Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV02308, Date: 2024-11-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24TRCV02308    Hearing Date: November 20, 2024    Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿ 

¿¿ 

HEARING DATE:                 November 20, 2024¿ 

¿¿ 

CASE NUMBER:                   24TRCV02308

¿¿ 

CASE NAME:                        Sylvia Lee Senegal King v. Torrance Memorial Hospital, et al.

¿¿ 

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant, Torrance Memorial Medical Center (erroneously sued as Torrance Memorial Hospital)

¿¿ 

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff, Sylvia Lee Senegal King

¿¿ 

TRIAL DATE:                       None set.  

¿¿ 

MOTION:¿                              (1) Defendant’s Demurrer¿

                                                (2)  Defendant’s Motion to Strike

¿ 

Tentative Rulings:                  (1) Defendant’s Demurrer¿to the second and third causes of action on grounds of duplicate causes of action is sustained, with 20 days leave to amend.

                                                (2) Defendant’s Motion to Strike the punitive damages allegations is granted

¿ 

I. BACKGROUND¿¿ 

¿¿ 

A. Factual¿¿ 

¿ 

On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff, Sylvia Lee Senegal King (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants, Torrance Memorial Hospital, and DOES 1 through 25 in Riverside County Superior Court, where this action originated. On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff, in pro per, filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), also in Riverside County, alleging causes of action for: (1) Negligent Medical Malpractice; (2) Medical Malpractice; and (3) Professional Negligence. On May 14, 2024, Judge Firetag in Department 3 of the Riverside County Superior Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue, transferring this case to the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

 

Defendant, Torrance Memorial Medical Center (erroneously sued as Torrance Memorial Hospital) (“Defendant”) filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike portions of the FAC.

 

B. Procedural¿¿ 

¿ 

On October 23, 2024, Defendant filed its Demurrer and Motion to Strike portions of the FAC. On November 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On November 14, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief.

 

 

 

II. ANALYSIS¿ 

¿ 

A.    Demurrer

¿ 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿ 

¿¿ 

A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿ 

 

                          i.          Meet and Confer

 

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) 

 

Per the declaration of Jeannine V. Stepanian, Esq., (“Stepanian Decl.”) counsel for Defendant, on October 22, 2024, she contacted Plaintiff via email to inform her that it recently came to Stepanian’s attention that she filed her FAC with the court, and that pleading was never served on their firm. (Stepanian Decl., ¶ 4.) On October 23, 2024, Stepanian and Plaintiff conferred telephonically and discussed the fact that the FAC was not served to Defendant or their firm and Defendant’s position that the FAC is insufficiently pled and subject to demurrer and a motion to strike. (Stepanian Decl., ¶ 5.) Defense counsel and Plaintiff were unable to resolve the matter, thus, Defendant had brought this demurrer and motion to strike. (Stepanian Decl., ¶ 5.)  

 

                        ii.          Discussion

 

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s FAC on the grounds that the first, second, and third causes of action fail to set forth fact sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant and because they are uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible.  

 

 

 

1.     Breach of Fiduciary Duty

 

In Defendant’s threadbare demurrer, it first argues that all three of Plaintiff’s causes of action fail because Plaintiff’s FAC did not sufficiently allege breach of fiduciary duty. Although Plaintiff has alleged the words “fiduciary duty” in each of the three causes of action (FAC, ¶¶ 24, 29, & 32), the court finds that she has not stated nor purported to state a cause of action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. The demurrer on uncertainty grounds is thus overruled.

 

2.     Duplicative Causes of Action

Next, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for negligent medical malpractice is deficient and that Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action for medical malpractice, and professional negligence are duplicative of the first. Preliminarily, the court agrees with Defendant’s duplicate argument. The California Supreme Court has determined that with respect to questions of substantive law, there is no distinction between ordinary negligence and professional negligence (i.e. medical malpractice) because “a defendant has only one duty, measured by one standard of care, under any given circumstances.”  (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1000.)  “[A] plaintiff cannot, on the same facts, state causes of action for ordinary negligence as well as professional negligence, as a defendant has only one duty that can be measured by one standard of care under any given circumstances.”  (Bellamy v. Appellate Department (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 797, 804.) 

