Judge: Rupert A. Byrdsong, Case: 24STCV20788, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV20788    Hearing Date: June 5, 2025    Dept: 28

Tentative Ruling

Judge Rupert A. Byrdsong

Department 28

Hearing Date:                                  June 6, 2025    

Case Name:                                     Downey Federal Credit Union v. Ramirez, et al.

Case No.                                          24STCV20788                                               

Motion                                             Default Judgment

Moving Party:                                 Plaintiff Downey Federal Credit Union

Responding Party:                          Unopposed

Notice                                               OK

Recommended Ruling:               Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment in its favor                                                                         and against Defendant Rafeal Armando Perez Ramirez is                                                                             GRANTED in the amount of $49,795.80.                

BACKGROUND

On August 16, 2024, Plaintiff Downey Federal Credit Union (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Rafael Armando Perez Ramirez (“Defendant”), as well as against California Department of Motor Vehicles and Does 1 through 20. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for (1) breach of contract (retail installment sale contract), (2) money lent, (3) account stated, (4) foreclosure and recovery of personal property, (5) conversion, (6) declaratory relief, and (7) temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Plaintiff alleges that George Chevrolet and Defendant entered into a written retail installment sale contract for the purchase of a 2021 Chevrolet Silverado for $64,614.85. Plaintiff claims Defendant financed the vehicle with George Chevrolet, and in exchange for financing, Defendant granted George Chevrolet a security interest in the vehicle. Allegedly, Defendant failed to make payments on the car, leaving an unpaid balance of $44,324.20. Plaintiff claims George Chevrolet assigned its rights in the contract to Plaintiff, and now, Plaintiff seeks to recover the outstanding amount.

Plaintiff personally served Defendant on January 30, 2025. On March 7, 2025, the Clerk entered default against Defendant. This is Plaintiff’s first request for entry of default judgment.

ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) Section 585 permits entry of a judgment after a defendant’s default has been entered.  A party seeking judgment on the default by the Court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP Section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties.  CRC 3.1800.

JC Form CIV-100 must be used to request court judgment.  Item number 2 must be completed.  Item number 8 must be completed if the Defendant is an individual.  Plaintiff must submit a proposed form of judgment. 

Here, Plaintiff filed a JC Form CIV-100 for Defendant, completed items 2 and 8, and submitted a proposed form of judgment using a JUD-100 form. Plaintiff dismissed the Doe defendants from the case on March 12, 2025. California Department of Motor Vehicles remains a defendant in this action, but its presence in this lawsuit does not prevent entry of default judgment against Defendant. Plaintiff only sued California Department of Motor Vehicles to obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendant from transferring or re-registering title to the vehicle. Santos Decl., ¶ 15. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not seeking joint and several liability against all Defendants, so seeking judgment against Defendant is proper. Mirabile v. Smith (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 685, 688-89. In other words, Plaintiff only seeks to recover the unpaid amounts from Defendant, not from California Department of Motor Vehicles, so no joint and several liability exists.

By defaulting, a defendant is deemed to admit all material allegations of the complaint that are well pleaded.  Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156.  The complaint need only alleged facts sufficient to apprise a defendant of the nature of the plaintiff’s demand, and it is immaterial that the complaint might have been subject to a demurrer for failure to make an allegation necessary to state a cause of action.  Id. at 1157.  See also CCP § 431.20; Bristol Convalescent Hospital v. Stone (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 848, 859 (stating that defaulting defendant admits absolute verity of all allegations of complaint giving rise to liability).

The plaintiff must prove the amount of damages before an actual entry of default judgment.  See Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1745.  In determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages after the defendant has defaulted, the plaintiff is only required to present evidence establishing a prima facie case for damages.  Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362.  The trial court must hear the evidence offered by the plaintiff and render judgment “‘in [its] favor for such sum, not exceeding the amount stated in the complaint, or for such relief, not exceeding that demanded in the complaint, as appears from the evidence to be just.  [Citations.]’”  Id. at 362.

A.           General Damages

The demand of the complaint is $44,324.20. Defendant and George Chevrolet entered into a Retail Installment Sale Contract for the sale of a 2021 Chevrolet Silverado for $64,614.85. Santos Decl., Ex. 1. Defendant failed to make payments on the vehicle, leaving an outstanding balance of $44,324.20, which is the amount required to pay off the car loan. Santos Decl., ¶¶ 9, 11, Ex. 3. George Chevrolet assigned its interest in the contract to Plaintiff. Santos Decl., Ex. 1, p. 8. Therefore, Plaintiff can recover the outstanding amounts on Defendant’s car loan.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to recover $44,324.20 in damages.

B.           Costs

Plaintiff requests recovery of costs in the amount of $537.80.  The memorandum of costs states that the request is based on (a) $435.00 in clerk’s filing fees and (b) $102.80 in process server’s fees.  CIV-100, ln. 7.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to costs in the amount of $537.80.

C.           Interest

Plaintiff seeks to recover interest pursuant to the Retail Installment Sale Contract. Santos Decl., Ex. 1. The contract calls for an annual interest rate of 6.90%. Santos Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 1. Plaintiff seeks to recover interest from February 17, 2024, the day after Defendant’s last payment on the vehicle. Santos Decl., ¶¶ 9, 11. Plaintiff seeks to recover interest through March 7, 2025, the day that Defendant’s default was entered. Santos Decl., ¶ 11. The standard interest calculator shows that the interest accrued during that time equals $3,217.57, but Plaintiff only seeks $3,214.08 in interest. Santos Decl., ¶ 11. The Court will award Plaintiff the lower amount in interest.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to interest in the amount of $3,214.08.

D.          Attorney Fees

Plaintiff seeks to recover $1,719.72 in attorney fees pursuant to the Retail Installment Sale Contract. Santos Decl., Ex. 1, ¶3.c. The contract provides that if Defendant fails to pay or pays late, Defendant will be responsible for collections costs, including Plaintiff’s attorney fees. Santos Decl., Ex. 1, ¶3.c. Because this is a default judgment application and the contract provision provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees, LASC Rule 3.214(a) applies. Rule 3.214(a) states that a party entitled to attorney fees pursuant to a contract on a default judgment application for an amount between $10,000.01 and $50,000.00 may recover $690.00 plus 3% of the excess over $10,000.00. As stated above, the damage amount is $44,324.20, so Plaintiff may recover $690.00 plus 3% of $34,324.20, which is $1,029.72. When totaled, the attorney fee amount is $1,719.72.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees in the amount of $1,719.72

E.           Total Judgment

The Court finds that Plaintiff proved the following judgment amount against Defendants:

CONCLUSION

Therefore, Plaintiff's request for entry of default judgment in its favor and against Defendant Rafael Armando Perez Ramirez. is GRANTED in the amount of $49,795.80.