Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV02401, Date: 2024-10-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24TRCV02401 Hearing Date: October 4, 2024 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿¿
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HEARING DATE: October 4, 2024
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CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV02401
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CASE NAME: 8731 Belford Fee Owner, LLC v. Be Meticulous,
LLC; Meticulous Services, LLC; and Does 1-25
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MOVING PARTY: Defendants Meticulous
Services, LLC; Be Meticulous, LLC
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RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff 8731 Belford
Fee Owner LLC
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TRIAL DATE: None Set
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MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer Without Motion to Strike
(2) Notice of Related Case
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Tentative Rulings: (1) SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend as to the first
cause of action, but OVERRULED as to the second and third causes of action
(2) Defendant’s NORC
fails to identify the case number of the case purportedly pending in the
Stanley Mosk courthouse (it gives the case number for the instant case), but
the Court assumes that Defedant is referring to case no. 24STCV00684 where
Judge Fujie who has the lower-numbered case will act on the NORC
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I. BACKGROUND¿¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿¿
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On July 25, 2024, Plaintiff 8731
Belford Fee Owner (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against Defendants Be
Meticulous, LLC; Meticulous Services, LLC (“Defendants”); and Does 1-25. This
action arises out of Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants have been running
an “illegal and unauthorized short-term rental business” in portions of a
450-unit residential apartment complex at 8731 Belford Avenue, Los Angeles,
90045 (“Belford Property”), which Plaintiff owns. (Complaint, ¶ 7.)
The
Complaint alleges three causes of action: (1) Unlawful Detainer, No Possessory
Interest, (2) Unlawful Detainer, Lawful Termination of Tenancy at Will; and (3)
Unlawful Detainer, Use of Premises for Unlawful Purpose. (Complaint, ¶¶ 24, 30,
37.)
B. Procedural
On August 16, 2024, Defendants filed this
demurrer. On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. Defendant’s Reply papers were tardily filed on
September 30, 2024, a mere four days before the hearing. Plaintiff filed objections to the tardy reply
brief and the tardy reply declaration also on September 30, 2024. The Court reviewed the late-filed reply
papers and the objections which do not materially affect the Court’s tentative ruling.
¿¿
¿II. MOVING
PARTY’S GROUNDS FOR THE DEMURRER
¿¿¿
Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that:
(1) the fifteen properties that are the subject of the action (“Subject
Properties”) are governed by the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance and
just cause for eviction is required, (2) verifications filed in previous
unlawful detainer actions against Defendants by Plaintiff’s once-removed
predecessor in interest for the Subject Properties verify and admit Defendants’
lease of the Subject Properties, and (3) Plaintiff’s Notice is defective.
¿III. JUDICIAL
NOTICE
A.
Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice
Defendants request that the
court take judicial notice of (1) information on the Subject Properties via
Zimas.lacity.org, (2) thirteen previously filed Unlawful Detainer Actions
against Defendants, and (3) Wilshire Properties, Inc.’s corporate documents
filed with the California Secretary of State.
Under Evidence Code § 452, the court may take judicial notice of
matters that include records or rules of another court and facts or
propositions of common knowledge, among other matters. However, the court cannot take judicial notice of the truth
of the contents of such matters. (Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 363, 369, fn. 1 [“The court may take judicial notice of the
filing and contents of a government claim, but not the truth of the claim”];
Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c) and (d) [stating that a court may take judicial
notice of official acts of the government and court records of this state].
The information on the Subject Properties is information
maintained by Los Angeles City. The thirteen previously filed actions were with
this court. The corporate documents were filed with the Secretary of State. All
of these documents are records maintained by state and local public entities,
including this court. As such, Defendants’ Request is GRANTED.
B.
Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff requests that the court
take judicial notice of (1) the Complaint filed in Be Meticulous, LLC et al
v. Madison Realty Capital Advisors, 24STCV00684; (2) the First Amended
Complaint filed in the foregoing case, and (3) Los Angeles Ordinance No. 185931
(“Home-Sharing Ordinance”).
Under Evidence Code § 452, the court may take judicial notice of
matters that include records or rules of another court and facts or
propositions of common knowledge, among other matters. The Court may also
take notice of regulations and legislative enactments issues by or under the
authority of the United States or any public entity in the United States.
