Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV01193, Date: 2024-06-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24TRCV01193 Hearing Date: June 25, 2024 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿
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HEARING DATE: June 25, 2024¿¿
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CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV01193
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CASE NAME: Christopher S.
Johnson Sr. V. Ford Motor Company, et al.
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MOVING PARTY: (1) Defendant, Ford Motor Company
(2) AutoNation Ford Torrance
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RESPONDING PARTY: (1) Plaintiff,
Christopher S. Johnson Sr.
(2) Plaintiff, Christopher S. Johnson Sr.
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TRIAL DATE: None set.
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MOTION:¿ (1) Ford Motor Company’s Demurrer¿
(2)
AutoNation’s Demurrer
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Tentative Rulings: (1) Ford Motor Company’s Demurrer¿ is OVERRULED as to the “new motor vehicle”
argument and SUSTAINED as to the fraudulent concealment claim.
(2)
AutoNation’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED.
(3)
The Court will discuss at oral argument whether Plaintiff believes leave to
amend could cure the deficiencies identified in this Tentative Ruling¿¿
I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
On April 8, 2024,
Plaintiff, Christopher S. Johnson Sr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against
Defendants, Ford Motor Company, AutoNation Ford Torrance, and DOES 1 through
10. The complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Violation of Civil Code §
1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code
§ 1793.2(a)(3); (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability – Civil
Code § 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5; (5) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment; and
(6) Negligent Repair.
Both Defendant Ford Motor
Company (“Ford”) and Defendant AutoNation have filed separate demurrers to
Plaintiff’s complaint.
B. Procedural¿¿
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On May 10, 2024, Ford Motor Company filed a Demurrer. On
June 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On June 17, 2024, Ford
filed a reply brief.
On May 10, 2024, AutoNation Ford Superstore also filed a
Demurrer. On June 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On June 17,
2024, AutoNation filed a reply brief.
II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
With Plaintiff’s opposition brief to Ford’s demurrer,
Plaintiff requested this Court take judicial notice of the following:
1.
Brandi Stiles et al. v. Kia Motors America,
Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 913, as modified May 23, 2024, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. This recent opinion from
the Second District Court of Appeal, Div. Six, squarely rejected the holding in
Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC, upon which Defendant Ford relies. Stiles involved a pleading
attack based on the idea that a 2011 car sold in 2013 is not covered by the
Song-Beverly Act’s repurchase-or-replace provision covering “other motor
vehicle[s] sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” (Civ. Code, § 1793.22,
subd. (e)(2)) and that the plaintiff needed to plead that the vehicle was
issued a “new or full” warranty with the sale.
The Court GRANTS this request
and takes judicial notice of the above.
III. ANALYSIS¿
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A.
Ford’s
Demurrer
Legal Standard
A demurrer can be used only
to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or
from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint
need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary
fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of
testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth
of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿
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A pleading is uncertain
if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may
lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so
confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams
v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)
However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a
complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified
under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿
Discussion
Ford demurs to
Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that it argues Plaintiff’s first cause of
action for Breach of Express Warranty, second cause of action for Breach of
Express Warranty – Civil Code section 1793.2(B), third cause of action for
Breach of Express Warranty – Civil Code section 1793.2(A)(3), fourth cause of
action for Breach of Implied Warranty, and fifth cause of action for Fraudulent
Inducement – Concealment each fail to allege sufficient facts to state causes
of action against Ford.