The present case is similar to that of Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992 (“Flowers”) in which the California Supreme Court stated: "The Court of Appeal thus erred in finding plaintiff's pleadings 'broad enough' to state a cause of action for ordinary negligence as well as professional negligence.” (Id. at 996.) This has been interpreted this to mean that Plaintiffs cannot use the same set of facts to assert a claim for professional negligence and ordinary negligence because a defendant has only one duty measured by one standard of care. (See Id. at 1000.)¿In Flowers, the California Supreme Court stated:

With respect to professionals, their specialized education and training do not serve to impose an increased duty of care but rather are considered additional "circumstances" relevant to an overall assessment of what constitutes "ordinary prudence" in a particular situation. Thus, the standard for professionals is articulated in terms of exercising "the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in good standing …." (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) The Reasonable Person, § 32, p. 187.) For example, the law " 'demands only that a physician or surgeon have the degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by practitioners of the medical profession in the same locality and that he [or she] exercise ordinary care in applying such learning and skill to the treatment of [the] patient.' [Citation.]" (Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Cal.2d 465, 473 [234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d 485], italics added.) Similarly, a hospital's "business is caring for ill persons, and its conduct must be in accordance with that of a person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances, a vital part of those circumstances being the illness of the patient and incidents thereof." (Rice v. California Lutheran Hospital (1945) 27 Cal.2d 296, 302 [163 P.2d 860], italics added; see also, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 438 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166] [psychotherapist "need only exercise 'that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of [that professional specialty] under similar circumstances.' "]; Gambert v. Hart (1872) 44 Cal. 542, 552 [same; attorneys]; Stuart v. Crestview Mut. Water Co. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 802, 811-812 [110 Cal.Rptr. 543] [same; engineers]; Montijo v. Swift (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 351, 353 [33 Cal.Rptr. 133] [same; architects]; Lindner v. Bartlow, Davis & Wood (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 660, 665 [27 Cal.Rptr. 101] [same; accountants].)¿ 

¿ 

Since the standard of care remains constant in terms of "ordinary prudence," it is clear that denominating a cause of action as one for "professional negligence" does not transmute its underlying character. For substantive purposes, it merely serves to establish the basis by which "ordinary prudence" will be calculated and the defendant's conduct evaluated. Nor does it distinguish a claim separate and independent from some other form of negligence. As to any given defendant, only one standard of care obtains under a particular set of facts, even if the plaintiff attempts to articulate multiple or alternate theories of liability. (Cf. Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 192; Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 119-120.)¿ 

¿ 

Any distinction between "ordinary" and "professional" negligence has relevance primarily when the Legislature has statutorily modified, restricted, or otherwise conditioned some aspect of an action for malpractice not directly related to the elements of negligence itself. For example, the statute of limitations for professional negligence against a health care provider can extend up to three years (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5), in contrast to the one year applicable to ordinary negligence (Code Civ. Proc., § 340).¿ (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 340.6 [setting limitations period for attorney malpractice at four years but shortening time if plaintiff discovers cause of injury sooner].) The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) contains numerous provisions effecting substantial changes in negligence actions against health care providers, including a limitation on noneconomic damages (Civ. Code, § 3333.2), elimination of the collateral source rule as well as preclusion of subrogation in most instances (Civ. Code, § 3333.1), and authorization for periodic payments of future damages in excess of $ 50,000 (Code Civ. Proc., § 667.7). (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 425.13 [restricting claims for punitive damages in actions for professional negligence against health care providers].) While in each instance the statutory scheme has altered a significant aspect of claims for medical malpractice, such as the measure of the defendant's liability for damages or the admissibility of evidence, the fundamental substance of such actions on the issues of duty, standard of care, breach, and causation remains unaffected.¿ 

¿ 

(Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal 4th 992, 997-999.)¿ 

 

Here, this court notes that the Flowers case discusses the standard of care for professional and general negligence in the context of motions for summary judgments. However, it is of note that in Flowers, the circumstance at issue was a patient’s fall from a hospital bed/gurney and the Supreme Court believed that the appellate court’s distinction between “professional” and “ordinary” negligence was erroneous. (Id. at 1001.)¿ Although a plaintiff is allowed to allege alternative theories in varied or inconsistent counts under certain circumstances (see Rader Co. v. Stone (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 10, 29), the issue presented before this court is that Plaintiff’s causes of action are not truly alternative or inconsistent – Plaintiff has brought causes of action for negligent medical malpractice, medical malpractice, and professional negligence. The underlying facts surrounding each cause of action are identical.