(Evid. Code § 452, subd. (b).) Thus, Plaintiff’s Request is GRANTED.
IV. ANALYSIS¿¿
¿¿
A.
Legal
Standard
As a
general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the
face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v.
Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests
the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc.
v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)
As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or
implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a
demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a
reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court
that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v.
YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any
reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it
is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada
Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
Finally,
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a
demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in
person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to
demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached
that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five
days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a
declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.41, subd. (a)(3).)
B.
Discussion
Plaintiff’s three causes of action are
claims for unlawful detainer, which is governed by California Code of Civil
Procedure, section 1162, which sets forth that:
When the
tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property, or
any part thereof, after the expiration of the term for which it is let to the
tenant; provided the expiration is of a nondefault nature however brought about
without the permission of the landlord, or the successor in estate of the
landlord, if applicable; including the case where the person to be removed
became the occupant of the premises as a servant, employee, agent, or licensee
and the relation of master and servant, or employer and employee, or principal
and agent, or licensor and licensee, has been lawfully terminated or the time
fixed for occupancy by the agreement between the parties has expired; but
nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as preventing the removal of the
occupant in any other lawful manner; but in case of a tenancy at will, it shall
first be terminated by notice, as prescribed in the Civil Code.
¿
(Code Civ. Proc, §
1161, subd. (1).)
In
short, the elements for unlawful detainer under section 1161(1) are: (1) the
tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) the possession is without
permission; and (3) the tenant has been properly served with written notice. Because
an unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding, the statutory procedure
must be strictly followed. (Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70
Cal.App.3d 742, 746 [internal citation omitted].)
Defendants
demur to the action by arguing that they held a valid lease with Plaintiff’s
predecessor in interest, that Plaintiff’s eviction required just cause, and
Plaintiff’s notice of eviction was defective.
1.
First
Cause of Action: Unlawful Detainer, No Possessory Interest
Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that “Defendants
hold no interest in the [Subject Properties], whether a leasehold interest or
otherwise. There exists no contractual relationship between the Landlord and
any of the Defendants.” (Complaint, ¶ 22.) For
the purposes of a demurrer, the Complaint’s allegations are accepted as true. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116
Cal.App.4th at 994.)
Defendants
argue that they held a valid written lease, which is evidenced by verifications
in separate unlawful detainer actions. (Demurrer, p. 8.) Defendants have
submitted these filings for judicial notice, but as discussed above, the court
may take judicial notice of the filing and contents of a claim, but not the
truth of the claim. (Gong, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 369, fn.
1.) As such, the court may not take judicial notice that these prior cases
established that Defendants had a valid lease. Defendants further argue that
Plaintiff has not pled facts to allege the absence of a lease. (Reply to
Opposition to Demurrer, p. 5.) However, Plaintiff rebuts the existence of a written
lease by pointing to Defendants’ pleadings in a separate proceeding, in which
Defendants affirmed their claim to possession arises from an oral lease
agreement. (Opposition to the Demurrer, p. 18.) Again, the court cannot take
judicial notice of the truth of information in a separate proceeding. But the
parties’ conflicting factual allegations present a factual issue that cannot be
disposed of through a demurrer.
Whether
Defendants held a valid lease and possessory interests is a question that
cannot be answered without considering facts beyond the face of the Complaint. However,
the prior lawsuit verified by an officer of the same entity, Wilshire
Properties, as verified the instant Complaint, creates uncertainty in the
allegations of the first cause of action that are not addressed or clarified by
the instant Complaint’s allegations. Plaintiff
has not alleged sufficient facts to address its once-removed predecessor, and
the arguments raised in the Opposition papers add to the uncertainty by use of
language such as “direct predecessor.” The Court finds these uncertainties to justify sustaining the demurrer to the first cause
of action, but leave to amend within 10 days is granted to address the
uncertainties.
2.
Second
Cause of Action: Unlawful Detainer, Lawful Termination of Tenancy at Will
Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that
“to the extent [Defendants claim] or may establish at trial the existence of a
tenancy or other estate at will, [Plaintiff] has lawfully terminated such
tenancy upon thirty (30) days’ notice…” (Complaint, ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff alleges that its predecessor served the 30-Day Notice on Defendants
in the manner required under Civil Code, section 789 and Code of Civil
Procedure, section 1162. (Complaint, ¶
27.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that just cause was not required for eviction
because Defendants are not a “tenant,” a natural person, or using the Subject
Properties as a residence. (Complaint, ¶ 9.)