First through Fourth Breach of Warranty Causes of Action - Violation
of Civil Code § 1793.2(d), Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b), Violation of
Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3), and Breach of the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability – Civil Code § 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5
First, Ford demurs to the first through fourth causes of
action on the grounds that Ford argues they are barred as matters of law
because the subject vehicle was used rather than a “new” motor vehicle. Specifically,
Ford argues that these causes of action fail because Plaintiff fails to allege
facts demonstrating he purchased a “new motor vehicle” with a “new car
warranty” within the meaning of Song-Beverly. Defendant relies on Rodriguez
v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209 (“Rodriguez”). This Court
notes that the California Supreme Court has granted review of Rodreguiz,
and thus its holding is not binding, but may be persuasive in making its
decision below. In Rodreguez, the Second District held that “a used car
purchased from a retail seller unaffiliated with the manufacturer” with “some
balance remaining on the manufacturer’s
warranty” did not constitute a “new motor vehicle” because the phrase “’other
motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’… refers to vehicles
that have never been previously sold to a consumer and come with full express
warranties.” (Rodriguez, 77 Cal.App.5th at 223.) The court in Rodriguez
distinguished Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 112 (Jensen) (the
case relied upon by Plaintiff, and discussed below), because “it involved a
lease by a manufacturer-affiliated dealer who issued a full new car warranty
along with the lease,” thus, “the [Jensen] court was not asked to decide
whether a used car with an unexpired warranty sold by a third-party reseller
qualifies as a ‘new motor vehicle’.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff further distinguishes Rodriguez by citing
the recently decided case of Stiles v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 913. In Stiles, the Second District Court of Appeal held:
“We cannot argue with the Rodriguez
court’s conclusion that the phrase “or other motor vehicle sold with a
manufacturer’s new car warranty” appears under the definition of a new motor
vehicle. (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).) That is why we conclude Stiles’s car, in
precisely meeting the definition as a “motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s
new car warranty,” is a new motor vehicle as defined by the statute. More
importantly, the Rodriguez court adds words to the statute. The statute
contains no such limitation as vehicles that have never been previously sold to
a consumer and come with full express warranties. Section 1793.22, subdivision
(e)(2) was enacted in 1992. (Stats. 1992, ch. 1232, § 7.) In the more than 30
years since then, the Legislature has had ample opportunity to add such
limiting language. It has not done so. It would be more than presumptuous for
us to add what the Legislature has not. The court’s assertion that section
1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) has only two categories – dealer-owned and demonstrator
– defies the rules of English grammar and logic.”
(Stiles,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 913.)
This Court finds that pursuant to both Jensen and
now Stiles, used cars purchased from a retail seller with a balance of
the manufacturer’s warranty are “new motor vehicles” within the meaning of the
Song-Beverly Act. In the present cause, Plaintiff has alleged that he purchased
a used 2020 Ford F150, which included the manufacturer’s bumper-bumper
warranty, powertrain warranty, emission warranty, etc. (Complaint, ¶¶ 7-8.) As
the Second District decided in Stiles, “a previously owned motor vehicle
purchased with the manufacturer’s new car warranty still in effect is a ‘new
motor vehicle’ as defined by section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2). Thus, the
replace or refund remedy of section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) applies.” (Stiles,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 913.) The
Legislature has had over a quarter century to amend Song-Beverly in a way that
would effectively overrule Jensen but has not done so. This Court finds Jensen and Stiles
to be the more persuasive readings of legislative intent. As such, this Court OVERRULES the demurrer as
to the Song-Beverly causes of action.
Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment
Next, Ford argues that Plaintiff’s
fifth cause of action for fraud fails to state sufficient facts to state a
cause of action against it.
Economic
Loss Rule
First, Ford argues that Plaintiff’s
fraud cause of action is barred by the economic loss rule. The economic loss
rules provides: “[w]here a purchaser’s expectations in a sale are frustrated
because the product bought is not working properly, his remedy is in contract
alone, for he has suffered only ‘economic losses.’” (Robinson Helicopter
Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988.) “The doctrine hinges on a distinction drawn
between transactions involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where
economic expectations are protected by commercial and contract law, and those
involving the sale of defective products to individual consumers who are
injured in a manner which has traditionally been remedied by resort to the law
of torts.” (Id.) Simply stated, the economic loss rule “prevents the law
of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other.” (Id.)
“The restrictions on contract remedies
serve purposes not found in tort law—they protect the parties’ freedom to
bargain over special risks and they promote contract formation by limiting
liability to the value of the promise.” (Harris v. Atlantic Richfield
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 70, 77.) This encourages efficient breaches, resulting in
increased production of goods and services at a lower cost to society. (Id.)
Because of these overriding policy considerations, the California Supreme Court
has proceeded with caution in carving out exceptions to the traditional
contract remedy restrictions. (Id.)
The most widely recognized exception is
when defendant’s conduct constitutes a tort as well as a breach of contract. (Harris,
14 Cal.App.4th at p. 78.) When one party commits fraud during the contract
formation or performance, the injured party may recover in both contract and
tort. (Id.) Should Plaintiff adequately allege the elements of fraud,
his claim shall survive the economic loss rule. Allowing Plaintiff’s fraud
cause of action to survive furthers, rather than undermines, the public policy
of allowing parties to freely bargain over special risks because parties who
are deprived of material facts governing their decision to enter into a
contract do not “freely” enter into such contract.
