Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 24TRCV03391, Date: 2025-01-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24TRCV03391    Hearing Date: January 14, 2025    Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling 

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HEARING DATE:                 January 14, 2025 

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CASE NUMBER:                   24TRCV03391

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CASE NAME:                        Tony Bell; Keyanna Williams v. Shivam Investments Inc., et al. 

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MOVING PARTY:                 Defendants, Shivam Investments Inc. and Carlos Naranjo

 

RESPONDING PARTY:        Plaintiffs, Tony Bell and Keyanna Williams.

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TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set.

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MOTION:¿                              (1) Demurrer

                                                (2) Motion to Strike

 

Tentative Rulings:                  (1) SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

(2) MOOTED.

 

 

 

I. BACKGROUND¿ 

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A. Factual¿ 

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On October 9, 2024, Plaintiffs, Tony Bell and Keyanna Williams (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a complaint against Defendants, Shivam Investments Inc., Carlos Naranjo, and DOES 1 through 50. The complaint alleges a cause of action for: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability; (2) Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability; (3) Negligence; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Violation of Unlawful Business Practices (Business & Professions Code Section 17200); and (6) Violation of Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances Section 8.52.130(B).

 

Now, Defendants, Shivam Investments Inc. and Carlos Naranjo (collectively, “Defendants”) have filed a demurrer to Plaintiff’s first, second, and fourth causes of action.

 

B. Procedural  

 

On November 22, 2024, Defendants filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint. On December 23, 2024, Plaintiffs, Tony Bell and Keyanna Williams, filed opposition briefs. On December 30, 2024, Defendants filed reply briefs. 

 

 

II. ANALYSIS ¿ 

 

A.    Demurrer

 

                                       i.          Legal Standard

 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿ 

 

A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿ 

 

                                     ii.           Meet and Confer Efforts

The declaration of Christopher G. Kerr, Esq. (“Kerr Decl.”), is offered in support of counsel’s compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Kerr declares that on November 18, 2024, he spoke on the phone with Plaintiff’s counsel to meet and confer in advance of the filing of a demurrer and motion to strike. (Kerr Decl., ¶ 3.) Despite the Counsels’ telephonic meet and confer efforts, Kerr states that they were unable to come to an agreement. (Kerr Decl., ¶ 3.)  The Court finds Defendants have sufficiently met and conferred prior to bringing the demurrer.

                                    iii.          Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability as against Defendant, Carlos Naranjo (“Naranjo”) on the grounds that Naranjo is a property manager, and therefore cannot be liable under any Breach of Contract Theories.

Plaintiffs’ opposition brief concedes that they take no issue dismissing the first cause of action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability as to Defendant, Naranjo only. As such, the demurrer is SUSTAINED with respect to the first cause of action as to Defendant Naranjo only.

                                    iv.          Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability

Although Defendants concede Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability (as it pertains to Defendant Shivam Investments Inc.), correctly states the standard and basis for habitability, they argue the second cause of action for Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability is merely an attempt to re-plead the first cause of action as through it is a tort.  In Plaintiffs’ opposition brief, they also state that they have no issue with the requested dismissal of the second cause of action. Thus, the Court sustains the demurrer as to the second cause of action.

                                      v.          Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead outrageous conduct or severe emotional distress with specificity, and instead, merely plead them in a conclusory way.  Defendants base their arguments on paragraph 44 of the complaint, alleging “Defendants’ conduct intentionally fail[ed] to repair and maintain the Subject Property was outrageous and beyond all boundaries of decency and reasonable civilized conduct. Defendants at all times knew and were aware that failing to repair and maintain the Subject Property would result in PLAINTIFFS suffering emotional distress and other damages. Defendants at all times acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing PLAINTIFFS severe emotional distress. Defendants intentionally failed to repair and maintain the Subject Property in an attempt to save money, increase their cash flow, intimidate PLAINTIFFS into not complaining, and/or to cause PLAINTIFFS to abandon the Subject Property.” (Complaint, ¶ 44.)

 

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ have alleged “extreme” and “outrageous” conduct in a conclusory way.  While Defendants fail to consider that the fourth cause of action incorporates by reference the entirety of Plaintiffs’ general allegations. (Complaint, ¶ 43), even the very detailed and specific contentions as to Defendants’ alleged conduct, if proven true, do not in the Court’s view amount to outrageous conduct that would exceed the boundaries of decency and in an orderly society.  Many tenants allege vermin or pest infestations, fungal growth, and failures of landlords to repair in garden-variety habitability claims.  While there is more here than the garden variety, the standard for extreme and outrageous misconduct is higher than what Plaintiffs have alleged thus far.  Thus, this Court SUSTAINS the demurrer with leave to amend, to allow Plaintiffs to allege more specific allegations of the “severe” and/or “extreme” emotional distress they have suffered due to Defendants’ alleged actions, and how the lack of heating or other alleged problems with the rental unit exceeds all bounds of what one could be expected to tolerate in our society.  But if Plaintiffs represent that they can provide more specifics or more detail as to the extreme and outrageous nature of the alleged misconduct of Defendants, the Court will permit leave to amend.   

 

B.    Motion to Strike

 

                                       i.          Legal Standard

 

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)¿¿ 

 

                                     ii.           Discussion

 

Defendant’s Motion to Strike seeks to strike allegations and prayer for relief of punitive damages from Plaintiffs’ complaint. Because Defendants’ basis for striking the paragraphs pertaining to punitive damages are based, in part, on the same arguments made in the demurrer, the Court finds that the Motion to Strike is MOOTED as it pertains to the paragraphs sustained on demurrer.

 

IV. CONCLUSION

 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. The motion to strike is MOOTED.

 

Unless notice is waived, Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this court’s ruling. ¿