In
their demurrer, Defendants first argue that the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance
applies to the Subject Properties, which would require Plaintiff to have just
cause for eviction. (Demurrer, pp. 5, 7.) However, Plaintiff argues that
Defendants are not entitled to claim protection against Ordinances which
require just cause, because they held no possessory interest, are not natural
persons, and applying such Ordinances would subvert the purpose of the
Ordinances. (Opposition to Demurrer, p. 15–17.) Plaintiff has alleged
sufficient facts to show a cause of action for use of premises for an unlawful
purpose, discussed infra, IV.B.3.
The
interpretation of a statute and the application of a statutory provision to facts
are legal questions, for the purposes of a demurrer. (Guteierrez v. Carmax
Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1242.) The Court
finds that the parties concede that the purpose of the Los Angeles Rent
Stabilization Ordinance was enacted to address a housing shortage (Demurrer, p.
7; Opposition to Demurrer, p. 17.) Defendants rely on Carter v. Cohen
for the proposition that the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance applies
to all rental units within its jurisdiction. (Demurrer, p. 7.) However, Carter
v. Cohen is distinguishable from the present case because the parties are
individual natural people, and the tenant in that case did not allegedly rent
multiple properties or seek to further sublease the property in dispute. (Carter
v. Cohen, 188 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1042.) The Carter v. Cohen court did
not determine that the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance applies to
entities like Defendants, and we decline to do so here. The Court finds that
Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under the second
cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Defendants
also argue that Plaintiff’s thirty-day termination
notice was defective, because Defendants possessed the property for longer than
a year. (Demurrer, pp. 8–9.) Civil Code, section 1946.1 states that a “hiring
of a residential real property for a term not specified by the parties is
deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied
by law unless of the parties gives written notice to the other of his or her
intention to terminate the tenancy.” Civil Code, section 1945 provides for the
creation of a month-to-month tenancy. If the subject property or properties are
subject to the Tenant Protection Act of 2019, then the notice required for
termination of a month-to-month tenancy is either 30 days or 60 days, depending
on whether the tenant has possessed the residence for less than a year. (Civ.
Code § 1946.1(b), (c).)
However, in its Complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants “hold no interest in the [Subject Properties], whether
a leasehold interest or otherwise.” (Complaint, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff
also does not allege any facts from which the applicability of the Tenant Protection
Act could be inferred, and the Complaint does not allege that Defendants have
been in residential occupancy of the 15 units for more than a year. As a
result, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts supporting
the second cause of action for unlawful detainer.
3.
Third
Cause of Action: Unlawful Detainer, Use of Premises for Unlawful Purpose
Finally, Plaintiff alleges in its
Complaint that it seeks possession on the grounds that Defendants are using the
Premises for an unlawful purpose. (Complaint, ¶ 32.) Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants violated Los Angeles Ordinance No. 18591 by “offering,
advertising, booking, facilitating, and/or engaging in Home Sharing and/or
Short Term Rental activity on the [Subject Properties.” (Complaint, ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have been renting out multiple units that are
not Defendants’ primary residence, in violation of the Ordinance. (Complaint, ¶
32.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to obtain a home-sharing
registration number, failed to include it in rental listings, and failed to
obtain written permission from Plaintiff prior to engaging in short term rental
activity. (Complaint, ¶ 13.)
In
their Demurrer, Defendants do not contest these allegations, or that unlawful
home sharing would constitute just cause for eviction. In their Reply,
Defendants “dispute Plaintiff’s allegations that they are engaged in illegal
short-term rental activities.” Whether Defendants are in violation of the
Home-Sharing Ordinance is a factual issue that cannot be adjudicated on
demurrer.” (Reply to Opposition to Demurrer, p. 8.)
Though
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are premature factual issues,
these allegations are facts that support Plaintiff’s third cause of action. As
previously discussed, a complaint’s allegations are accepted as true for the
purposes of a demurrer. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.) Defendants have
not made a showing that Plaintiff alleged insufficient facts to support its
third cause of action.
