Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV00403, Date: 2024-05-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24TRCV00403 Hearing Date: May 3, 2024 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling
HEARING DATE: May 3, 2024
CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV00403
CASE NAME: Tatiana McNeal; Yolanda Johnson v. Graceway, LLC, et al.
MOVING PARTY: (1) Defendants, Graceway, LLC
RESPONDING PARTY: (1) Plaintiffs, Tatiana McNeal and Yolanda Johnson
TRIAL DATE: Not Set.
MOTION: (1) Defendant’s Demurrer
Tentative Rulings: (1) Defendant’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part, with 30 days leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual
On February 5, 2024, Plaintiffs, Tatiana McNeal and Yolanda Johnson (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Graceway, LLC and DOES 1 through 20. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability/Tenantability; (3) Breach of Implied Warranty of Quiet Enjoyment; (4) Negligence; and (5) Nuisance.
Defendant, Graceway, LLC (“Defendant”) now files a demurrer to the Complaint.
B. Procedural
On March 26, 2024, Defendant filed a Demurrer. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief. On April 26, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief.
II. GROUNDS FOR MOTIONS
Defendant demurs to the Complaint on the grounds that it argues Plaintiff’s Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth causes of action are time-barred, duplicative, and/or uncertain.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
B. Discussion
Statute of Limitations Issue
As to each of the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth causes of action, Defendant argues that the causes of action are time-barred. For each cause of action at issue, the statute of limitations is two (2) years.
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged numerous dates of notification as to different issues allegedly present in their unit. In fact, regarding the mold growth, water leak, and heating outage, Plaintiff has pleaded notice of such issues as recently as February 1, 2023 to August 2023. Defendant correctly identifies allegations such as those in ¶ 48 where Plaintiffs allege “from March 2020 to present” ¶ 10 which alleges that “in or around March 2020, Plaintiffs began notifying Defendants of a putrid odor . . . .” The Opposition acknowledges that complaints reported early in the tenancy might be time-barred as to damages allegedly sustained outside the limitations period, but for purposes of the pleading stage they allege a continuous accrual theory. Under the continuous accrual doctrine, each breach of a recurring obligation is independently actionable. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192.) This doctrine provides that “a series of wrongs or injuries may be viewed as each triggering its own limitations period, such that a suit for relief may be partially time-barred as to older events but timely as to those within the applicable limitations period.” (Id.) If Plaintiff pleads and proves all the elements of a claim–wrongdoing, harm, and causation, each may be treated as an independently actionable wrong with its own time limit for recovery. This means some claimed damages may be outside of the statutory period but others may proceed past the demurrer stage. In contrast, the continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them. (Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 811–818.) Plaintiff argues the former doctrine, not the latter, on the facts of this case.
As pleaded, the Complaint alleges ongoing, repeated or continuous accrual such that the causes of action challenged on this Demurrer are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. At later stages in this case and trial Plaintiffs will likely be limited in the damages they can recover to only those falling within the limitations period for each cause of action, but at the pleading stage the claims pass muster as to this demurring ground. Thus, Defendant’s Statute of Limitations argument as to each of the four causes of action at issue in this Demurrer is overruled.
Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability/Tenantability
Defendant next argues that Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability/Tenantability fails. To establish a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs must establish (1) “the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability,” (2) “notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition,” (3) “the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and” (4) “resulting damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability/Tenantability claim fails as a matter of law because it is duplicative of Plaintiffs’ Breach of Contract claim. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ attempt to assert this cause of action under both contractual and tort theory should not be permitted.
This Court notes that the second cause of action is quite similar to that of the first cause of action for Breach of Contract. For example, Plaintiffs have alleged: “Each violations indicate Defendant failed to perform under the contract and substantially failed to comply with those applicable civil codes, building and safety codes, case law, and housing code standards that materially affected Plaintiffs’ welfare, and safety as well as their ability to quietly enjoy the Property, which they were promised contractually by Defendants.” (Complaint, ¶ 39.) However, this Court also notes that Plaintiffs have alleged: “…these violations were all material breaches of implied warranties of habitability and the lease agreement itself and rendered the property legally uninhabitable with a rental value of zero from at least March 2020 to present.” (Complaint, ¶ 41.) Thus, it does appear that Plaintiff has vaguely attempted to state causes of action for both contractual and implied breach of warranty of habitability. Are these duplicate theories of recovery or not?