In Dhital v. Nissan
North America, Inc., the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff’s claim
for fraudulent inducement (concealment) was not barred by the economic loss
rule (Id. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 837.) Like the instant case, the
Dhital plaintiffs alleged that “Nissan, by intentionally concealing facts about
the defective transmission, fraudulently induced them to purchase a car.” (Id.
at 838.). The Court of Appeal ruled that “Robinson did not hold that any claims
for fraudulent inducement are barred by the economic loss rule. Quite the
contrary, the Robinson court affirmed that tort damages are available in
contract cases where the contract was fraudulently induced.” (Id. at
839.) “[A] defendant’s conduct in fraudulently inducing someone to enter a
contract is separate from the defendant’s later breach of the contract or
warranty provisions that were agreed to.” (Id.)
Here, Plaintiff’s claim
is based upon Defendant’s alleged presale concealment, which is distinct from
Defendant’s alleged subsequent breach of its warranty obligations. Accordingly,
based on the existing persuasive authority— Dhital, the Court finds that
the economic loss rule does not bar Plaintiff’s claim. This court is aware that
this very issue is pending before the Supreme Court in Rattagan v. Uber
Tech., Inc. (Case No. S272113) and in Kia v. Super. Ct. (Case No.
S273170). Until the Supreme Court states otherwise, this court will follow Dhital
for its “potentially persuasive value” (CRC Rule 8.1115(e)(1)) and finds that
Plaintiff’s claim is not barred by the Economic Loss Rule.
Specificity
Requirement
Next,
Ford also argues Plaintiff’s fraud claim fails as a matter of law
because it is not pleaded with the requisite specificity. The elements of a
cause of action for fraudulent concealment are: (1) concealment of a material
fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose; (3) the defendant intended to
defraud by failing to disclose; (4) plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would
not have acted as it did had it known the fact; and (5) damages.” (Butler
America, LLC v. Aviation Assurance Company, LLC (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 136,
144.) The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and
specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of “liberal
construction” of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12
Cal.4th 631, 645.) To properly allege fraud against a corporation, the
plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons allegedly making the false
representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said
or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)
Here, Ford
argues that the fraud claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff did not
plead it with the requisite specificity. Ford asserts that Plaintiff needs to
allege: (1) the specificity of the defect Ford allegedly concealed; (2) Ford’s
duty to disclose; (3) that Ford and Plaintiff has a transactional relationship;
(4) that Ford had exclusive knowledge; (5) that Ford engaged in active
concealment; and/or (6) that Ford made partial representations while
suppressing material facts. As far as Ford’s argument that Plaintiff’s
complaint lacks specificity, the Court disagrees. In fact, the allegations in
Plaintiff’s complaint are exceptionally detailed. Although it is true that the Complaint
fails to allege the names of the persons who concealed facts or who knew of a
transmission flaw, details of that nature are required in affirmative
misrepresentation cases, not concealment cases.
This Court
finds that such specificity meets the requisite pleading standard for
fraudulent concealment. However, with fraudulent concealment, California law, a
duty to disclose material facts may arise (1) when the defendant is in a
fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant has exclusive
knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant
actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; or (4) when the defendant
makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. (Falk
v. General Motors Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2007) 496 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1098-1099
citing LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326.) The Opposition alleges that the complaint
contains allegations supporting that the transmission defect was a material
fact, that it poses safety risks, and that it arose during the warranty
period.
Transactional
Relationship
Ford argues that Plaintiff’s fraud claim
fails because Plaintiff does not allege a transactional relationship between Ford
and Plaintiff, or other circumstances giving rise to a duty to disclose. Here,
Plaintiff does not allege a transactional relationship existed between the
parties, but instead, relies on the argument that a transactional relationship
is not required under Dhital. Instead, Plaintiff contends that a
transactional relationship is not required for Ford to have a duty to disclose.
The Court notes that the Complaint does allege that from at least March 2,
2018, Ford issued many TSBs and service bulletin updates to its dealers in the
United States, but not to its customers, acknowledging problems of harsh
shifting, jerking, clunking, and delays in acceleration or deceleration
releasing to the 8-speed transmission.
Although a transactional relationship has not been
alleged or argued, Plaintiff does argue that the transmission defect is a
material one, poses safety risks, and that the transmission defect arose during
the warranty period. However, the other requirements besides transactional
relationship are exclusive knowledge of a material fact, active concealment of
a material fact, or partial representation but suppression of material fact.
The Complaint alleges that Ford had exclusive and/or superior knowledge. (Complaint,
¶¶ 39-50.) The Complaint also alleges that Ford’s concealment of this safety
defect was material and that a reasonable person would have considered them to
be important in deciding whether or not to purchase the Subject Vehicle.
(Complaint, ¶¶ 76, 80.) The Complaint
also contends that Ford knowingly and intentionally concealed material facts
and breached its duty not to do so. (Complaint, ¶ 79.)
Until 2022, when Dhital was
decided, the California Supreme Court and the state Courts of Appeal had not
published any decisions on the economic loss doctrine in a SBA case, but a
number of federal district court decisions have. Further, the California
Supreme Court has granted review of the decision in Dhital, suggesting
that the SCOC will not be completely affirming that decision. A recent Central
District of California decision cast doubt on the vitality of Dhital’s
determination that the allegations in that case were sufficient to state a
cause of action. The court in Antonov v. General Motors LLC (C.D. Cal.,
Jan. 19, 2024, No. 823CV01593FWSMJR) 2024 WL 217825, at *11 noted that “in Dhital
the California Court of Appeal conducted limited substantive analysis of the
plaintiffs' transactional relationship allegations due to the defendant's
failure to fully brief the argument.” Antonov found Dhital's
“cursory analysis” of the direct transactional relationship issue was
unconvincing, given the Second District’s failure to even cite to Bigler-Engler
or other California precedent governing transactional relationships, and given
the Second District’s failure to address the numerous cases holding that
automobile dealerships are not the agents of manufacturers. (Id; Condrashoff
v. General Motors LLC (E.D. Cal., May 23, 2024, No. 2:24-CV-00108-DAD-DB)
2024 WL 2399645, at *5; Kuehl v. General Motors LLC (C.D. Cal., Nov. 17,
2023, No. 2:23-CV-06980-SB-SK) 2023 WL 8353784, at *3.)
This Court finds the Antonov
decision more persuasive than Dhital on this point. This Court finds
that the fact that a manufacturer publicly makes available a host of TSBs
bearing on an allegedly concealed defect – through its mandated sharing of TSBs
with the NHTSA and the NHTSA’s posting of all TSBs on its website – defeats an
allegation that the same manufacturer concealed the existence of such defects in
prior or current models of its vehicle. As a matter of public policy, best
decided by the Legislature rather than the courts, a manufacturer as a matter
of law cannot be liable for fraud due to facts it is alleged to have concealed
when the same pleading alleges that it publicized those facts. A manufacturer
should not be subject to punitive damages claims merely because it has received
customer complaints about abrupt, harsh, flaired, or delayed transmission
shifts but does not disclose those prior customer complaints at the point of
sale, in the absence of allegations of bodily injury or property damage caused
by such allegedly defective transmission functions.
Plaintiff has not alleged or argued any
grounds for asserting a general duty by a motor vehicle manufacturer to
disclose to a consumer that it has had warranty complaints or reports of
malfunctions or that a component or system in a prior version of a transmission
has been the subject of repair recommendations or procedures. The creation of such a duty seems better left
to the policy-making branches of government rather than the judiciary. Such a
duty seems to implicate balancing the burden that would be placed on
manufacturers of such a broad duty against the perceived value that disclosures
of such a wide array of information might yield for consumers. The law already
recognizes a duty to recall or retrofit (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Badger
Construction Equipment Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1791, 1827; Lunghi v.
Clark Equipment Co. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 485, 494), but such a cause of
action requires harm in the form of personal injury rather than the economic
losses alleged in the complaint here.
Thus, this Court’s tentative ruling is to
SUSTAIN the demurrer as to the fraudulent concealment cause of action.
B.
AutoNation’s
Demurrer
AutoNation demurs to
Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for Negligent Repair on the grounds it argues
that it fails to state sufficient facts to allege a cause of action for
negligent repair and is barred by the economic loss rule.