IV. CONCLUSION¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Demurrer is OVERRULED as
to the second and third causes of action, and SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to
amend as to the first cause of action. Unless waived, notice of the ruling shall be given by
Plaintiff.
Tentative Ruling¿¿
¿¿¿
HEARING DATE: October
4, 2024
¿¿¿ CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV02401
¿¿¿ CASE NAME: 8731 Belford Fee Owner, LLC v. Be
Meticulous, LLC; Meticulous Services, LLC; and Doe
¿¿¿ MOVING
PARTY: Defendant Meticulous
Services, LLC; Be Meticulous, LLC
¿¿¿ RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff 8731 Belford Fee Owner
LLC
¿¿¿ TRIAL DATE: None
Set
¿¿¿ MOTION:¿ (1) Motion for Protective Order
(2) Request for Sanctions
¿¿ Tentative
Rulings: (1) , (2) The Court will be briefly continuing the hearing
but will inquire as to any additional meeting and conferring between counsel since
the opposition and objection papers were filed
I. BACKGROUND¿¿¿
¿¿¿ Factual¿¿¿
On
July 25, 2024, Plaintiff 8731 Belford Fee Owner (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant
action against Defendants Be Meticulous, LLC; Meticulous Services, LLC
(“Defendants”); and Does 1-25. The Complaint alleges three causes of action:
(1) Unlawful Detainer, No Possessory Interest, (2) Unlawful Detainer, Lawful
Termination of Tenancy at Will; and (3) Unlawful Detainer, Use of Premises for
Unlawful Purpose. (Complaint, ¶¶ 24, 30, 37.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
have been running an “illegal and unauthorized short-term rental business” in
portions of a 450-unit residential apartment complex at 8731 Belford Avenue,
Los Angeles, 90045 (“Belford Property”), which Plaintiff owns. (Complaint, ¶
7.)
There is a separate pending
civil action (24STCV00684) filed by Defendants concerning forty-two properties,
fifteen of which are the same properties involved in the present action. (Motion
for Protective Order, p. 4.) Parties have undertaken discovery in that action.
(Motion for Protective Order, p. 4.)
On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff propounded
and served requests for production of documents on Defendants in the instant
unlawful detainer action. (Motion for Protective Order, p. 6.) On August 23,
2024, Plaintiff propounded and served requests for production of documents in the
civil action. (Motion for Protective Order, p. 6.) Defendants assert that the
requests for production of documents are identical and seek the same
information. (Motion for Protective Order, p. 6.) Defendants also assert that
they have served verified, code-compliant responses in the civil action.
(Motion for Protective Order, p. 7.)
On August 26, 2024, Defendants filed a
Notice of Related case with the intention of consolidating to avoid the
duplication of discovery. (Motion for Protective Order, p. 7.) Plaintiff
opposed the Notice. (Motion for Protective Order, p. 7.) The NORC and an objection to it were also
filed in the “Civil Action” pending before Judge Fujie, who has the
lower-numbered case.
B. Procedural
On September 6, 2024, Defendants
filed a Motion for Protective Order to limit Plaintiff’s discovery requests,
alleging that they are duplicative, overly broad, and irrelevant in many
instances. (Motion for Protective Order, p. 10.) On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff
filed an opposition and objections to the declaration of defense counsel. ¿¿
¿II. MEET AND
CONFER
On
August 26, 2024, Defendants emailed a meet and confer letter to Plaintiff.
(Declaration of Michelangelo Tatone, ¶ 11.) On August 30, 2024, parties met and
conferred telephonically. (Declaration of Michelangelo Tatone, ¶ 11.)
On September 3, 2024, Defendants sent a
second meet and confer letter to Plaintiffs. (Declaration of Michelangelo
Tatone, ¶ 11.) On September 4, 2024, parties met and conferred; however, Plaintiff
was unwilling to amend the requests. (Declaration of Michelangelo Tatone, ¶
11.)
III. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff separately filed evidentiary
objections to the Declaration of Michelangelo Tatone with their Opposition. The
Court has not yet had the opportunity to consider in detail the objections nor
to prepare a tentative ruling on the motion, so the Court will be briefly
continuing the hearing.