Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 23TRCV03999, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV03999, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23TRCV03999 Hearing Date: October 23, 2024 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿¿

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HEARING DATE: October 23, 2024¿

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CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV03999

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CASE NAME: Rosalie Fierro v. Stadco LA, LLC dba Sofi Stadium, et al.

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MOVING PARTY: (1) Defendant, Stadco LA, LLC, Pincay RE, LLC, and Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC

(2) Plaintiff, Rosalie Fierro

(3) Defendant, Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC

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RESPONDING PARTY: (1) Plaintiff, Rosalie Fierro

(2) Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC

(3) Plaintiff, Rosalie Fierro

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TRIAL DATE: August 25, 2025

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MOTION:¿ (1) Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Motion to Deem Matters Admitted, and Requests for Sanctions

(3) Defendants’ Motion to Request Relief from Waiver with Respect to Objections Raised in Discovery

Tentative Rulings: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration is CONTINUED.

(3) Defendants’ Motion to Request Relief from Waiver with Respect to Objections Raised in Discovery is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND¿¿¿

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A. Factual¿¿¿

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On December 1, 2023, Plaintiff, Rosalie Fierro (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants, Stadco LA, LLC dba Sofi Stadium, Stadco LA Manager, LLC, Pincay RE, LLC, Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC, Hollywood Park Management Company II, LLC, and DOES 1 through 50. The complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Negligence; and (2) Premises Liability. The complaint asserts allegations that on January 30, 2022, Plaintiff was an attendee and ticketholder of the 49ers game at Sofi Stadium, when – during the second quarter of the game – Plaintiff felt a blunt force impact to the back of her head and neck, which allegedly propelled her out of her seated position, and directly into the back of a stadium seat directly ahead of where she was seated. (Complaint, ¶¶ 11, 12, & 16.)

Plaintiff further alleges that just prior to being struck, she is informed and believed, that an intoxicated individual, John Doe 1, lost their balance and fell into the rows of people ahead of them. (Complaint, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff asserts that she is informed and believes that John Doe 1 through his fall, fell over seats and onto rows ahead of him, resulting in John Doe 1 ultimately impacting the back of Plaintiff, resulting in the incident. (Complaint, ¶ 18.) Plaintiff contends that the impact of her face and body with the stadium seat ahead of her caused serious injuries to Plaintiff, including, but certainly not limited to, a concussion, bruising, and severe head, neck, and back pain. (Complaint, ¶ 19.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that event staff and emergency personnel failed to notice or tend to Plaintiff after impact despite Plaintiff being in excruciating pain from the incident. (Complaint, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff argues that instead, she had to proceed to leave her seat and seek help and was required to walk all over the premises before finding event staff to assist her. (Complaint, ¶ 20.) As a result of the incident, Plaintiff asserts that she suffered severe injuries to her body and nervous system as a result of the incident, and Plaintiff continues to suffer from these injuries to the present day. (Complaint, ¶ 21.)

i. Facts Relating to Motion to Compel Arbitration

Defendants, Stadco LA, LLC, Pincay RE, LLC, and Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC (“Moving Defendants”) filed a motion to compel arbitration. Moving Defendants assert that Plaintiff expressly agreed to their Stadium Seat License Agreement Terms and Conditions on September 5, 2019. Moving Defendants state that section 11 of the License Agreement Terms included an arbitration provision which mandates that all disputes must and will be settled by binding arbitration and that both the Defendant and Plaintiff were each waiving the right to trial by judge or jury. As such, Moving Defendants have brought this motion to compel arbitration.

ii. Motion to Compel Further Responses

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Further Responses from Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC (“HPMC”). Plaintiff asserts that on April 16, 2024, she served Defendant with Set One of written discovery. Plaintiff argues that responses were originally due on May 20, 2024. On May 14, 2024, Plaintiff states that Defendant’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel to request an extension until June 3, 2024, to provide discovery responses, which Plaintiff agreed to. On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff further states that Defendant’s counsel requested a second extension until June 17, 2024, to provide Plaintiff with discovery responses, which Plaintiff granted. A third extension was requested for July 1, 2024, but was granted for June 24, 2024. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that on June 24, 2024, counsel for HPMC requested a fourth extension until June 28, 2024, which Plaintiff agreed to. A fifth extension was requested on June 26, 2024 for July 12, 2024, but was granted by Plaintiff for July 5, 2024. Again, on July 3, 2024, a sixth extension was requested for July 12, 2024, which was agreed to by Plaintiff.

On July 10, 2024, Defendant HPMC again requested a seventh extension until July 19, 2024, which Plaintiff notes that she agreed to. After further meet and confer discussions, Plaintiff notes that she reluctantly agreed to an eighth extension until July 17, 2024. On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff contends that Defendant served untimely discovery objections.

After further meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff argues that Defendant HPMC’s counsel neither met and conferred with Plaintiff, nor have they provided further document production. Thus, Plaintiff has filed this Motion to Compel Further Responses from Defendant HPMC as to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and has filed a Motion to Deem Matters Admitted.

iii. Motion for Relief from Waiver

In anticipation of the above discovery motion, Defendant HPMC has filed a Motion to Request Relief from Waiver with Respect to Objections Raised in Discovery. Defendant HPMC asserts that relief is sought on the grounds that due to an apparent electronic hiccup with the service of HPMC’s discovery responses and objections by counsel, although HPMC asserts that the responses were prepared, finalized, and believed to be served by counsel on the date they were due, they were apparently actually sent and received by Plaintiff’s counsel the following morning. As such, Defendant HPMC moves for an order granting relief pursuant to those sections as it argues the evidence demonstrates that this situation was due to a technical defect which far exceeds the threshold of “mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect” provided by the statutes.

B. Procedural¿¿¿

i. Motion to Compel Arbitration

On September 3, 2024, Moving Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration. On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On October 16, Defendants filed a reply brief.

ii. Motion to Compel Further Responses

On September 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Compel Further Responses. On October 10, 2024, HPMC filed an opposition brief. To date, no reply brief has been filed.

iii. Motion for Relief from Waiver

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On September 19, 2024, Defendant HPMC filed its Motion to Request Relief from Waiver with Respect to Objections Raised in Discovery. On September 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On October 16, Defendant filed a reply brief.

¿II. ANALYSIS¿¿

A. Motion to Compel Arbitration

i. Legal Standard

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) states that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-72.)

California law states that “[o]n petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….” (Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1281.2, generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2)¿the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting¿rulings on common issues.

When seeking to compel arbitration, the initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by preponderance of evidence. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.) It is sufficient for the moving party to produce a copy of the arbitration agreement or set forth the agreement’s provisions. (Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove by a preponderance of evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract or the arbitration clause. (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) Subsequently, the moving party must establish with the preponderance of admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. (Ibid.) The trial court then weighs all the evidence submitted and uses its discretion to make a final determination. (Ibid.) “California law, ‘like [federal law], reflects a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements and requires close judicial scrutiny of waiver claims.’” (Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 31.)

If the court orders arbitration, then the court shall stay the action until arbitration is completed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

ii. Discussion

Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff entered into a License Agreement concerning her season tickets at SoFi Stadium. Section 11 of the License Agreement contains an arbitration clause which states:

“11. CHOICE OF LAW; MANDATORY AND BINDING ARBITRATION; NO CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS OR ARBITRATIONS; LIMITATION ON TIME TO MAKE CLAIMS.

PLEASE READ THIS PROVISION CAREFULLY. THIS LICENSE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT ALL DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES WILL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION. LICENSEE IS THUS GIVING UP LICENSEE’S RIGHTS TO GO TO COURT TO ASSERT OR DEFEND ITS RIGHTS UNDER THIS LICENSE AGREEMENT (EXCEPT FOR MATTERS THAT MAY BE TAKEN TO SMALL CLAIMS COURT). THE PARTIES’ RIGHTS WILL BE DETERMINED BY A NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR AND NOT A JUDGE OR JURY. THE PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO A FAIR HEARING, BUT THE ARBITRATION PROCEDURES ARE SIMPLER AND MORE LIMITED THAN RULES APPLICABLE IN COURT. THE ARBITRATOR’S DECISIONS ARE AS ENFORCEABLE AS ANY COURT ORDER AND ARE SUBJECT TO VERY LIMITED REVIEW BY A COURT.

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b) Mandatory and Binding Arbitration. With respect to any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this License Agreement, no matter on what theory, including without limitation, contract, tort, statutory or regulatory, or common law, and including regarding the applicability or validity of this arbitration provision (collectively, “Claims”), the parties agree to negotiate in good faith to achieve a mutually satisfactory resolution. If the parties do not resolve any dispute by informal negotiation, any other effort to resolve the dispute will be conducted exclusively by binding arbitration as described in this Section 11; provided, however, that the parties have the right to litigate any Claim in small claims court, if all the requirements of the small claims court, including any limitations on jurisdiction and the amount at issue in the Claim, are satisfied. Licensee agrees to bring a Claim in small claims court only in Licensee’s county of residence or the County of Los Angeles, California. LICENSEE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT LICENSEE IS GIVING UP THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE (OR PARTICIPATE IN AS A PARTY OR CLASS MEMBER) ALL DISPUTES IN COURT BEFORE A JUDGE OR JURY, except as described in the foregoing sentence for Claims that may be litigated in small claims court. Instead, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, all Claims will be resolved before a neutral arbitrator, whose decision will be final except for a limited right of appeal under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. sections 1-9 (or any successor thereto). Any court with jurisdiction over the parties may enforce the arbitrator's award.

