Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 19PSCV00880, Date: 2024-11-12 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 19PSCV00880    Hearing Date: November 12, 2024    Dept: G

Defendant Weishi Xie’s Motion to Amend Judgment

Respondent: NO OPPOSITION

Defendant Weishi Xie’s Motion to Enforce Protections on Social Security Income and Household Funds under Federal and California Law and Request to Unfreeze Bank Accounts

Respondent: Plaintiffs Tony To Chong Loo, Cui Ping Loo, Danny Weising Loo, and William Loo

Non-Party Weiming He’s Claim of Exemption

Respondent: Plaintiffs Tony To Chong Loo, Cui Ping Loo, Danny Weising Loo, and William Loo

Defendant Agnes Nwapa-Jourdan’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons; Vacate and Set Aside Default and Default Judgment; Recall and Quash Writs of Execution and Abstracts of Judgment; Dismissing the Action Pursuant to CCP Sec. 583.210 and 250 et seq.

Respondent: Plaintiffs Tony To Chong Loo, Cui Ping Loo, Danny Weising Loo, and William Loo

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Weishi Xie’s Motion to Amend Judgment is DENIED without prejudice.

Defendant Weishi Xie’s Motion to Enforce Protections on Social Security Income and Household Funds under Federal and California Law and Request to Unfreeze Bank Accounts is DENIED without prejudice.

Non-Party Weiming He’s Claim of Exemption is DENIED without prejudice.

Defendant Agnes Nwapa-Jourdan’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons; Vacate and Set Aside Default and Default Judgment; Recall and Quash Writs of Execution and Abstracts of Judgment; Dismissing the Action Pursuant to CCP Sec. 583.210 and 250 et seq. is CONTINUED to a date to be determined at the hearing presently set in Department G (Pomona).

BACKGROUND

This is a consolidated action to quiet title. Plaintiffs Tony To Chong Loo, Cui Ping Loo, Danny Weising Loo, and William Loo allege that Defendant Zixi Li acted in concert with others to use the Loos’ names to forge, present, and notarize false powers of attorney and deeds of trust to obtain loans.

On October 2, 2019, the Loos, with the exception of William Loo, filed a complaint alleging the following causes of action against Li, LC Equity Group (LC Equity), Ress Financial Corporation (Ress Financial), First American Title Company (First American), Weishi Xie, Agnes N. Nwapa-Jourdan, all persons known and unknown, and Does 1-25: (1) declaratory relief, (2) cancellation of instruments, (3) slander of title, (4) quiet title, and (5) unjust enrichment. Subsequently, the following Defendants were added to the action: Sunwest Trust FBO David W. Free (Free Trust); Steven Goldenberg; Michael J. Tannenbaum; Oxnard Street, LLC (Oxnard Street); ZVI Gutentag and Michael Gutentag, Trustees of the Gutentag Family Trust (Gutentag Trust); Sunwest Trust FBO Joseph Davis (Davis Trust); Eyal Gutentag and Diane Gutentag, Trustees of the Gutentag Revocable Trust, Dated June 4, 2019 (2019 Gutentag Trust); The Bernard Rothschild Pension Plan, by and through Bernard Rothschild and James Bernard Rothshild as Trustees (Rothschild Pension Plan); Summit Capital LLC (Summit), and CDG Investments, LLC (CDG).

On December 5, 2019, Tannenbaum filed a cross-complaint against Li, Xie, and Roes 1-20, alleging causes of action for (1) indemnity, (2) contribution, (3) intentional misrepresentation, (4) concealment, and (5) negligence of a notary public. On the same day, the Davis Trust, Goldenberg, the 2019 Gutentag Trust, the Free Trust, the Gutentag Trust, Oxnard Street, CDG, and LC Equity filed a cross-complaint against the same defendants and alleging the same causes of action.

On October 2, 2019, William Loo filed a verified complaint alleging the following causes of action against Li, M. Zha, Nwapa-Jourdan, Summit, the Rothschild Pension Plan, JMR Investments (JMR), Does 1-25, and all persons unknown, alleging the following causes of action: (1) declaratory relief, (2) cancellation of instruments, (3) slander of title, (4) quiet title, and (5) unjust enrichment.

On December 5, 2019, Summit and the Rothschild Pension Plan filed a cross-complaint against Li, Zha, and Roes 1-20 for (1) indemnity, (2) contribution, (3) fraud by intentional misrepresentation, (4) fraud by concealment, and (5) negligence of a notary public.

On June 7, 2023, the separate actions by the Loos and William Loo were consolidated into the present action.

On May 23, 2024, the court entered a judgment in favor of the Loos against Xie, Zha, Li, and Nwapa-Jourdan. On June 28, 2024, the court granted the Loos’ motion for the award of attorney fees.

On September 6, 2024, Xie filed a notice of appeal.

On September 25, 2024, Xie filed the present motions.

On October 4, 2024, non-party Weiming He filed the present claim of exemption with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. The judgment creditor filed a notice of opposition to the claim of exemption and set a hearing on He’s claims for November 12, 2024.

On October 8, 2024, Nwapa-Jourdan filed the present motion to quash the service of summons.

On October 28, 2024, Xie filed a notice abandoning Xie’s appeal.

A hearing on the present motions and claim of exemption is set for November 12, 2024.

XIE’S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT

Xie moves the court to amend its previous judgment with a more detailed explanation of the legal grounds and reasoning behind the judgment. For the following reasons, the court DENIES Xie’s motion.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivisions (a)(10) and (b), a motion and its supporting papers must be filed and served at least sixteen (16) court days before the hearing date with an additional five (5) days required if the mailing address is within the State of California.

