Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV02464, Date: 2025-02-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24TRCV02464 Hearing Date: February 27, 2025 Dept: 8
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HEARING DATE: February 27, 2025
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CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV02464
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CASE NAME: Erica Morrison; Henry
Martinez v. Campbell Family Investments Irvine, LLC, et al.
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MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Campbell Family Investments
Irvine, LLC & Pan American Properties
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Erica Morrison and Henry
Martinez
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TRIAL DATE: Not
Set.
MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer
(2)
Motion to Strike
Tentative Rulings: (1) SUSTAINED in part,
OVERRULED in part.
(2)
GRANTED in part (as to the nuisance claim), DENIED in part (as to the IIED
claim).
I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
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On July 30,
2024, Plaintiffs, Erica Morrison and Henry Martinez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
filed a complaint against Defendants, Campbell Family Investments Irvine, LLC,
Pan American Properties, Inc., and DOES 1 through 100. The complaint alleges
causes of action for: (1) Violation of California Civil Code section 1942.4;
(2) Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability; (3) Private Nuisance; (4)
Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.; (5) Negligence;
(6) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; and (7) Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress.
Now,
Defendants, Campbell Family Investments Irvine, LLC
and Pan American Properties (hereinafter, “Defendants”) file a Demurrer and
Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
B. Procedural¿¿
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On January 24, 2025, Defendants filed a demurrer and
motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint. On February 10, 2025,
Plaintiffs filed opposition briefs. On February 20, 2025, Defendants filed
reply briefs.
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Demurrer
i.
Legal
Standard
A demurrer can be used only to challenge
defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters
outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only
allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that
might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A.
v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For
the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer
admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City
Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab
Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿
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A pleading is uncertain if it is
ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer
for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders
the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to
respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed,
even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can
be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of
California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿
ii.
Discussion
Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ complaint on the grounds that they
argue Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for private nuisance and seventh cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress do not state
sufficient facts to state causes of action against Defendants.
1.
Meet and Confer Requirement
The
declaration of Stephanie S. Poli, Esq., (“Poli Decl.”) is offered in support of
counsel’s compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Poli declares
that on January 14, 2025, she called Plaintiffs’ counsel in an attempt to meet
and confer regarding Defendants intention to file a demurrer and motion to
strike. (Poli Decl., ¶ 3.) Poli states that she was directed to email
Plaintiffs’ counsel and did so the same day. (Poli Decl., ¶ 3.) Poli asserts
that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s single response did not address the meet and confer
efforts. (Poli Decl., ¶ 3.) As such, on January 16, 2025, Poli asserts she sent
written correspondence setting forth the basis for the intended filing of a
demurrer and motion to strike. To date, Poli maintains that she received no
response. (Poli Decl., ¶ 3.)
This Court finds that the meet and
confer requirements have been met.
2.
Third Cause of Action – Private Nuisance
To establish an action for private nuisance,
(1) “the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his
property”; (2) “the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and
enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes the
plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage”; (3) “the interference with the
protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be
unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to
constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners,
LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-263, citations, italics, brackets, and
quotation marks omitted.)
Courts have allowed plaintiffs to
litigate nuisance causes of action in cases involving housing conditions.
(See, e.g., Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 919.)
“The torts of negligence and nuisance . . . frequently are, coexisting and
practically inseparable . . . . A nuisance, if not in most, instances,
especially with respect to buildings or premises, presupposes negligence.”
(Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 92,
104.) When the overriding issue involves a traditional tort, the claim
should not be litigated under “the guise of a nuisance action.” (City
of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (1995) 30 Cal.App.4th 575, 584.)
“When negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about
lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim. (El
Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337,
1349.) In such cases, the nuisance claim “stands or falls with the
determination of the negligence cause of action.” (Pamela W. v.
Millsom (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 950, 954.)
Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521 is
instructive. In Melton, the trial court properly sustained
defendant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ nuisance cause of action because that claim
“[relied] entirely on the facts asserted in plaintiffs’ causes of action for
negligence and premises liability[,]” both of which were also properly
sustained. (Melton, 183 Cal.App.4th at 540, 542.) As such,
the “nuisance cause of action was merely a clone of the first cause of action
using a different label.” (Id. at 543, citing El Escorial
Owners’ Assn., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.) Melton
makes clear that a nuisance claim cannot survive demurrer if the facts upon
which it rests mirror those of an unviable negligence claim, and nothing more.
Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ third cause of action
for private nuisance and fifth cause of action for negligence arise out of a
purported breach of due care to maintain the premises in a habitable condition.
Defendants highlight that Plaintiffs claim that Defendants “negligently and
carelessly maintained, operated, and managed the Subject property thus
breaching the duties owed to Plaintiffs.” (Complaint, ¶ 130.) Defendants argue
that the private nuisance claim simply states the same issues as alleged
throughout the rest of the complaint, including termite infestation, structural
damage, mold issues, plumbing issues, electrical issues, deficient weather
proofing, and lifting flooring. (Complaint, ¶ 106.) Defendants contend there
are no factual allegations alleged that differentiate these two causes of
action, the nuisance claim is “merely a clone” of the negligence claim.
Here, the Court also finds that the negligence
and private nuisance claims rest on the same facts and theories. Although the
Court does not find the causes of action to be alleged verbatim, the Court
nonetheless does not find there to be a meaningful distinction between the two
causes of action. The Court will allow
oral argument as to this issue, but the tentative ruling is to SUSTAIN demurrer
and discuss leave to amend.
3.
Seventh Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
Next,
Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. “The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that
usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and
ellipses omitted.)
Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress fails because it is based on the same habitability,
negligence, and nuisance allegations and do not raise to the level of “extreme”
and “outrageous.” The Court disagrees. In fact, the Court finds the allegation
that Defendants knew and were placed on notice of the multiple allegations of
the state of the property, yet allegedly failed to remedy or attempt to make
remediation efforts it despite multiple complaints made in addition to numerous
inspections conducted, if proven true, could be found by a jury to rise to the
level of extreme and outrageous conduct. As such, the demurrer to this cause of
action is OVERRULED.
B. Motion to
Strike
i.
Legal Standard
The court
may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems
proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any
pleading.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).)¿ The court may also strike all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿ (Id., § 436(b).)¿ The
grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false
improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws.¿ (Id.,
§ 436.)¿ The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the
pleading or by way of judicial notice.¿ (Id., § 437.)¿ “When the defect
which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow
leave to amend.”¿ (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)¿
ii.
Discussion
Defendants seek to strike any
mention to punitive damages. While the Court is SUSTAINING the demurrer as to
the third cause of action, the Court is overruling the demurrer to the intentional
infliction claim which could potentially support punitive damages. The Court also finds that other allegations,
if proven, may rise to the level of
despicable, malicious, willful, knowing, cruel, unjust, and/or
oppressive conduct. Thus, the references in the Complaint to justify punitive damages
predicated on the nuisance cause of action should be striken, but the Court DENIES the Motion to Strike as to the
other portions of the complaint.
III.
CONCLUSION¿¿
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For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’
demurrer is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part. The Motion to Strike is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part.
Defendants are ordered to
provide notice.
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