Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 24TRCV01108, Date: 2024-08-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV01108, Date: 2024-08-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24TRCV01108 Hearing Date: August 28, 2024 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿

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HEARING DATE: August 28, 2024

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CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV01108

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CASE NAME: Rosario Marcela Rivera Santos v. General Motors LLC, et al.

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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Rosario Marcela Rivera Santos

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, General Motors, LLC

TRIAL DATE: Not Set.

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MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One.

Tentative Rulings: (1) CONTINUED to September 14, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. and with each side to provide a status report by September 12 as to (a) the remaining RFPs at issue after GM’s belated production of at least some responsive documents, and (b) the parties’ positions given the Court’s indication of the scope of its typical rulings on discovery of other customers’ complaints and of technical literature in a Lemon Law case

I. BACKGROUND¿¿

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A. Factual¿¿

On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff, Rosario Marcela Rivera Santos (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant General Motors (“GM”) and DOES 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act § 1793.2.

On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff propounded Request for Production of Documents, Set One, on Defendant seeking documents bearing on several categories, including: (1) Plaintiff’s own vehicle; (2) Defendant’s warranty and replacement/repurchase policies, procedures, and practices; and (3) Defendant’s knowledge of the same or similar defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. The moving papers assert that on June 6, 2024, Defendant GM responded with some substantive responses but also asserting boilerplate objections that are not code-compliant. Plaintiff also notes that Defendant GM did not provide verifications in support of its responses until June 12, 2024. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant nevertheless failed to produce many of the responsive documents requested with its written responses. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has failed to produce the entirety of the emails, memoranda, data or investigations that could help Plaintiff establish Defendant’s knowledge of the same or similar defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model. Plaintiff argues that this evidence would establish Defendant GM’s knowledge and inability to repair the defects.

As such, Plaintiff has brought this Motion to Compel Further responses to the propounded Requests for Production of Documents, Set One.

B. Procedural¿¿

On July 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed this Motion to Compel Further Responses. On August 15, 2024, Defendant GM filed an opposition brief. On August 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) For discovery purposes, information is regarded as relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 288.)

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFP”) may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) ¿

"The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of burden require the objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding party's subjective intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort it would take to respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) However, no such evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad on its face. (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.

B. Discussion

Meet and Confer Efforts

In the declaration of Gregory Sogoyan, Esq.’s (“Sogoyan Decl.”), counsel for Plaintiff, declaration, he notes that on June 14, 2024, he sent Defense counsel a letter attempting to meet and confer in good faith regarding Defendant’s deficient responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶ 19, Exhibit 5.) Sogoyan contends that the letter detailed the deficiencies that existed in Defendant GM’s discovery responses and provided supporting authority for the supplemental discovery responses and the document production sought. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶ 19.) More specifically, Sogoyan notes that he explained the importance of the document production requested and that good cause existed for the production. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶ 19.)

Sogoyan contends that on June 25, 2024, after receiving no response from Defendant GM, he sent a further meet and confer letter to address Defendant GM’s responses and objections. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶ 20.) Plaintiff contends that the letter also addressed Defendant GM’s claim that the documents sought are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and detailed that the documents sought are both relevant and probative. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶ 20.) As of the date of the filing of this motion and Sogoyan’s declaration, Sogoyan notes that Defendant failed to respond despite Plaintiff’s two meet and confer attempts. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶ 24.)

In GM’s opposition brief, it argues that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith prior to bringing this motion. GM contends that Plaintiff’s letter, without providing substantive reasoning or analysis, declared GM’s objections waived, and demanded that GM produce all manner of documents without objections. However, this Court notes that GM’s opposition admits to not attempting to meet and confer with Sogoyan until after the filing of this motion. The Court finds Defendant GM’s argument that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith to lack merit. Per GM’s own opposition brief, it did not attempt to meet and confer with Plaintiff until after the filing of this motion.

Requests for Production of Documents

Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court compelling GM’s further responses to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 1-31.

The Court orders the parties to further meet and confer regarding this discovery motion. This Court notes that GM has asserted that it has already produced all available documents that specifically relate to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Terrain and that are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims in this matter. Plaintiff does not address this portion of the opposition, or why this production is insufficient. By the same token, it appears that GM has not made any production as to the RFPs seeking other customers’ complaints, GM’s knowledge of the alleged defects, whether GM concedes that Plaintiff’s vehicle contained defects covered by the warranty, and many other matters. As such, this Court CONTINUES the hearing on this motion to September 14, 2024 and seeks a status report from each side on or before September 12, 2024 to clarify which RFPs remain in dispute now that GM has already produced some, a status report required in part because of Defendant’s failure to meet and confer with Plaintiff before Plaintiff filed this motion.

For purposes of enabling counsel to prepare for both their meet and confer and the parties’ oral argument, the Court sets forth below some basic parameters for what it typically orders with respect to certain of the discovery requests embraced by this motion. The Court typically orders and limits production of documents including ESI in a Song-Beverly single-vehicle case as follows:

1. Purchase and/or lease contract concerning the subject vehicle must be produced.

2. Repair orders and invoices concerning the subject vehicle must be produced, including the “accounting” copies showing the hours and dates of activity by dealer personnel.

3. Communications between the plaintiff and the warrantor/manufacturer and/or its servicing dealers, and communications between Plaintiff and the manufacturer’s factory representative and/or call center concerning the subject vehicle.

4. Warranty claims submitted to and/or approved by Defendant concerning the subject vehicle.

5. The applicable Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual published by defendant and provided to its authorized repair facilities, within the State of California, for the year the lawsuit was filed. If a separate written policy, procedure, or manual exists regarding repurchases or buy backs appliable to vehicles sold or leased in California, that would also be required to be produced for the year the lawsuit was filed and/or the year Plaintiff contends the vehicle became qualified for repurchase (such as upon satisfaction of the Presentation Element of a Song-Beverly cause of action under Section 1793.2(d)(2) or 1793.22). Such documents would be produced subject to a protective order.

6. Any internal analysis and/or investigation regarding the primary or other recurring alleged defects claimed by plaintiff in her/his vehicle, applicable to the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle. The Court tends to focus on the claimed symptom experienced by the plaintiff as described in the dealers’ repair records, rather than a broad and vague characterization of the claimed defect as described by counsel in the litigation. For example, if the customer experienced a black Infotainment screen when shifting in reverse, or a harsh engagement or clunk of the transmission when accelerating from 2nd to 3rd gear, those symptoms rather than any other nature of malfunction of the Infotainment system or transmission would be the narrowing of scope of such internal analysis or investigation to be produced.

7. Other customers’ complaints similar to the alleged defects claimed by plaintiff, limited to vehicles purchased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle. The other customer complaints again would be limited in scope to the description of the symptom as shown on the dealer repair records. The Court typically discusses with counsel the type of documents that may be required and the format for a production of documents such as in a sortable Excel spreadsheet that lists a compilation or summary of voluminous documents.

8. Technical Service Bulletins and/or Recall Notices for vehicles purchased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle, whether mentioned in the repair history of the subject vehicle or not, that bear on the claimed symptoms experienced by the plaintiff as described in the dealers’ repair records rather than on broad characterizations such as “engine defect” or “transmission defect.”

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court CONTINUES Plaintiff’s motion to September 14, 2024.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice.