Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV01288, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24TRCV01288 Hearing Date: October 9, 2024 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿
¿¿
HEARING DATE: October 9, 2024
¿¿
CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV01288
¿¿
CASE
NAME: Leticia Rodriguez
Reyes v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. et al.
¿¿
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
American Honda Motor Company
¿¿
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Leticia Rodriguez Reyes
¿¿
TRIAL DATE: None.
¿¿
MOTION:¿ Defendant’s Demurrer to
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
¿
Tentative Rulings: SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend
¿¿
¿
I. BACKGROUND¿¿
¿¿
A.
Factual¿¿
¿
This action arises out of a
warranty agreement between Plaintiff Leticia Rodriguez Reyes (Plaintiff),
Defendant American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (Defendant), and Does 1 through 10.
The FAC alleges that on October 22,
2018, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant regarding a
2019 Honda Odyssey (Vehicle) that Defendant manufactured and distributed.
Plaintiff filed this action on
April 15, 2022. Plaintiff alleges four
breach of warranty claims under the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff alleges that several
defects and nonconformities arose in the Vehicle during the warranty period
including electrical defects, engine defects, and transmission defects.
Plaintiff alleges she presented the Vehicle to Defendant’s authorized repair
facilities seven (7) times between 2019 and 2023. After each repair, the
facility represented to the Plaintiff that the Vehicle had been repaired. Plaintiff
alleges that despite these efforts, the Vehicle continued to exhibit defects
and nonconformities.
B.
Procedural
On June 24, 2024, Defendant
demurred to Plaintiff’s third alleged cause of action for breach of express
warranty under Civil Code 1793.2(a)(3).
On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed
the operative first amended complaint (FAC).
On September 6, 2024, Defendant again
demurred to Plaintiff’s third alleged cause of action for breach of express
warranty under Civil Code 1793.2(a)(3).
On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff
filed an opposition to Defendant’s demurrer.
¿II. MEET AND CONFER
¿¿
A
demurring party must “meet and confer” in person or by telephone conference
with the opposing party at least five (5) days prior to the deadline for a
responsive pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41.)
Here,
Defendant offers the Declaration of Samantha M. Geraghty, Defendant’s counsel,
to show compliance with section 430.41. (Declaration of Samantha M. Geraghty.) Geraghty
asserts that Defendant’s counsel of record attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s
counsel prior to filing this motion. (Id. ¶¶ 2-4.) On July 15, 2024, Defendant’s
counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel a letter requesting to meet and confer
about the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s third cause of action no later than
August 2, 2024. (Id.; Exhibit 1 “Meet and Confer Letter – July 15,
2024,” pp. 1-2.) The letter also described Defendant’s issues with Plaintiff’s
third cause of action. (Id. p. 1.) Plaintiff did not respond.
The
Court finds that the meet-and-confer requirement has been met.
¿III. ANALYSIS¿
¿
A.
Legal
Standard ¿
A
party may demur on the basis that a complaint fails to state a cause of action.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency
of a complaint. (Donabedian v. Mercury
Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer is treated as
“admitting all material facts properly pleaded,” but not the truth of
“contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247; Aubry v.
Tri-Defendants Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) Questions of
plaintiff’s ability to prove unlikely allegations are of no concern. (Committee
on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197,
213-214.)
Because
a demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading, the Court accepts
as true even the most improbable alleged facts, and the Court does not concern
itself with the plaintiff’s ability to prove its factual allegations. (Align
Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958.) “‘Facts
appearing in exhibits attached to the first amended complaint also are accepted
as true and are given precedence, to the extent they contradict the
allegations.’” (Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091.)
¿
B.
Discussion
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a
claim for breach of express warranty under Civil Code section 1793.2,
subdivision (a)(3).
Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges Defendant
violated breached an express warranty under Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision
(a)(3) by failing to make “available to its authorized service and
repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect
repairs during the express warranty period.” (FAC, ¶ 57.)
To
plead a cause of action for breach of an express warranty, a party “must allege
the exact terms of the warranty, plaintiff’s reasonable reliance thereon, and a
breach of that warranty which proximately causes plaintiff injury.” (Williams
v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 142.)
Defendant
demurs arguing that Plaintiff does not plead facts indicating what parts or
literature were not available to the repair facilities. (Demurrer, pg.
3:26-27.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff alleges general statements of
law without alleging specific facts or damages beyond “a single conclusory
statement that damages were suffered.” (Id. at pg. 2:13-14.)
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that her allegations describing each specific
repair is sufficient to show Defendant did not provide sufficient parts or
literature to its authorized repair facilities. (Opposition, pg. 2:6-9, citing
FAC, ¶¶ 22-28.) Plaintiff also contends that because the attempted repairs
failed to fix the Vehicle’s issues, the Court can infer based on Plaintiff’s
pleadings that the “literature and/or parts provided
by HONDA were insufficient to effect attempted repairs as required by section
1793.2(a)(3).” (Id. pg. 2:13-15.)
Plaintiff also attempts to include additional facts in its
opposition to prove the repair facilities were without ample literature or
parts to effect repairs:
HONDA’s
authorized repair facility, Sunnyvale HONDA, found specific diagnostic codes
and performed repairs based on HONDA’s literature and parts. Buena Park HONDA
even contacted HONDA for additional information. However, the attempted repairs
did not resolve the problem, and the audio-visual display screen continues to
intermittently go black and/or blank and there is static noise when the vehicle
is in use. (Opposition, pg. 2:9-13.)
Plaintiff attempts to add these facts in her opposition
which undercut her cause of action by showing Defendant did provide literature
and parts that repair facilities could use to repair the Vehicle. However, demurrers
focus solely on the factual allegations within the complaint.
The
Court finds that Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not adequately support her
third cause of action for express warranty under Civil Code section 1793.2,
subd. (a)(3). Plaintiff alleges she took the Vehicle
to several authorized facilities for repairs on seven occasions, but after each
repair, the Vehicle defects continued. Plaintiff does not allege any facts
identifying whether the “literature or parts” were insufficient, only that the Court
should infer insufficiency based on the facts alleged. However, the Court
must rule based on the allegations in the complaint, not based on “contentions,
deductions or conclusions of law” or other inferences. (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247.) Plaintiff
fails to allege sufficient facts to allow the Court to rule in her favor.
Accordingly,
the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action,
with leave to amend.
IV.
CONCLUSION¿¿
Defendant’s
demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
Plaintiff has
20 days to amend its First Amended Complaint for the third cause of action for
under Civil Code section 1793.2, or to move forward on only the first two
causes of action.
¿¿
¿