Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV01322, Date: 2024-11-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24TRCV01322 Hearing Date: November 1, 2024 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿¿
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HEARING DATE: November 1, 2024¿
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CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV01322
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CASE NAME: Christopher Meeks, et al. v. Bay Crest
Care Center, LLC, et al.
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MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Bay Crest Care Center, LLC dba Bay Crest
Care Center and Rita Simms
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs,
Christopher Meeks, individually and as successor-in-interest to James Meeks
(deceased); James Louis Meeks, Jr., Brittany Tarsha Emerson, Tavaors Javon
Meeks, De’Ante Lasean Emerson
TRIAL DATE: Not Set.
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MOTION:¿ (1) Defendants Motion to Compel
Arbitration
Tentative Rulings: (1) ARGUE. The Court tentatively views the gravamen of
the Complaint as once sounding in elder abuse rather than medical malpractice
which would suggest the motion to compel arbitration of the non-signatory
plaintiffs should be denied. What is the
cause of death listed on the death certificate or autopsy? Did Decedent see a doctor or PA at Bay Crest
shortly before his final illness?
I. BACKGROUND¿¿¿
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A.
Factual¿¿¿
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On April 17, 2023, Plaintiffs, Christopher Meeks,
individually and as successor-in-interest to James Meeks (deceased); James
Louis Meeks, Jr., Brittany Tarsha Emerson, Tavaors Javon Meeks, De’Ante Lasean
Emerson (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants, Bay
Crest Care Center, LLC dba Bay Crest Care Center, Rita Simms, Imelda Punzalan,
and DOES 1 through 100. The complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Elder
Abuse and Neglect; (2) Negligence; (3) Violation of Patient’s Bill of Rights;
(4) Wrongful Death (Elder Abuse and Neglect); and (5) Wrongful Death
(Negligence).
Defendants, Bay Crest Care Center, LLC dba Bay Crest
Care Center and Rita Sims (“Moving Defendants”) now file a Motion to Compel
Arbitration.
B. Procedural¿¿¿
On September 23, 2024, Moving Defendants
filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and for Stay Action. On October 21, 2024, Plaintiffs
filed an opposition brief. On October 25, 2024, Moving Defendants filed a reply
brief.
¿II.
ANALYSIS¿¿
A. Legal
Standard
The Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”) states that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) California law
incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal
Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. (Engalla
v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-72.)
California law states
that “[o]n petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the
existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to
the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the
petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….” (Code Civ. Proc, §
1281.2.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the
existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears
the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle
Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55
Cal.4th 223, 236.)
Pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure §1281.2, generally, on a petition to
compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either
(1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2)¿the right to compel
arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement;
or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or
create conflicting¿rulings on common issues.
When seeking to compel
arbitration, the initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement by preponderance of evidence.
(Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa
v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.) It
is sufficient for the moving party to produce a copy of the arbitration
agreement or set forth the agreement’s provisions. (Gamboa, 72
Cal.App.5th at 165.) The burden then shifts to the opposing party to
prove by a preponderance of evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract
or the arbitration clause. (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa,
72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) Subsequently, the moving party must
establish with the preponderance of admissible evidence a valid arbitration
agreement between the parties. (Ibid.) The trial court then
weighs all the evidence submitted and uses its discretion to make a final
determination. (Ibid.) “California law, ‘like [federal law],
reflects a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements and requires close
judicial scrutiny of waiver claims.’” (Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific
Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 31.)
If the court orders
arbitration, then the court shall stay the action until arbitration is
completed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)
B. Discussion
Moving
Defendants move to arbitrate this case on the grounds that they argue Decedent
and Rebecca Brownslee, a Bay Crest representative, executed an arbitration
agreement on January 29, 2018, shortly after he was admitted to Bay Crest.
(Declaration of Joeffrey Dykee (“Dykee Decl.”), 2-3, Exhibit B.) Moving
Defendants argue that the arbitration agreement stated in bold that Decedent’s
agreement to arbitrate was not a condition to be admitted to or receive care at
Bay Crest, and further stated, both at the beginning of the agreement and above
the signature blocks, in bold and all capital letters, that by agreeing to
arbitrate, the party was waiving his right to a trial by judge or jury and
should be read carefully. (Dykee Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit B, p. 1 & 4.)