Here, while Xie’s motion included a proof of service showing the present motion was served on the court, Xie failed to provide any proof that the present motion was properly served on the other parties in this action. Because “the court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a motion that has not been properly noticed for hearing on the date in question,” the court DENIES Xie’s motion without prejudice. (Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1204-1205.)

XIE’S MOTION TO ENFORCE PROTECTIONS

Xie moves the court for an order enforcing protection against judgment collection efforts and unfreezing bank accounts. For the following reasons, the court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Xie’s motion.

Legal Standard

At a hearing on a claim of exemption, “the [judgment debtor] has the burden of proof” in demonstrating that the property claimed exempt is indeed exempt. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 703.520, subd. (b), 703.580, subds. (b), (c).) In meeting this burden, the judgment debtor must establish the right by evidence or facts; an affidavit which merely follows the language of the statute and states nothing more than conclusions of law is insufficient. (Le Font v. Rankin (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 433, 435.)

Discussion

In this case, Xie argues Xie’s Social Security benefits are exempt from wage garnishment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 407. While Xie is correct, Xie fails to present any evidence that establishes the funds levied included Social Security funds. Although Xie has filed a motion and submitted some exhibits, Xie fails to provide a proper declaration and fails to authenticate the exhibits provided. And while Xie also claims the garnishments will cause financial hardship, Xie fails to provide a proper financial statement as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 708.530.

Accordingly, the court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Xie’s motion.

HE'S CLAIM OF EXEMPTION

He claims exemption with regards to He’s wages. For the following reasons, the court DENIES He’s claim of exemption.

Legal Analysis

At a hearing on a claim of exemption, “the [judgment debtor] has the burden of proof” in demonstrating that the property claimed exempt is indeed exempt. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 703.520, subd. (b), 703.580, subds. (b), (c).) In meeting this burden, the judgment debtor must establish the right by evidence or facts; an affidavit which merely follows the language of the statute and states nothing more than conclusions of law is insufficient. (Ibid.)

Discussion

In opposition to He’s claim of exemption from wage garnishment, the Loos state this claim is inapplicable because no wage garnishment has been served in the present case. (Opp., Evanns Decl., ¶ 2.) While He is not presently represented by counsel, He is held to the same standards as an attorney. (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) Accordingly, because He did not file the proper claim for exemption, the court DENIES He’s claim of exemption.

NWAPA-JOURDAN’S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Nwapa-Jourdan moves to quash the service of summons on Nwapa-Jourdan and set aside the entry of default judgment. For the following reasons, the court CONTINUES the hearing on this motion.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), “The court may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” “[A] default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) Thus, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), “the court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper service.” (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.)

Furthermore, whenever an application for relief from default judgment is made no more than six (6) months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by the moving party’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the court may vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against the moving party or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against the moving party, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the moving party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., §473, subd. (b).) “The six-month time limit for granting statutory relief is jurisdictional and the court may not consider a motion for relief made after that period has elapsed.” (Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42 (Manson).) That “six-month period runs from entry of default, not entry of judgment.” (Id.)

Courts liberally grant motions to vacate default judgments when relief is promptly sought and the opposing party is not prejudiced as the law strongly favors resolution on the merits. (Kramer v. Traditional Escrow, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 13, 28.) Courts only require “slight evidence” to support vacating a default and resolve all doubts in favor of the party seeking relief. (Ibid.) However, “[t]he only occasion for the application of section 473 is where a party is unexpectedly placed in a situation to his injury without fault or negligence of his own and against which ordinary prudence could not have guarded.” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206, quoting Elms v. Elms (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 508, 513.)

Discussion

On October 17, 2019, the Loos filed a proof of service purporting to have personally served Nwapa-Jourdan. (Nwapa-Jourdan Decl., Ex. A.) In it, their process server, “E Ratliff,” states Ratliff personally served Nwapa-Jourdan on October 9, 2019, at 2217 Patricia Avenue in Los Angeles. (Nwapa-Jourdan Decl., Ex. A.) Ratliff describes Nwapa-Jourdan as “Blk Male 50-60 5’7 250 Drk Hair.” (Nwapa-Jourdan Decl., Ex. A.)

In this case, Nwapa-Jourdan argues the proof of service is defective as Nwapa-Jourdan is not the individual described. Because the proof of service appears valid on its face, it is subject to “rebuttable presumption that the service was proper.” (Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163 [internal quotations omitted].) To rebut this presumption, Nwapa-Jourdan provides a declaration denying ever receiving personal service of summons. (Nwapa-Jourdan Decl., ¶ 3.) Nwapa-Jourdan also states, “I am a female, and it is not reasonable to mistake me for a male.” (Nwapa-Jourdan Decl., ¶ 3.)

In opposition, Eric Ratliff provides a supplemental declaration describing the service attempt. But the declaration appears to have a formatting error that has resulted in a portion of the declaration being obscured. The obscured portion includes key language stating where the declaration was signed and which state’s perjury laws apply. Furthermore, Nwapa-Jourdan has failed to file any timely reply papers that address this new evidence.

Accordingly, the court will CONTINUE the hearing on this motion in order for the Loos to refile a properly formatted version of this declaration and for Nwapa-Jourdan to file a supplemental reply if so desired.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court makes the following rulings on the present motions.

Xie’s motions to amend judgment and enforce protections are DENIED without prejudice.

He’s claim of exemption is DENIED without prejudice.

Nwapa-Jourdan’s motion to quash summons and vacate the entry of default judgment is CONTINUED to a date to be determined at the hearing presently set in Department G (Pomona).