¿

Thus, the court will be SUSTAINING demurrer as to the second and third causes of action based on the duplication argument alone. The court’s analysis of the first cause of action for Negligent Medical Malpractice continues below.

 

3.     Medical Malpractice

 

The elements of a professional negligence medical malpractice cause of action are: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.” (Borrayo¿v. Avery¿(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 304, 310 (quoting¿Hanson v.¿Grode¿(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606.)¿¿Medical malpractice arises where there is a physician-patient relationship between the plaintiff and defendant doctor.¿ (See¿Burgess v. Superior Court¿(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1075.)¿ Further, in the context of hospitals, this court emphasizes that “ ‘[p]resent-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes [sic], as well as administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of ‘hospital facilities’ expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.’ Although hospitals do not practice medicine in the same sense as physicians, they do provide facilities and services in connection with the practice of medicine, and if they are negligent in doing so they can be held liable.”  (Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital (2012) 55 Cal.4th 291, 310 (“Leung”).) In Leung, the California Supreme Court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that defendant hospital’s acts or omissions were a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury after the trial court gave the jury instruction: “A hospital must provide procedures, policies, facilities, supplies, and qualified personnel reasonably necessary for the treatment of its patients.” (Id. at 310.)

 

Here, Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that: (1) Defendant Torrance and its staff had a duty of medical care and to act in good faith and in the best interest of Plaintiff (FAC, ¶ 20); (2) that Defendant breached the applicable standard of medical care owed to Plaintiff (FAC, ¶¶ 21, 25, 28, 31); (3) that this breach was the direct and proximate cause of the following harms: (i) suffering conscious pain and suffering both in the past and future; (ii) incurring medical expenses in the past and will incur future medical expenses; (iii) suffering mental and emotional sorrow and anguish; (iv) suffering permanent physical injuries and disfigurement; and (v) was required to undergo additional medical procedures and has sustained other damages. (FAC, ¶ 21.) The Plaintiff’s detailed allegations of her claimed injuries resulting in the alleged breach of the applicable standard of care are quite specific. (FAC, ¶¶ 6-18.)

 

Because this court is sustaining the demurrer on the grounds that the second and third causes of action in Plaintiff’s FAC are duplicative, the court suggests Plaintiff consolidate the allegations as to ordinary negligence and professional negligence into a single medical malpractice cause of action in accordance with the requirements above. 

 

B.    Motion to Strike

 

                          i.          Legal Standard

 

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)¿¿ 

 

                        ii.          Discussion

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 prohibits the inclusion of punitive damages allegations in a medical malpractice suit until or unless the plaintiff obtains an order permitting those allegations.  The intention of the Legislature is to require the plaintiff to make a motion, supported by admissible evidence after sufficient discovery has been undertaken in the case so the Court can act as a gatekeeper to screen garden variety medical malpractice clams from those suits where “there is a substantial probability that plaintiff will prevail” on her or his claim of malice, oppression, or fraud as required by Civil Code section 3294.  It is premature for plaintiff here to include punitive damages allegations or a prayer for such damage without plaintiff having made a motion for leave to amend and for the Court to make the required finding of substantial probability.  The motion to strike punitive damages is thus GRANTED and in plaintiff’s amended pleading the allegations and prayer for recovery of punitive damages should be excluded in order to avoid another round of pleading motions.

IV. CONCLUSION¿¿ 

 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. Further, the Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

¿¿¿ 

Defendant is ordered to give notice.¿¿¿¿ 

¿¿¿