Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 20STCV04748, Date: 2023-08-25 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Defendant Southern California Regional Rail Authority’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Southern California Regional Rail Authority’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART on Plaintiffs’ claims for dangerous condition and negligent design, training, hiring, and supervision, and DENIED IN PART as to claims involving Lagana’s operation of the train.

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

This is a wrongful death action. In February 2019, Mauricio Kevin Moreno was hit and killed by a Metrolink train on Cogswell Road in El Monte. Moreno is survived by Moreno’s parents, Luis Martinez Moreno and Alicia Moreno/Santander. On February 5, 2020, the Morenos filed a filed a complaint against the City of El Monte (City), Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LA Metro), County of Los Angeles (County), State of California acting by and through the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), Metrolink acting by and through Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), Jad Paul Lagana, and Does 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) liability of public entities and public employees pursuant to Government Code sections 815.2, 815.4, and 820; (2) dangerous condition of public property; (3) wrongful death; and (4) negligence.

On June 3, 2021, the Morenos dismissed the County from the action. They also dismissed Caltrans on December 13. On December 28, the City filed a cross-complaint against LA Metro, the County, Caltrans, Metrolink, and Roes 1-10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) equitable indemnity, (2) apportionment and contribution, and (3) declaratory relief.

In January 2023, the City, Metrolink, LA Metro, and Lagana filed the present motions for summary judgment. On August 11, the City was dismissed from the action. A hearing on the remaining motions for summary judgment is set for August 25. A final status conference is also set for September 27 with a jury trial on October 10.

In ruling on the Morenos’ evidentiary objections, the court SUSTAINS objections numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 20, and OVERRULES objections numbered 1, 11, 16, 19, 21, 22, and 23.

Metrolink, LA Metro, and Lagana (collectively, Defendants) move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Lagana was not negligent in operating the train at issue, (2) any claim of negligence in hiring, training, or supervising engineers is preempted by federal law, (3) the court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims relating to the design of the rail crossing where the incident occurred, (4) Metrolink is immune from claims involving the design of the rail crossing, (5) Metrolink was not negligent in designing or operating the rail crossing where the accident occurred, and (6) no dangerous condition of public property existed at the time of the incident. LA Metro also argues they are not jointly liable for Metrolink’s actions.

For the following reasons, the court GRANTS LA Metro’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety, GRANTS IN PART Metrolink’s motion for summary judgment on the Morenos’ claims for dangerous condition and negligent design, training, hiring, and supervision, DENIES IN PART Metrolink’s motion as to claims involving Lagana’s operation of the train, and DENIES Lagana’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication provides “courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) It must be granted “if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the opposing party must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Metrolink and Lagana argue the Morenos cannot establish Metrolink was negligent in operating the train that killed Moreno as Lagana did not breach a duty of care in operating the train and Moreno’s negligence was the sole cause of the accident. LA Metro argues it cannot be held liable for Metrolink’s actions as a matter of law. The court disagrees with regards to Metrolink and Lagana’s arguments but agrees with regards to LA Metro’s argument.

The basic elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) “As a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is liable for injuries caused by [their] failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances . . . .’” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 472, quoting Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112.) But the standard for the safe operation of trains is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 and applicable federal regulations. (Southern California Regional Rail Authority v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 712, 731-732 (SCRRA), citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood (1993) 507 U.S. 658 (Easterwood).)

In this case, Defendants argue Lagana was operating the train at the federally permitted speed prior to the accident. But, Defendants failed to provide any admissible evidence of the train’s speed at the time of the accident. While Defendants point to the declaration of Foster Peterson, Peterson’s statements regarding the train’s speed are inadmissible hearsay and were provided without foundation. (MSSOLMSJ[1], ¶ 8, 17-20; MSSOMMSJ[2], ¶ 17-20.) Thus, the court finds Defendants failed to meet their initial burden of showing that Lagana complied with the applicable standard of care.

Even if Defendants had carried their burden, Plaintiffs introduced evidence showing a triable issue of fact exists regarding whether Lagana properly utilized the train’s horn. Plaintiffs argue federal regulations require a train’s horn to be utilized between fifteen to twenty seconds before the train enters the railroad crossing. (49 C.F.R., § 222.21, subd., (b).) They also argue federal regulations require two long horn blasts followed by one short blast and another long blast. (49 C.F.R., § 222.21, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs also point to Lagana’s deposition, where Lagana admitted that the train’s horn was not utilized until nine or ten seconds before the train entered the railroad crossing. (MSSOLMSJ, ¶ M-Q; Siegler Decl., Ex. 1, p. 127:25-128:3, 128:19-22, 131:17-19.) Thus, the court finds a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Lagana breached the applicable standard of care for operating a train by failing to timely utilize the train’s horn.

In reply, Defendants argue that an earlier horn blast from farther away would not have been sufficient to warn Moreno. “Causation is ordinarily a question of fact but ‘where the facts are such that the only reasonable conclusion is an absence of causation, the question is one of law, not of fact.’” (Novak v. Continental Tire North America (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 189, 197 (Novak), quoting State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 353 (State Dept.).) Here, the court finds it is reasonable to conclude that the timing of the train’s horn could have impacted whether Moreno had sufficient warning of the oncoming train. Thus, a triable issue of fact exists.