Negligent Repair
Economic Loss Rule
AutoNation
argues that Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for Negligent Repair against it
fails because it is barred by the economic loss rule. Under the economic loss rule, a plaintiff
is precluded from recovery in tort where her damages consist solely of an
economic loss. (Seely v. White Motor Co. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 9, 17-18
(Seely).) “California Courts
define economic loss as ‘damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and
replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits—without any
claim of personal injury or damages to other property.’” (Department
of Water & Power v. ABB Power T & D Co. (C.D.Cal. 1995) 902 F.Supp.
1178, 1186, fn. 4.) The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to
recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations
unless he can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual
promise. (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34
Cal.4th 979, 988, 993 (Robinson) (economic loss rule prevents law of
contract and law of tort “from dissolving one into the other”).)
As with all negligence claims, a central question is
whether a duty is owed. In undertaking to repair the vehicle, AutoNation had a
duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing harm. However, absent physical harm,
no negligence claim is stated: “[U]nder California law, it is ‘not presumed’
that a defendant owes a duty of care to guard against economic losses
unaccompanied by injury to person or property.” (Southern California Gas
Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th 391, 397.) Stated differently,
AutoNation did not have “a tort duty to guard against negligently causing”
“purely economic loss.” (Id. at 398.) Here, because the Complaint does
not allege injury to person or property, no tort duty exists. In this case,
Plaintiff does not allege any contractual relationship between Plaintiff and
AutoNation; but assuming there is one, the economic loss rule would still bar
recovery.
In Plaintiff’s opposition brief,
Plaintiff urges this Court to find that the economic loss rule does not apply
to negligent repair claims where subcomponents of a vehicle cause damage to a
larger component or where the component causes damage to the vehicle into which
it has been incorporated, relying on Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 473. Jimenez
holds that a manufacturer may be strictly liable for harm resulting to other
parts of a product caused by the defective part that it manufactured. This is
sometimes referred to as the “component exception.” This argument is not
aligned with the pleading in this case, however. Plaintiff has not asserted a
claim for strict liability. Further, there are no allegations that AutoNation
manufactured any part, much less a defective part that caused harm to
Plaintiff’s Vehicle. While Plaintiff does assert that AutoNation is
in the business of selling automobiles and automobile component parts
(Complaint, ¶ 5), Plaintiff’s allegations against AutoNation only reference the
repair aspect of AutoNation’s business and its alleged failure to properly
store, prepare, and repair the Subject Vehicle. (Complaint, ¶¶ 89.)
AutoNation
specifically relies on the argument that Plaintiff’s claim is that AutoNation
failed to repair Plaintiff’s vehicle to conform to warranty, and thus, arises
from the warranty contracts involved in the case. In urging the application of
the component exception in this case, Plaintiff relies on an unpublished
federal case. The theory of this case is that negligent repair of a
subcomponent part could cause damage to other parts of the vehicle. However,
the Complaint here does not discuss AutoNation’s liability in terms of using defective
component parts. As such, Plaintiff may not now rely on this argument, and the
arguments in its cited unpublished case to stand for the proposition that its
Complaint is not barred by the economic loss rule and instead qualifies or the
component parts exception. As such, the demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action
is SUSTAINED as the cause of action, on its face, is barred by the economic
loss rule.
Insufficient
Facts Plead
AutoNation next argues
that Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action for Negligent Repair fails because it
lacks sufficient facts to state a cause of action against AutoNation. A cause
of action for negligence requires (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use
due care, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damage to the
plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006)
137 Cal. App. 4th 292, 318.)
Specifically, AutoNation argues that Plaintiff
has failed to plead any facts that show that AutoNation’s conduct resulted in
any damages. The Court agrees. Though Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts, in a
conclusory way, that “AutoNation’s negligent breach of its duties owed to
Plaintiff was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages,” Plaintiff fails to
otherwise plead the nature and extent of what her damages are. (Complaint, ¶ 90.)
Thus, the demurrer is SUSTAINED on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to plead
damages supporting her negligent repair cause of action.
IV. CONCLUSION¿¿
¿¿¿
For the foregoing reasons, Demurring
Defendants’ Demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
Further, AutoNation’s
demurrer is sustained.
Demurring Defendants are
ordered to give notice.
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