I. BACKGROUND

 

A. Factual

 

On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff, Furqan Ali (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, American Honda Motor Co., Inc., and DOES 1 through 10. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging causes of action (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3); and (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 1794, 1795.5).  

 

Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“AHM”) now files a demurrer to the FAC.  

 

B. Procedural

On May 23, 2024, AHM filed its Demurrer. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On July 9, 2024, AHM filed a reply brief.  

 

II. ANALYSIS   

 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿¿ 

A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

 

 

Preliminarily, this Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition brief does not argue against AHM’s contention that the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts for each cause of action, but only addresses the statute of limitations issue.  

 

 

The declaration of Leanna L. H. Vault, Esq., is offered in support of counsel’s compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Vault declares that on May 9, 2024, she met and conferred telephonically with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the demurrer. However, Vault contends that the parties’ respective counsels were unable to come to an agreement regarding the grounds for which AHM brings this demurrer. (Declaration of Leanna L. H. Vault (“Vault Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-3.) Thus, this Court finds that the meet and confer requirements have been met.  

 

 

AHM first argues that each of Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims are time barred.  The statute of limitations for breach of implied warranty of merchantability is four years. (CCP § 337, Comm. Code § 2725, Montoya v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 493, 495; Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc.¿(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306.) “A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.” (Comm. Code § 2725(b).)  While the Song-Beverly Act supplements rather than supersedes the provisions of the UCC, the same four-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under either statute.   (Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3rd 205, 213-24.)  The discovery rule of Section 2725(2) also applies to claims under the SBA, such that a cause of action accrues not on the date of sale, but rather when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that the warrantor or its authorized repair facility was unable to fix the warranty-covered defects after a reasonable number of attempts.  (Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3rd at p. 218.) 

 

Plaintiff alleges that he purchased the 2017 Honda Pilot on December 1, 2018. Plaintiff did not file his complaint until February 29, 2024, and did not file this FAC until April 22, 2024. As such, AHM argues that on its face, all four causes of action are time-barred.¿The FAC attaches the Honda warranty, which includes a 5-year, 60,000-mile warranty on the powertrain, which per page 10 of the warranty booklet includes the engine and internal parts of the transmission.  The FAC alleges one specific repair history event in paragraph 22, which mentions powertrain concerns at 47,025 miles.  This event was alleged to have occurred within four years and one month after sale and is within the four years before the lawsuit was filed.  

 

In opposition to the demurrer, Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations does not begin to run from the date of the sale of the subject vehicle, but instead, is tolled. California’s discovery rule delays the start of the statute of limitations accrual period until the plaintiff discovers, or is on inquiry notice (i.e., has reason to discover) facts supporting a cause of action. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.)¿¿“The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have “ ‘ “information of circumstances to put [them] on inquiry ” ’ ” or if they have “ ‘ “the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation.” (Id. at 808; fn. 2 provides: “At common law, the term “injury,” as used in determining the date of accrual of a cause of action, “means both ‘a person's physical condition and its “negligent cause.” ’ ” ”(emphasis in original).)¿¿The discovery rule applies to Lemon Law claims.  (Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3rd at p. 218.) 

“In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’ ” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 808, citing (McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 (superseded on limited grounds by Code Civ. Proc. § 340.8(c))(emphasis in original).)¿¿“When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a case of action or application of the delayed discovery rule is generally a question of fact, properly decided as a matter of law only if the evidence (or, in this case, the allegations in the complaint and facts properly subject to judicial notice) can support only one reasonable conclusion.” (Broberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 912, 921.)¿¿ 

 

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that on January 9, 2023, with approximately 47,025 miles on the odometer, Plaintiff presented the subject vehicle to Defendant’s authorized repair facility with various concerns, including, electrical, engine, and/or transmission. (FAC, ¶ 22.) Plaintiff asserts that the electrical concerns include but are not limited to: the center display screen going blank and the navigation screen showing incorrect streets, and the rear entertainment system does not show on the screen. (FAC, ¶ 22.) Further, Plaintiff contends that the engine and/or transmission concerns include, but are not limited to, the Subject Vehicle shaking, and multiple warning lights simultaneously turning on when starting the vehicle in the morning. (FAC, ¶ 22.) Plaintiff further contends that he continued to experience symptoms of the defects despite Defendant’s representation that the various defects were repaired. (FAC, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that he had no way of uncovering Defendant’s claimed deception with respect to the defects, given that Defendant performed various diagnostics and/or undertook repairs before asserting that nothing was wrong with the subject vehicle or that the vehicle had been repaired. (FAC, ¶ 26.)  