Moreover, Moving Defendants state that Decedent was expressly advised that he
could consult an attorney to review the arbitration agreement and had thirty
days after signing to cancel the arbitration agreement, but he did not. The arbitration agreement states, in relevant
part:
[i]t is the parties’ intention that this Agreement shall
inure to the direct benefit of and bind the Center, its parent, affiliates,
subsidiary companies, owners, officer, directors, medical directors, employees,
successors, assigns and agents and shall insure to the direct benefit of and
bind the Patient, his/her successors, spouses, children, assigns, agents, third
party beneficiaries, heirs, trustees and representatives, including the
personal representative or executor of his/her estate, and any person whose
claim is derived through or on behalf of the Patient.
(Dykee Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit B, p. 3, § 16.)
[a]ny and all claims or controversies arising out of or in
any was relating to this Agreement or to the Patient’s [Meeks] stay at the
Center [Bay Crest], including all prior stays at the Center, including disputes
regarding interpretation and/or enforceability of this Agreement, whether
arising out of state or federal law, whether existing now or arising in the
future, whether for statutory, compensatory or punitive damages and whether
sounding in breach of contract, negligence, tort or breach of statutory duties
(including, without limitation, claims based on personal injury or death),
regardless of the basis for any duty or of the legal theories upon which the
claim is asserted.
(Dykee Decl., ¶ 3,
Exhibit B, p. 1, §2.)
In
opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the motion should be denied because: (1)
Plaintiffs’ wrongful death causes of action are rooted in elder abuse and
neglect and not in professional negligence, and therefore not subject to Code
of Civil Procedure section 1295; (2) there is a high likelihood of conflicting
rulings on a common issue of law or fact that the court should deny enforcing
the arbitration agreement in its entirety as outlined in Code of Civil
Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c); and (3) there is neither evidence
that the arbitration agreement was explained to Decedent in a form and manner
that he understood, nor evidence that Decedent acknowledged that he understood
the agreement according to Federal Regulation Code section 483.70 (m).
i.
The FAA versus Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1295
In
Moving Defendants’ moving papers, they argue that both the FAA and California
law apply to the arbitration agreement. The court agrees that both provisions
apply as the FAA is mentioned in the agreement as well as many references to
“state law for the state in which the Center is located.”
First,
Plaintiffs oppose the motion on the grounds they argue Code of Civil Procedure
section 1295 does not apply to their wrongful death claims that are based on
elder abuse and neglect because the code section only applies to professional
negligence. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1295,
Any contract for medical
services which contains a provision for arbitration of any dispute as to
professional negligence of a health care provider shall have such provision as
the first article of the contract and shall be expressed in the following language:
¿“It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to
whether any medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or
unauthorized or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be
determined by submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not
by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for
judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by
entering into it, are giving up their constitutional right to have any such
dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the
use of arbitration.”
(Code Civ. Proc., §¿1295, subd. (a).)
The effect of Section 1295 is that
it permits patients who consented to arbitration to bind their heirs in actions
for wrongful death when the language of the agreement manifests an intent to
bind. (Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 849; see also Avila v.
Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 841-842
(“Avila”).) On a claim for wrongful death, however, heirs are only bound
when the underlying claim is for professional negligence. (Avila, supra,
20 Cal.App.5th at 841-842.) The Avila Court provided: "[i]f the
primary basis for the wrongful death claim sounds in professional negligence as
defined by MICRA, then section 1295 applies. If, as plaintiffs claim here, the
primary basis is under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.) (the Act), then section 1295 does not
apply and neither does Ruiz’s exception to the general rule that one who has
not consented cannot be compelled to arbitrate." (Id. at 842.)
Thus, although Plaintiffs are non-signatories to the arbitration agreement in
their individual capacity, they may still be bound by it as heirs to Decedent.
As such, the crux of the issue presented is whether the complaint’s wrongful
death claim is based on a primary basis of professional negligence or
allegations of elder abuse.
In this case, the complaint alleges
causes of action grounded in both elder abuse by neglect as well as negligence.
Although the complaint does not explicitly state a claim or even make reference
to the term “professional negligence,” Avila’s
holding does not turn on whether the pleading states a claim for professional
negligence, but rather whether the “primary basis” for the wrongful death claim
sounds in professional negligence or elder abuse. The Court of Appeals in Avila
instructs that the difference between the two claims rests on whether the
pleading alleges a failure to provide medical services, which reads as elder
abuse; or the substandard performance of medical services that were provided. (Id.
at 843.)
The first and third causes of action
based on elder abuse and fraud assert that Defendants neglected Decedent when
they: “failed to exercise the degree of care that reasonable persons in a like
position would exercise by denying or withholding goods or services
necessary to meet the basic needs of Decedent MEEKS, specifically including the
failure to assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food,
clothing or shelter, the failure to provide medical care for physical
and mental health needs, the failure to protect from health and safety
hazards, and the failure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration.”