Except for Claims eligible to be heard in small claims court as described above, all Claims that cannot be settled through informal negotiation will be adjudicated exclusively through confidential binding arbitration in accordance with the then current Consumer Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”), or, in the event the AAA declines or is unable to administer the arbitration, by a nationally recognized arbitration forum reasonably selected by Fanfaire. AAA rules are available from the AAA, which can be contacted by mail at 725 South Figueroa, Suite 400, Los Angeles, California 90017, by telephone at (800) 778-7879, or through its website at www.adr.org. The arbitrator’s award shall be binding and may be entered as a judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction. Licensee agrees that the Stadium Company, Fanfaire or the Team Party may seek any interim or preliminary relief from a court of competent jurisdiction in Los Angeles County, California necessary to protect its rights or property pending the completion of arbitration.” (Id. at p. 21-22 (§ 11(b).)

(Exhibit 1 pg. 38-39)

In Plaintiff’s opposition brief, she argues that the License Agreement is for her season tickets to the Rams football team at Sofi Stadium, not for the injury she sustained at the stadium. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. Section 11, subsection (b) of the arbitration agreement states “Mandatory and Binding Arbitration. With respect to any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this License Agreement, no matter on what theory, including without limitation, contract, tort, statutory or regulatory, or common law, and including regarding the applicability or validity of this arbitration provision (collectively, “Claims”), the parties agree to negotiate in good faith to achieve a mutually satisfactory resolution.” Thus, the arbitration agreement does not only speak to Plaintiff’s season tickets, and instead, includes any theory of liability arising from her being a season ticket holder – including injuries she may suffer while using said season tickets.

However, Plaintiff also argues that this court should deny Moving Defendants’ motion because Plaintiff asserts that Defendants: (1) waived its right to arbitration through its voluntary participation in proceedings; (2) is attempting to enforce an alleged arbitration agreement despite the fact that it is not a signatory to that agreement; and (3) that the arbitration provision cannot be enforced.

1. Waiver

Plaintiff’s opposition asserts that Moving Defendants have waived their (what Plaintiff argues is non-existent) right to arbitration through its voluntary participation in these proceedings. Plaintiff argues that this is because Moving Defendants have filed their Answer without ever raising arbitration as an affirmative defense and engaging in merits discovery by serving Plaintiff with written discovery on February 26, 2024. Plaintiff relies on the factors set forth in St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187 (“St. Agnes”). The recent California Supreme Court decision in Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. noted that “[t]he United States Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411 (“Morgan”) rendered the St. Agnes framework inapplicable in cases governed by the FAA’s procedural rules.” (Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562 (“Quach”).) The Court in Morgan specifically rejected an arbitration-specific prejudice requirement, stating, “”the FAA’s ‘policy favoring arbitration’ does not authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules.” (Morgan, supra, 596 U.S. at 418.)

The California Supreme Court in Quach, after careful analysis of the CAA, found there was no basis for the arbitration-specific prejudice rule under California law. (Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at 576.) The Court also turned to the question of how to analyze a waiver issue without the St. Agnes prejudice requirement, finding “[i]n ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, a court should separately evaluate each generally applicable state contract law defense raised by the party opposing arbitration. It should not lump distinct legal defenses into a catch-all category called ‘waiver.’” (Id. at 583-84.) The Quach Court found that “[a]mong the factors we identified as relevant to a ‘waiver’ determination in St. Agnes are some that are relevant to other defenses, such as forfeiture, estoppel, laches or timeliness, but not to waiver. [Citation.]…[Citations.] Instead, a court should be careful to consider only those factors that are relevant to the specific state law defense the party resisting arbitration has raised.” (Id. at 584.)

As in Quach, the defense raised by Plaintiff in this case was waiver. (Ibid.) “The waiver inquiry is exclusively focused on the waiving party’s words or conduct; neither the effect of that conduct on the party seeking to avoid enforcement of the contractual right nor that party’s subjective evaluation of the waiving party’s intent is relevant. [Citations.] This distinguishes waiver from the related defense of estoppel, ‘which generally requires a showing that a party’s word or acts have induced detrimental reliance by the opposing party.’ [Citations.] To establish waiver, there is no requirement that the party opposing enforcement of the contractual right demonstrate prejudice or otherwise show harm resulting from the waiving party’s conduct.” (Id. at 585.)

