Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 24TRCV02080, Date: 2024-10-01 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV02080, Date: 2024-10-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24TRCV02080 Hearing Date: October 1, 2024 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling

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HEARING DATE: October 1, 2024

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CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV02080

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CASE NAME: CHRISTIN JESUS ALEGRIA, et al. v. HUI Q. WONG, et al.

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MOVING Parties: Defendants Hui Q. Wong, Trustee of the Wong Living Trust (erroneously sued as Hui Q. Wong, an individual), and the Wong Family Trust, a Living Trust

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RESPONDING PARTY: None

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TRIAL DATE: None

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MOTION:¿ Demurrer with Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) Overrule in part and sustain in part the Demurrer, with 30 days leave to amend.

(2) Deny the Motion to Strike.

I. BACKGROUND¿¿

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A. Factual¿¿

Christian Jesus Alegria and Paola Jannette Chaname (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this landlord-tenant action against Defendants Hui Q. Wong, Trustee of the Wong Living Trust (erroneously sued as Hui Q. Wong, an individual) and Wong Family Trust, a Living Trust. Plaintiffs allege that for the last 30 years, they have rented 14921 Firmona Ave., Lawndale, CA 90260 (the “Property”) from Defendants. (Compl., ¶¶ 9, 10.) Throughout their tenancy, they allegedly complained to Defendants regarding habitability issues (including roach infestation), but Defendants never fixed those issues effectively. (Compl., ¶ 10.) In addition, on May 1, 2024, a fire erupted at the Property allegedly due to faulty electrical cables that Plaintiffs had complained about. (Compl., ¶ 11.) The fire not only damaged Plaintiffs’ personal belongings but also left the entrance of the house structurally compromised and unsafe for habitation. (Compl., ¶ 12.)

B. Procedural

¿ On June 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Defendants and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, asserting causes of action for (1) constructive eviction, (2) breach of habitability, (3) negligence, (4) breach of quiet enjoyment, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), (6) violation of state and local Health and Safety Codes, and (7) loss of use.

On August 20, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer with motion to strike. On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed his oppositions to the demurrer and motion to strike, attaching proofs of service showing they were mailed to defendant’s counsel that same date. Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition to each pleading motion on September 30, apparently having not received the opposing papers.

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¿III. ANALYSIS¿

A. Demurrer

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿

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A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿

“If a complaint does not state a cause of action, but there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment, leave to amend must be granted.” (Milligan v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation Dist. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.)

Before filing a demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).)

Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Demurrer, p. 3:2-13 (section titled “Conference Prior to Filing of Demurrer”).)

First Cause of Action for Constructive Eviction

“A constructive eviction occurs when the acts or omissions to act of a landlord, or any disturbance or interference with the tenant’s possession by the landlord, renders the premises, or a substantial portion thereof, unfit for the purposes for which they were leased, or which has the effect of depriving the tenant for a substantial period of time of the beneficial, enjoyment or use of the premises.” (Groh v. Kover’s Bull Pen, Inc. (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 611, 614.) “Any interference by the landlord by which the tenant is deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises amounts to a constructive eviction if the tenant so elects and surrenders possession.” (Johnson v. Snyder (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 86, 88.)

Here, Defendants demur the first cause of action for constructive eviction arguing that it is uncertain and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the following reasons. Constructive eviction requires that the tenant abandon the premises within a reasonable time after giving notice that the premises are uninhabitable. Here, Plaintiffs allege that they knew of the uninhabitable conditions of the premises for the last thirty (30) years but waited until they moved out in 2024 and sued on June 24, 2024. Therefore, Defendants imply, Plaintiffs have failed to allege constructive eviction because they have not alleged facts showing that they abandoned the Property within a reasonable time after giving notice of the uninhabitable premises.

However, whether Plaintiffs abandoned the Property within a reasonable time presents an issue of fact that cannot be adjudicated on a demurrer. Moreover, the Complaint alleges that as recently as May 1, 2024, a fire erupted at the Property due to faulty electrical wiring (that Plaintiffs had complained about) and the fire damaged the structure of the Property, making it unsafe for habitation. (Compl., ¶ 11.) The Complaint then alleges that Plaintiffs sent Defendants two letters in May 2024, informing the latter about the fire and stating that the Property was unhabitable, but Defendants never responded or contacted Plaintiffs. (Compl., ¶¶ 4, 15.) Therefore, on May 30, 2024, Plaintiffs vacated the Property. (Compl., ¶ 31.) A trier of fact may find those facts show that Plaintiffs abandoned the Property within a reasonable time after giving Defendants notice of the fire damage and need for repairs.

