Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV01345, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24TRCV01345    Hearing Date: October 2, 2024    Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling

¿¿ 

HEARING DATE:                 October 2, 2024

¿¿ 

CASE NUMBER:                   24TRCV01345

¿¿ 

CASE NAME:                        HENRY YEE  v. GOLDBOURN PHILLIP TRAPP, JR., et al.

¿¿ 

MOVING PARTIES:              Specially Appearing Defendant Loya Casualty Insurance Company (erroneously sued as Fred Loya Insurance Agency, Inc. (Doe 1))

¿¿ 

RESPONDING PARTY:        Plaintiff Henry Yee

¿¿ 

TRIAL DATE:                        None

¿¿ 

MOTION:¿                              Demurrer

¿ 

Tentative Ruling:                    Sustain with leave to amend, and continue CMC from its current 10/3/24 date approximately 75 days

I. BACKGROUND¿¿ 

¿¿ 

A.    Factual¿¿ 

In this personal injury lawsuit arising from an automobile collision, Plaintiff Henry Yee (“Plaintiff”) sues Defendants Goldbourn Phillip Trapp, Jr. (“Trapp”), United States Postal Service (“UPS”), and Precious Evans (“Evans”), alleging the following. On April 28, 2022, Plaintiff was driving his vehicle when he was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Evans, who claimed that she was struck by a vehicle driven by Trapp (a UPS employee), who was negligently driving a UPS vehicle. As a result of the impact, Plaintiff allegedly sustained property damage to his vehicle as well as personal injuries to his head, neck, back, arms, and legs. He is claiming general and special damages above $100,000.

B.    Procedural

¿           On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Trapp, UPS, Evans, and Does 1 to 10, asserting causes of action for (1) motor vehicle negligence and (2) general negligence.

            On July 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended to Complaint substituting “Fred Loya Insurance Agency, Inc.” for the defendant sued fictitiously as Doe 1.  On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Proof of Service of Summons on “Fred Loya Insurance Agency, Inc.”

On August 29, 2024, Loya Casualty Insurance Company (“Loya Casualty”), claiming that it was erroneously sued as “Fred Loya Insurance Agency, Inc.,” filed the instant demurrer.

On September 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed his opposition.   No reply has been filed as of the date of this tentative ruling. 

 ¿¿ 

¿III. ANALYSIS¿ 

A. Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿ 

¿¿ 

“If a complaint does not state a cause of action, but there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment, leave to amend must be granted.” (Milligan v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation Dist. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.)

B. Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).)

Here, Loya Casualty has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Demurrer, Declaration of Christine E. Urbano, ¶ 4.)

B. Discussion

The Complaint asserts the first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence and second cause of action for general negligence against Loya Casualty.  Loya Casualty has filed a demurrer to those negligence claims, arguing that Plaintiff failed to join the proper parties. (Notice of Demurrer, p. 2:13-23; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (d) [stating that a party may object to a complaint by filing a demurrer on the ground that “[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties”].)

However, the demurrer does not specify which party Plaintiff failed to join, or even explain the basis for its joinder argument. (See Van Zant v. Apple Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 965, 973 (“Van Zant”) [“Code of Civil Procedure section 389 (section 389) governs joinder of parties”]; Pinto Lake MHP LLC v. County of Santa Cruz (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1006 [explaining that Section 389, subdivision (a) (“Section 389(a)”) “defines persons who should be joined in a lawsuit if possible and are thus deemed necessary to the action”]; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 785, 793 [pointing out that under Section 389(a)(1), parties “should be joined as defendants if, in their absence, ‘complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.’ [Citation]”]; Van Zant, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 974–975 [explaining that for a party to be deemed necessary under Section 389(a)(2), the absent party must claim an interest relating to the subject of the action].)

Therefore, the Court finds the joinder argument unpersuasive.

However, Loya Casualty also demurs to the negligence claims, arguing that Plaintiff failed to state sufficient facts against Loya for the following reasons. First, Plaintiff did not plead any facts to support his first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence. (Demurrer, p. 6:12-13.) Second, with regard “to the second cause of action for general negligent driving, … Defendant Loya as a corporation cannot drive a vehicle ….” (Demurrer, p. 6:13-16 [italics removed].) Lastly, Plaintiff cannot not sue Loya Casualty, an insurance company, for direct liability based on the contract that the defendant had with its insured. (Demurrer, pp. 6:23-7:4.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has a valid claim against Loya Casualty because (1) Loya Casualty was Defendant Evans’ insurance company at the time of the motor vehicle collision and (2) Loya Casualty denied Plaintiff’s insurance claim without investigation. (Opposition, p. 3:7-13.)  He asserts that Loya Casualty owed Evans the duty to provide insurance coverage and provide Evans with legal representation. (Opposition, p. 4:8-11.)  He also asserts that Loya Casualty breached its duty to Evans “by not providing representation in the investigation and/or evaluation of the automobile claim. Furthermore, they breach[ed] their duty to Plaintiff by not providing legal representation to Defendant Evans.” (Opposition, p. 4:14-18.) “As a result of the breach of that duty, [Plaintiff] incurred damages: medical expenses, property damage, loss of income and general pain and suffering.” (Opposition, p. 4:18-21.) “Plaintiff justifiably relied upon the statements of [Loya Casualty], when in fact they had no intention of investigating and providing counsel to their insured: [Evans].” (Opposition, p. 5:15-18.)

However, nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege he is suing Loya Casualty because the defendant was Evans’ insurance company at the time of the collision.

As the Demurrer points out, “‘“[g]enerally an insurer may not be joined as a party-defendant in the underlying action against the insured by the injured third party. The fact that an insurer has agreed to indemnify the insured for any judgment rendered in the action does not make the insurer a proper party. Liability insurance is not a contract for the benefit of the injured party so as to allow it to sue the insurer directly.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Royal Indemnity Co. v. United Enterprises, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 194, 205 [emphasis added] (“Royal Indemnity”).) Therefore, “a third party who is not in privity of contract with the liability insurer (nor named as an express beneficiary of the policy), … would normally lack standing to sue the insurer to resolve coverage questions about a tortfeasor, such as where there has been a failure to settle a claim under the policy.” (Ibid. [emphasis added].)

There are exceptions to the above rule that a third party generally does not have standing to sue an insurer. (See Royal Indemnity, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 205-207 [explaining that those exceptions include (1) “where the injured third party is a judgment creditor, who has standing as such to seek payment under the insurance policy,” (2) “where the claimant is an assignee of the insured’s claims,” (3) if “‘the liability insurance also provides medical payments coverage for anyone injured by the insured, the injured party may have a direct claim against the insurer for his or her medical expenses. I.e., the injured party is treated as an additional insured as to the medical payments coverage,’” (4) “where the insurer itself is seeking to obtain declaratory relief against a third party claimant ….,” (5) if a liability insurer joins the injured third party as codefendant in a declaratory relief action to determine coverage, the third party may raise coverage issues in that action, rather than waiting until after a judgment is obtained and suing as judgment creditor, (6) when the insurer is allowed to take over in litigation if its insured is not defending an action, to avoid harm to the insurer].)

Here, however, the Complaint has not alleged which exception, if any, applies in this case such that Plaintiff has standing to sue Loya Casualty for the company’s alleged refusal to investigate Plaintiff’s claims or provide Evans with legal representation.

Therefore, the Court agrees that the Complaint has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Loya Casualty.

Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained, with leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

            The Demurrer is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.  If Plaintiff elects to amend to address the concerns raised by this Demurrer, he shall file and serve his first amended complaint within 30 days of this ruling.     Loya Casualty Insurance Company to give notice of the Court’s ruling.