Judge: Rupert A. Byrdsong, Case: 23STCV22493, Date: 2025-01-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV22493 Hearing Date: January 16, 2025 Dept: 28
Tentative
Ruling
Judge Rupert A.
Byrdsong
Department 28
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Hearing
Date: January 16, 2025
Case Name: Glasby v. Dutch Apparel,
LLC
Case
No.: 23STCV22493
Motion: Set Aside Entry of Default
Moving Party: Dutch Apparel, LLC
Responding Party: Unopposed
Notice: OK
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Recommended Ruling: Defendants’ motion to set aside entry of
default is DENIED.
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BACKGROUND
On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff Hannah
Glasby (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Dutch Apparel, LLC (“Defendant”)
and Does 1 through 50. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for (1) nonpayment of
wages and (2) waiting time penalties under Labor Code Section 203.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant employer her
as a model for a still image shoot on January 25, 2022. Plaintiff claims her
wages for the shoot were $2,500.00. Allegedly, Defendant failed to timely pay
Plaintiff for her work as a model. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks statutory
damages for the nonpayment of wages and for waiting time penalties.
Plaintiff personally served Defendant on
October 22, 2023. The Clerk entered default against Defendant on May 7, 2024. Defendant
now moves to set aside entry of default.
MOVING PARTY POSITION
Defendant argues that setting aside default
is mandatory in this case because Defendant’s counsel erred and has attached an
affidavit to this motion explaining counsel’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect. Defendant’s counsel attests that he believed that the
case was at issue because the eCourt system accepted Defendant’s answer in this
matter for filing, signifying to counsel that the default had been vacated. Further,
counsel states that he would have learned of this error at the case management
conference on September 30, 2024, but counsel’s office recently changed
practice management software systems, and the case management conference, as
well as other hearings, were deleted from counsel’s calendar. Counsel urges the
Court that Defendant should not be punished for counsel’s error.
OPPOSITION
No opposition filed as of 1/13/2024.
REPLY
No reply filed as of 1/13/2024.
ANALYSIS
“The court may, upon any terms as may be
just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or
her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b). “Application for this relief shall be
accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed
therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made
within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment,
dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”
Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b).
“[T]he court shall, whenever an application
for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in
proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to
his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1)
resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which
will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment
or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the
default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”
Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b).
Section 473 “is remedial in its nature and is
to be liberally constructed.” Reed v.
Williamson (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 244, 248. The statute’s purpose “is to
promote the determination of actions on their merits.” Even Zohar Const. & Remodeling, Inc.
v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 839. “Even in a case
where the showing under [CCP § 473] is not strong, or where there is any doubt
as to the setting aside of a default, such doubt should be resolved in favor of
the application.” Reed, supra,
185 Cal.App.2d at 249.
Here, the Clerk entered default against the
Defendant on May 7, 2024, but Defendant did not file the motion to set aside
entry of default until December 18, 2024. Defendant’s motion is beyond the
six-month period laid out in Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b). When a
motion to set aside default is untimely under Section 473(b), statutory relief
is not available. Mason, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
36, 42.
However, Defendant can still seek to set
aside the entry of default on equitable grounds. Id. Equitable relief to
set aside entry of default is only available in exceptional circumstances. Luxury
Asset Lending, LLC v. Philadelphia Television Networks, Inc. (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 894, 910. “To set aside a judgment based on extrinsic fraud or
extrinsic mistake, the moving party must satisfy three elements: ‘First, the
defaulted party must demonstrate that it has a meritorious case. Secondly, the
party seeking to set aside the default must articulate a satisfactory excuse
for not presenting a defense to the original action. Lastly, the moving party
must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default once it had been
discovered.’” Id. at 911 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The issue here is that Defendant has not made
any arguments regarding equitable relief. Defendant has not demonstrated
exception circumstances, fraud, or mistake. Thus, the Court cannot, on its own,
set aside entry of default in this matter on equitable grounds. The parties may
stipulate to setting aside entry of default.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s
motion to set aside entry of default is DENIED.