The California Supreme Court in Quach found clear and convincing evidence of waiver. But the Coourt is inclined to continue the hearing ont eh arbitration motion because of the new matters raised for the first time in moving parties’ reply papers, so that Plaintiff can submit a sur-reply.

B. Motion to Compel Initial Responses

i. Legal Standard

A party must respond to interrogatories within 30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.260, subd. (a).) If a party to whom interrogatories are directed does not provide timely responses, the requesting party may move for an order compelling responses to the discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) The party also waives the right to make any objections, including one based on privilege or work-product protection. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) There is no time limit for a motion to compel responses to interrogatories other than the cut-off on hearing discovery motions 15 days before trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., 2030.290.) No meet and confer efforts are required before filing a motion to compel responses to the discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411 (“Sinaiko”).)

Further, where there has been no timely response to a Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010 demand, the demanding party must seek an order compelling a response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300.) Failure to timely respond waives all objections, including privilege and work product. Thus, unless the party to whom the demand was directed obtains relief from waiver, he or she cannot raise objections to the documents demanded. There is no deadline for a motion to compel responses. Likewise, for failure to respond, the moving party need not attempt to resolve the matter outside court before filing the motion. Where the motion seeks only a response to the inspection demand, no showing of "good cause" is required.

Under Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.280(c), the court shall make the order deeming the truth of the matters admitted unless the responding party serves before the hearing a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Code Civ. Proc § 2033.220. Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.220 requires that each answer either admits, denies or specifies that the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge. As stated in Demyer v. Costa Mesa Mobile Home Estates, the moving party is not required to meet and confer before bringing this action. (Demyer v. Costa Mesa Mobile Home Estates, 36 Cal.App.4th 393, 395.)¿¿ Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part, that the court may impose a monetary sanction on a party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. A misuse of the discovery process includes failing to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).)¿¿

ii. Discussion

Here, Plaintiff is seeking this court order HPMC’s objection-free responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, Requests for Production of Documents, Set One and Document Production, and to Deem Matters Admitted from Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission, Set One. HPMC does not disagree that it served untimely responses to Plaintiff’s propounded discovery as they have filed a premature Motion for Relief of Waiver. The court also notes that Plaintiff’s moving paper’s conclusion seeks an order compelling further responses, despite moving under statutes for initial responses, noticing and filing a motion for initial responses and to deem matters admitted, and including such a request in her introduction.

Regardless of the parties’ efforts to combine their arguments on original lack of any response with their arguments on the sufficiency of the belated responses (and the objections), and the asserted grounds for relief from waiver of the right to object, the constellation of arguments bearing on the July 18, 2024 written responses is premature. This is a motion to compel INITIAL, not FURTHER responses. The pending motions were filed after responses had already been served, after objections were asserted, and after additional meet-and-confer efforts to address the asserted inadequacy of the belated responses. There is no separate statement required for a motion to compel initial responses, but one is required for FURTHER responses, and one is not filed in the present case. The Code has different provisions for motions to compel further responses, for an order addressing objections, and for argument as to whether objections are deemed waived or whether relief from the deemed waiver should be afforded. Those latter issues are not properly before the Court at this time.

The Court determines that the motion to compel an initial response to the interrogatories, document demands, and motion to deem matters admitted is improperly filed after responses had already been served and is thus DENIED as being mooted by the belated service of the responses. A motion to compel further responses is the proper motion to have been filed. Further, the issue of waived objections or relief from any such waiver was presented by the notice of motion filed separately by HPMC and is discussed below, unless the parties can resolve those issues by meeting and conferring as to the same. The Court thus encourages the parties to stipulate to extend the time to bring a motion to compel FURTHER responses, to meet and confer on resolving the objections and claimed insufficient substantive responses, and to attempt to narrow the remaining issues if any requiring the court’s assistance in resolving.

iii. Sanctions

Sanctions are denied under the circumstances outlined above.

C. HPMC’s Motion for Relief

Although the Court encourages the parties to further meet and confer regarding the responses, the court notes that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, HPMC’s counsel has attested to his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and/or excusable neglect. As such, the Court is inclined to grant relief from waiver of objections.

III. CONCLUSION¿¿¿

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For the foregoing reasons, the hearing on Moving Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration is CONTINUED.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses and Deem Matters Admitted is DENIED.

HPMC’s Motion for Relief from Waiver is tentatively GRANTED.

HPMC shall give written notice unless waived.