 

Defendant argues that the alleged Song-Beverly causes of action occurred at the time of the sale of the Subject Vehicle, on or about December 1, 2018, and that Plaintiffs did not file this action until February 29, 2024. Defendant’s argument ignores the discovery rule, the allegations of a powertrain complaint within the first 5 years and 60,000 miles after sale, and the conclusionary allegation that Plaintiffs did not discover Defendant’s wrongful conduct until “shortly before filing this Complaint  . . . .”   Plaintiff included vague and conclusionary statements in his FAC that the discovery rule, Class Action Tolling, and the Repair Doctrine delayed the accrual of their Song-Beverly causes of action. The Class Action tolling allegations in paragraph 27 contend that the filing of Conti v. American Honda, Case No. 2:19-cv-2160 on March 22, 2019 tolled the statute of limitations here.  However, the FAC contains absolutely no details whatsoever as to whether a class was or was not certified, what type of class action was alleged there, as to what claimed defect or defect, and how that other lawsuit’s pendency bears on the allegations in this case.  The Court thus does not base its tentative ruling on the threadbare assertion of the words “class action tolling” without any specific factual allegations to support that assertion such as when the purported class certification was denied which would of course end the claimed tolling period.  However, Plaintiff has provided at least some factual allegations as to the discovery rule and repair doctrine, as discussed below.  

 

The FAC alleges that AHM’s Song-Beverly violations occurred, not only at the time of the sale, but also AHM’s violations continued as Plaintiff continued to experience symptoms of the defects despite Defendants’ representations that the various defects were repaired. (FAC, ¶¶ 22, 34, 40.) Plaintiff further alleges that he discovered Defendant’s wrongful conduct alleged in the FAC shortly before filing the Complaint in February of 2024, as the subject vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following AHM’s unsuccessful attempts to repair them. (FAC, ¶ 29.)   But the FAC lacks details as to what happened between January 9, 2023 when Plaintiff presented the subject vehicle for a powertrain complaint and the filing of suit over a year later.  For example, the FAC lacks any allegation as to what it was that occurred “shortly before” suit was filed that caused Plaintiff to discovery AHM’s alleged wrongful conduct.  The FAC fails to allege the date and circumstances of the claimed belated discovery.  The FAC fails to address whether the same alleged defect or symptom reappeared on a particular date or whether that was or was not brought to AHM’s or its dealers’ attention.  Instead, paragraph 25 vaguely alleges that Plaintiff “continued to experience symptoms of the defects.” Although the only specific date of defect alleged falls within the four (4) year statute of limitation from when the original complaint was filed, this Court notes that at least for the repair doctrine, Plaintiff may need to include more specific facts of the claimed ongoing defect.  

 

 

AHM also argues that Plaintiff’s causes of action are not alleged sufficiently.  Plaintiff alleges basic facts bearing on the core Lemon Law duty that if a manufacturer or representative does not service or repair the vehicle to conform with the express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer or representative must replace the vehicle or reimburse the buyer.¿ (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (d).)¿ 

 

Here, the FAC alleges that the subject vehicle suffered transmission defects and engine defects that were unable to be conformed by AHM or its representatives, but that despite this, AHM failed to replace the vehicle or reimburse Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶¶ 22-27.)   

 

AHM argues that the allegations are pleaded in a conclusory way. The Court agrees. The FAC is barely one step removed from a lawsuit that merely recites the elements of a cause of action by quoting CACI. The Court finds that Plaintiff is required to include a greater factual development of what occurred in the subject vehicle’s repair history to support the four causes of action that are pleaded in a vague and conclusionary way. Further, because the Court will be requiring Plaintiff to amend his pleading because of the vague and conclusory allegations in its four causes of action, the Court encourages Plaintiff to plead the tolling allegations with greater specificity as well, as indicated in the Court’s above analysis, and to plead if truthful more than the single presentation mentioned in the Complaint because the core refund-or-replace contention requires more than a single presentation.  (Silvio v. Ford Motor Co. (2003) 109 CA4th 1205, 1208.) 

 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, AHM’s demurrer is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend.   

 AHM is ordered to give notice of the ruling unless notice is waived.