration agreement or set forth the agreement’s provisions. (Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove by a preponderance of evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract or the arbitration clause. (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) Subsequently, the moving party must establish with the preponderance of admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. (Ibid.) The trial court then weighs all the evidence submitted and uses its discretion to make a final determination. (Ibid.) “California law, ‘like [federal law], reflects a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements and requires close judicial scrutiny of waiver claims.’” (Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 31.)

If the court orders arbitration, then the court shall stay the action until arbitration is completed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

B. Discussion

Defendant Lyft submits evidence of each Plaintiff having a history of consenting on the Lyft platform. For example, Lyft’s evidence includes the following consents of Plaintiff Stanley: (1) September 10, 2021; and (2) January 8, 2023. Lyft’s evidence also includes the following consents of Plaintiff Mateen: (1) December 19, 2016; (2) December 25, 2017; (3) August 15, 2018; (4) May 2, 2023. Lastly, Lyft’s evidence includes the following consents from Plaintiff Morneau: (1) October 18, 2016; (2) November 21, 2019; (3) January 6, 2021; and (4) January 8, 2023.

Defendant Lyft also includes the Arbitration Agreement it argues has been accepted by the Plaintiffs several times through updates to the Terms and Services. Lyft states that introduction on the very first page of the Terms of Service alerted Plaintiffs to the arbitration agreement, conspicuously and unambiguously sating:

PLEASE BE ADVISED: THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS PROVISIONS THAT GOVERN HOW CLAIMS BETWEEN YOU AND LYFT CAN BE BROUGHT (SEE SECTION 17 BELOW). THESE PROVISIONS WILL, WITH LIMITED EXCEPTION, REQUIRE YOU TO SUBMIT CLAIMS YOU HAVE AGAINST LYFT TO BINDING AND FINAL ARBITRATION…

By entering into this Agreement, and/or by using or accessing the Lyft platform you expressly acknowledge that you understand this Agreement (including the dispute resolution and arbitration provisions in Section 17) and accept all of its terms. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, YOU MAY NOT USE OR ACCESS THE LYFT PLATFORM…

(Lyft’s Compendium of Exhibits (“COE”), Exhibit 3.)

Per Lyft, the “SEE SECTION 17 BELOW” is a blue hyperlink that takes the reader directly to the full arbitration provision within the Terms of Service. The arbitration provision itself, under the bolded heading “DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENT,” states in capital letters: “YOU AND LYFT MUTUALLY AGREE TO WAIVE OUR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN A COURT OF LAW BY A JUDGE OR JURY AND AGREE TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE BY ARBITRATION,…” (COE, Exhibit 3, ¶ 17(a).) Further, the scope of the agreement states it covers “any dispute, claim or controversy, whether based on past, present, or future events, arising out of or relating to…the Lyft Platform, the Rideshare Services…and all other federal and state statutory and common law claims.” (COE, Exhibit 3, ¶ 17(a).)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that this court should deny the motion because the arbitration provision is inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Chung Ho and that the provision does not contemplate motor vehicle accidents being submitted to arbitration. First, as for the issue regarding Defendant, Chung Ho, Plaintiffs assert that they are not contractually bound to arbitrate their motor vehicle personal injury claims against Defendant Ho and thus, the motion must be denied due to the real possibility of inconsistent rulings and cumulative and duplicative use of judicial resources. Plaintiffs rely on Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2. However, Plaintiffs also do not dispute that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies. Therefore, Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 is preempted, and the third-party litigation exception under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2(c) is preempted [Dias v. Burberry Ltd. (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2021) 2021 WL 2349730, at *18 (holding that Section 1281.2 was inapplicable because FAA governs the Agreement)].

Next, as to the issue of whether the arbitration provision contemplated motor vehicle injury claims against Defendant Chung Oh. Plaintiffs argue they lacked constructive notice that a motor vehicle accident would be subject to arbitration because Lyft lists a number of specific claims despite arguing “all claims” are subject to arbitration. Thus, Plaintiffs contend the “all claims: language is ambiguous because: (1) it does not give notice of motor vehicles specifically being subject to this arbitration provision even though it lists over 50 specific types of claims subject to arbitration; and (2) the “all claims” language is misleading because there are other sections of the arbitration provision that also discuss claims not being subject to all claim’s verbiage. Because of this, Plaintiff states there was no knowing waiver of their rights to a jury trial.

The Court requests oral argument as to whether Chung Oh consents to arbitrate plaintiff’s claims against him or opposes arbitration. The Court assumes that as a Lyft driver, Chung Oh agreed to arbitrate any disputes he might have with Lyft, including any cross-complaint that Lyft might bring against him for indemnity or contribution. The claims against Lyft may be separate or wholly interrelated with the claims against Chung Oh. Having piecemeal litigation as between parties to the arbitration agreement and parties who are non-signatories was contemplated by Congress in the FAA and has been addressed by caselaw. As noted in Lyft’s Reply Brief, the manner of handling non-signatories as third parties is to stay the litigation against them while the arbitration proceeds, or to have the cases proceed separately. Given the potentially related case pending in Torrance, the Court seeks oral argument as to whether to stay Plaintiff’s case against co-defendant Chung Oh or to have parallel proceedings progress.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant Lyft’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. Lyft is ordered to give notice.