There is “a common law implied warranty of habitability in residential leases in California....” (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 619.) There also is a statutory claim by residential tenants that a landlord breached its obligation under Civil Code section 1941 to keep residential property in “a condition fit for [human] occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof.” Of course, the same act may give rise to both causes of action, i.e., a breach of contract and a tort, such as where it is alleged that the defendant performed its contractual duty in a negligent manner. “When such a hybrid cause of action arises, the plaintiff may pursue both legal theories of recovery until an occasion for an election of remedies arises.” (Perry v. Robertson (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 333, 340.)
The remedies for a contractual breach and a tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability differ: the remedy for a contractual breach is simply the difference between actual rent and reasonable rent, while the remedy for a tortious breach can include damages for “annoyance or discomfort or for injury to [] personal property.” (Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at 1297-99.) The Court’s view is that because the implied warranty of habitability offers different damages, it is conceivable that lawsuit if properly pleaded could maintain such a cause of action separately form a breach of contract or breach of statutory duties cause of action. Here, however, there is sufficient vagueness and ambiguity as to the nature of the claim and the labels for the different causes of action that the Court will SUSTAIN the Demurrer on uncertainty grounds with 30 days leave to amend. In an amended pleading, Plaintiffs must ensure that each element to each separate cause of action is properly pleaded. For example, Plaintiffs’ general allegations and negligence cause of action include the assertion that notice was provided to the landlord, but this is notice is not pleaded under the second cause of action, nor is the element of reasonable time to correct the claimed defect. A more certain pleading would also specify what codes or what statutory requirements are alleged to have been violated, e.g., the failure to provide the specifically enumerated standard of Civil Code §1941.1(a)(3) to provide hot and cold running water.
Breach of Implied Warranty of Quiet Enjoyment
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s third cause of action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Quiet Enjoyment fails. The elements of a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment are: (1) a lease agreement between plaintiff and defendant; (2) absence of language contrary to the implied covenant that tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession; (3) act or omission of the landlord, or anyone claiming under the landlord, which “substantially interfere[s] with a tenant[’]s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy”; and (4) an applicable remedy. (See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588-591.)
Defendant makes the exact same arguments as above about this third cause of action. As to the duplication of the breach of contract cause of action, the Court notes, as it did above, that although the alleged misconduct appears to be the same, the legal theories are different. As such, this Court overrules the Demurrer based on this argument.
Defendant also argues that this cause of action, as pleaded, is uncertain. Defendant bases this argument on the fact that Plaintiffs have plead allegation such as: “obligations under the case laws and codes of Los Angeles, and the State of California,” and “unfit for human occupation in that it substantially failed to comply with those applicable codes, building and safety codes, case law, and housing code standards.” This Court notes that to sustain a demurrer on the basis of uncertainty, a Defendant would not be able to gather what is being alleged against them on the face of the pleadings. Here, the general allegations section for the Complaint, which has been incorporated into the third cause of action by reference, only amorphously mentions the civil codes and health and safety codes. Thus, the Court does agree that a more certain pleading would be required to specify what codes or what statutory requirements are alleged to have been violated, or what other factual grounds or basis exists for the trier of fact to finds that the Plaintiffs’ quiet enjoyment of the rental premises has been breached. Thus, this Court SUSTAINS demurrer with thirty (30) days leave to amend.
Negligence
In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Here, however, Defendant does not demur as to insufficient allegations. Instead, Defendant merely argues that Plaintiff’s cause of action is time-barred. As noted above, this Court disagrees. Thus Demurrer is OVERRULED as to this cause of action.
Nuisance
The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not identified whether this is a cause of action for private nuisance or public nuisance or both. However, nothing in Plaintiffs’ Complaint appears to be making a cause of action for public nuisance. Instead, Plaintiffs assert that: (1) Each condition which was allowed to exist on the property was an obstruction to the free use of the Property and interfered with the comfortable enjoyment of life and or property (Compliant, ¶ 67); and (2) that the conditions and failure to cure them substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of the property (Complaint, ¶ 68). However, as to the element of unreasonableness, as noted above, the unreasonableness of the interference must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment. (Mendez, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at 262-263.) However, Plaintiffs allege that they suffered unreasonable annoyance over the course of their tenancy. An unreasonable annoyance is an insufficient allegations. Why did the litany of alleged issues in the apartment become a nuisance? How long did it or they occur? How was their use and enjoyment disturbed? Did they have to move out because of the mold? Were workers consistently in and out of the apartment? Did they get sick whenever being inside for a certain amount of hours? More information will be needed to sufficiently plead this cause of action.
As such, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to this cause of action with thirty (30) days leave to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part
Defendant is ordered to give notice.