While the Demurrer asserts that the constructive eviction cause of action is inconsistent with the fourth cause of action for breach of quiet enjoyment, the Court disagrees. “An eviction is actual when a landlord takes direct action to physically expel the tenant from the premises. An eviction is constructive if the landlord engages in acts that render the premises unfit for occupancy for the purpose for which it was leased, or deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises.” (Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1152.) Further, “every lease includes a covenant of quiet possession and enjoyment. (Civ. Code, § 1927.) This covenant is breached upon actual or constructive eviction of the tenant.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1299.) Taking the allegations as a whole, a former tenant may seek contract damages for the period of time he or she allegedly endured problems (which may include habitability issues) that affected the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises while Defendant still resided there, and also seek constructive eviction remedies for the period of time AFTER the tenant vacated the allegedly disturbed premises. According, the Demurrer is overruled as to the first cause of action.

Second Cause of Action for Breach of Warranty of Habitability

To establish a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs must establish (1) “the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability,” (2) “notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition,” (3) “the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and” (4) “resulting damages.” (Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297.) Defendants demur to the second cause of action arguing that it is insufficient and uncertain just because it alleges the same facts as the fourth cause of action for breach of quiet enjoyment. (Demurrer, p. 9:17-27.)

However, the second cause of action concerns Defendants’ alleged failure to maintain the Property in a habitable condition (Compl., ¶ 37), while the fourth cause of action alleges that Defendants disrupted Plaintiffs’ peaceful enjoyment of the Property (Compl., ¶ 47). Whether arising out of the same facts or different set of facts, a tenant or former tenant may pursue both a quiet enjoyment claim and a habitability claims.

Therefore, the demurrer to the second cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability is overruled.

Third Cause of Action for Negligence

“To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff’s damages or injuries.” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.)

Here, Defendants demur the third cause of action arguing that (1) the Complaint fails to allege causation (specifically, that the facts concerning causation are speculative and conclusory), (2) “the damages claimed in the prayer and factually, appear not to have any relationship to reality and are purely speculative,” and (3) “there is a two-year statute of limitations for negligence and the allegations in the complaint extend over 30 years.” (Demurrer, p. 11:6-11.)

The Court does find the time period argument to be persuasive. Plaintiff cannot recover for harm caused outside the statute of limitations period, and there is vagueness and ambiguity in the allegations of what damages were alleged to be caused by what conduct. On the other hand, the Complaint alleges that Defendants’ failure to fix an electrical issue caused a fire that damaged Plaintiffs’ belongings (property damage having a three-year statute of limitations), and that fire allegedly happened in May 2024. Given those facts, it is not evident from the face of the Complaint that the entirety of Plaintiff’s negligence claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Therefore, the Demurrer to the third cause of action for negligence is sustained, with 30 days leave to amend to specify what alleged misconduct at what point in time is claimed to have caused what elements of harm.

Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of Quiet Enjoyment

“‘In the absence of language to the contrary, every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, whereby the landlord impliedly covenants that the tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises. [Citations.] The covenant of quiet enjoyment “insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenant’s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ¶ The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment implies a term in a contract, and a breach of the covenant gives rise to an action in contract. As such, the damages available for a breach of the covenant are contract damages.” (Ginsberg, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 896–897.)

Here, Defendants argue that there are no facts to support the fourth cause of action.

However, the Court has found that the Complaint has alleged facts sufficient to support breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. “This covenant is breached upon actual or constructive eviction of the tenant.” (Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1299.) While the remedies may overlap and the Court will be mindful of duplicative claims affording the same remedies as this case progresses, at the pleading stage the demurrer lacks merit and is thus overruled.

Fifth Cause of Action for IIED

“‘The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress were summarized in [citation], as follows: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”’ [Citation.]” (Flynn v. Higham (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 681.)

“Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that is ‘“so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community”’ [citation] and must be ‘“of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress.”’ [Citation.] ‘“‘[I]t is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.’”’ [Citation.]” (Chang v. Lederman (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 67, 86–87.) Conduct to be outrageous must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.) To meet the reckless disregard standard, plaintiff must allege and show that the reckless conduct ignored the possibility that Plaintiff would suffer emotional distress, not merely an injury. (Cervantes v. J.C. Penny Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593; Little v. Stuyvesant Life Insur. Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 451, 462.) Behavior may be considered outrageous if the defendant abuses a close relationship (such as employer-employee, lawyer-client, hospital-patient, or insurer-insured), or know the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress, or acts when recognizing that the conduct is likely to result in mental or emotional injury. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1122.) Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d), quoted in Molko, supra at p. 1122.)

For example, in Stoiber v. Honeychuck¿(1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiff tenant had stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress by alleging that she had suffered “‘extreme emotional distress’ as a result of the [landlord’s and property manager’s] ‘knowing, intentional, and willful’ failure to correct defective conditions of the premises.” The Stoiber ¿court observed that whether the failure to act was extreme and outrageous “under the present allegations [in that case], present[ed] a factual question—it cannot be said as a matter of law that [plaintiff] has not stated a cause of action.” (Id.¿at p. 922; Burnett v. Chimney Sweep¿(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1069.)

Here, Defendants demur to the IIED claim, arguing that because the Complaint concedes that Defendants attempted to remedy the issues Plaintiffs complained about, Defendants’ conduct was not extreme or outrageous. (Demurrer, pp. 12:23-13:3.)

The Court has seen scores of suits by tenants against landlords alleging the failure to make repairs over an extended period of time, such that less than all of them constitute misconduct “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Those IIED claims that survive demurrer tend to have greater detail of the nature of the misconduct raising it above a mere habitability issue and to the level of intending to inflict severe emotional distress. This Complaint, as pleaded, does not sufficient allege what is extreme or what is outrageous to pass the pleading threshold for an IIED cause of action. The Court thus sustains the demurrer to the IIED cause of action with 30 days leave to amend.

Sixth Cause of Action for Violation of State and Local Health and Safety Codes

Defendants demur the sixth cause of action, arguing that “[t]he allegations in the complaint are generally not specific and conclusive in nature.” (Demurrer, p. 13:17-18.)

The Court agrees. The sixth cause of action alleges that “Defendant has violated state and local health and safety codes by failing to maintain the property in a safe condition.” (Compl., ¶ 49.) However, it fails to specify which laws or Codes were violated.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the sixth cause of action for violation of state and local health and safety codes is sustained, with 30 days leae to amend.

Seventh Cause of Action for Loss of Use

Defendants demur the seventh cause of action for loss of use, arguing that it is duplicative of some claims and that the allegations are, among other things, conclusory.

The Court agrees that the seventh cause of action fails to state a claim; instead it alleges an element of damages. Plaintiffs allege that parts of the Property are uninhabitable and that they should be compensated for the portion of the Property that was unusable, but it is unclear (1) on what legal theory those allegations are based (e.g., breach of contract) and (2) which portions of the Property were unusable.

Therefore, the demurrer to the seventh cause of action for loss of use is sustained, without leave to amend.

B. Motion to Strike

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436.) “Immaterial” or “irrelevant” matters include allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim, or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)

“Before filing a motion to strike …, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).)

Here, Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Motion to Strike, p. 4:2-12 (section titled “Conference Prior to Filing of This Motion to Strike”).)

Defendants move to strike the punitive damages allegations, arguing that the Complaint fails to allege any facts that support those damages.

“Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) states: ‘In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant [i.e., punitive damages].’” (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041.)

As used in Civil Code section 3294: “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

Here, the Court finds that the Complaint has alleged facts showing oppression, by alleging the following, among other things. Defendants refused to fix electrical issues despite Plaintiffs’ complaints and as a result of that failure, a fire broke out in Plaintiffs’ home, and Plaintiffs narrowly escaped physical harm. (Compl., ¶¶ 11, 13.) There was allegedly a cockroach infestation that Defendants did not eradicate, causing Plaintiffs to experience rashes and other ailments. (Compl., ¶¶ 10, 21.) Even after notices and orders to comply from the government entities regarding the habitability issues, Defendants allegedly still failed to fix the habitability issues. (Compl., ¶ 25.) Those facts raise sufficient allegations that, if believed, a jury could finds that Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of their rights.

Therefore, the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damage is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Motion to Strike is DENIED.

The Demurrer is OVERRULED IN PART and SUSTAINED IN PART as discussed above, with 30 days leave to amend. ¿

Defendants to give notice of the ruling.