(Complaint, ¶ 104.) This court notes that although these allegations
(especially which claim “deny,” “withhold,” and “failed to…”) intuitively read
as elder abuse, the allegations are often pared with other allegations of
failure to provide care to an adequate standard of care. Allegations such as
those read more as the substandard provision of medical services, rather than
the failure to provide such services. Again, this court emphasizes that Elder
neglect does not refer to substandard performance of medical services but
rather the failure of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and
comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of their professional
standing, to carry out their custodial obligations. (Avila, at
p. 843, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 42; see Fenimore v. Regents of University of
California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348-1349, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d
345.)
The
court will allow oral argument on this issue as to whether the complaint reads
more as a failure to provide medical services versus substandard performance of
medical services. However, the court finds that under Avila and Ruiz,
Plaintiffs’ claims read more so as substandard performance of medical services.
ii.
Applicability
of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2, Subdivision (c)
The remaining non-wrongful death causes
of action, including Plaintiffs’ survivor claims for dependent adult abuse,
negligence and violation of patient’s bill of rights remain at issue. Moving
Defendants have suggested this court follow the recent decision in Holland
v. Silverscreen Healthcare (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1125 (although recently
granted review by the Supreme Court) while Plaintiffs suggests reliance on that
case may only be instructive, and that instead, this court should rely on Hearden
v. Windsor Redding Care Center, LLC, et al. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1010.
In Hearden, four (4) residents of
a defendant care center passed away due to COVID-19 infections. Family
members of those residents subsequently filed suit against the defendant care
center, individually and as successors-in-interest to the decedents. The
defendant care center subsequently moved to compel arbitration based on four
(4) agreements signed by the successor family members. (Hearden, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1013-1014.)
The lower court denied
the defendant care center’s motion to compel arbitration in Hearden,
“finding that as to three of the agreements, there was no evidence the family
signatory had authority to sign on behalf of the decedent; as to all four of
the agreements, there was no evidence the family signatory agreed to arbitrate
their individual claim; and as to one successor claim in which the family
signatory had power of attorney, the trial court exercised its discretion to
deny the motion to compel arbitration to avoid the possibility of conflicting
results.” (Id. at 1014.)
The Hearden Court of Appeal
determined that the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in
denying the motion to compel arbitration. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court of Appeal emphasized that Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 (c)
“gives a trial court discretion to deny a motion to compel arbitration as to
all or part of an arbitrable controversy when ‘[a] party to the arbitration
agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with
a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related
transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common
issue of law or fact.’” (Id. at 1017, quoting Code Civ. Proc., §
1281.2 (c).)
In Moving Defendants’ reply brief, they argue Hearden is
distinguishable because the vast majority of the claims asserted by the
plaintiffs (elder abuse, violation of patient’s bill of rights, unfair
competition, wrongful death, and fraud) were either found to be predicated on
elder neglect versus the lone cause of action for professional negligence or
expressly excluded from arbitration by the agreement’s terms, such that it was
well within the Court’s discretion to find under section 1281.2, subdivision
(c), that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings militating the denial
of the motion to compel arbitration. (Hearden,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1017-20.)
Moving Defendants assert that here, Plaintiff’s violation of patient’s bill of
rights claim is not excluded from the agreement and is predicated on medical
negligence, and Plaintiffs’ allegation of a separate wrongful death claim based
on medical negligence, and all other survivor claims (i.e., elder abuse and
negligence causes of action) are all expressly contemplated in the agreement as
being arbitrable. However, Moving Defendants concede that only one of the five
causes of action alleged (the wrongful death – elder abuse & neglect claim)
is arguably not subject to binding arbitration.
The court seeks oral argument based on the issue of maintaining
certain causes of action in the court and sending the rest to arbitration.
iii.
Defenses to Arbitration
Plaintiffs
argue that the Moving Defendants failed to demonstrate that the arbitration
agreement was explained to Decedent and that he understood what he was signing.
However, in reply, Moving Defendants note the express delegation clause in
Section 9 of the arbitration agreement, as they cited to in the moving papers, which
militates that the arbitrator, not the court, shall determine the agreement’s
validity, interpretation, construction, performance, and enforcement. The court
agrees that such delegation clause warrants such.
iv.
Stay of Superior Court Action
Depending
on the parties’ arguments to the questions requested above, this court notes
that the decision to stay this action pending arbitration will depend on the
decisions on the issues above.