Last, Defendants argue Moreno’s negligence was the sole cause of the accident. In particular, they argue Moreno violated Vehicle Code section 22451, subdivision (a)(1), which requires a pedestrian to stop no less than fifteen feet from the nearest railroad track when “[a] clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device or a flagman gives warning of the approach or passage of a train, car, or on-track equipment.” However, Defendants failed to provide any admissible evidence that established Moreno entered the tracks while electrical or mechanical signal devices were warning of an oncoming train. Instead, Defendants relied on inadmissible hearsay statements from their expert. (MSSOLMSJ, ¶ 21, 23-26.) Accordingly, the court finds questions of fact remain regarding whether Lagana was negligent in operating the train at issue. Therefore, Metrolink and Lagana’s motion for summary judgment on this ground is DENIED.

LA Metro independently argues it cannot be held liable for Metrolink and Lagana’s negligence. Pursuant to Government Code section 6508.1, subdivision (1), if an agency formed pursuant to a joint powers agreement “is not one or more of the parties to the agreement but is a public entity, commission, or board constituted pursuant to the agreement, the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the agency shall be debts, liabilities, and obligations of the parties to the agreement, unless the agreement specifies otherwise.”

In this case, it is undisputed that Metrolink is a joint powers authority and that LA Metro is one of Metrolink’s five member agencies. (MSSOLAMSJ[3], ¶ 1.) Pursuant to Metrolink’s operating agreement, “the debts, liabilities, and obligations of [Metrolink] shall not be the debts, liabilities and obligations of the member agencies.” (MSSOLAMSJ, ¶ 3; Marden Decl., Ex. 2, § 7.0.) While Plaintiffs dispute this fact, Plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence that established the existence of a dispute over the terms of this agreement. Thus, the court finds as a matter of law, LA Metro cannot be held liable for Metrolink’s actions in this case.

The court notes it is undisputed that the train in question was a Metrolink train being operated in Metrolink’s San Gabriel Subdivision. (MSSOLAMSJ, ¶ 4.) It is also undisputed that Lagana was operating the train in question and that Lagana was a certified locomotive engineer employed by Amtrak. (MSSOLAMSJ, ¶ 9, 44, 47, A.) Lastly, pursuant to Metrolink’s joint powers agreement, it is responsible for operating a passenger train service and operation of the trains is not one of the responsibilities for its members. (MSSOLAMSJ, ¶ 2; Marden Decl., Ex. 2, §§ 2.0, 4.0.)

Based on these facts, LA Metro established it was not responsible for operating the train involved in this incident. The burden now shifts to Plaintiffs to establish that a triable issue of material fact exists as to LA Metro’s involvement. Plaintiffs fail to carry this burden and instead point to the provision of Metrolink’s joint powers agreement that states member agencies are involved in “operational decisions, fare structure, and other policy areas.” The court determines that Plaintiffs take this quotation out of context since the full provision states as follows:

“Policy support shall be provided by the MEMBER AGENCIES to either approve, or respond quickly to, any recommendations made as to funding shares, operational decisions, fare structures, and other policy areas.” (Marden Decl., Ex. 2, § 4.3.)

As the full text of this section makes clear, members agencies are responsible for policy support in these areas and are not required to individually make operational decisions. This interpretation is supported by another provision of the same agreement which states Metrolink is responsible for the approval of operations policies and selection of commuter rail operators. (Marden Decl., Ex. 2, §§ 3.14, 3.16) Accordingly, because no dispute exists that LA Metro was not involved in the operation of the train involved in the incident, LA Metro’s motion for summary judgment on this ground is GRANTED.

Metrolink and LA Metro contend Plaintiffs’ claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and training are preempted by federal law. The court agrees.

As noted above in the previous section, the Federal Railroad Safety Act and applicable federal regulations preempt state law standards for the safe operation of trains. (SCRRA, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 731-732.) Defendants contend the standards for the eligibility, training, testing, certification, and monitoring of train engineers are established by federal regulation. (49 C.F.R., § 240.1, subd. (b).) While Defendants fail to cite to any binding California authority on these points, federal court decisions recognize that negligent hiring, supervision, and training claims involving train engineers are preempted by federal regulation. (Prentice v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2014, 12–cv–05856–MEJ) 2014 WL 3868221, *8; Carter v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (N.D. Cal. 2014) 63 F.Supp.3d 1118, 1156; Cf. Union Pacific R. Co. v. California Public Utilities Com’n (9th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 851, 868 [state regulations for training or certification of train engineers preempted by federal law].)

In this case, it is undisputed that Lagana was a certified train engineer at the time of the incident. (MSSOMMSJ, ¶ 41.) Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to establish a triable issue of material fact as to Lagana’s qualifications. The court finds that Plaintiffs separate statement does not point to any additional facts on this point. While Plaintiffs contend Defendants failed to establish Amtrak properly complied with federal regulations in certifying Lagana, that requirement was met by the statement that Lagana was certified. Although the burden to establish this fact had shifted to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs did not dispute this fact in their separate statement and failed to introduce any contrary evidence regarding Lagana’s certification or qualifications.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground is GRANTED.

Metrolink and LA Metro maintain that Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the design of the Cogswell railroad crossing are barred by the California Public Utilities Commission’s (PUC) jurisdiction and immunity pursuant to Government Code section 830.6. Defendants also maintain they are entitled to summary judgment because the Cogswell railroad crossing had adequate and functioning signals and did not constitute a dangerous condition. The court agrees that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the PUC’s jurisdiction and, even if they were not, the court determines causation cannot be established as a matter of law.

“The PUC has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation and control of utilities, and once it has assumed jurisdiction, it cannot be hampered, interfered with, or second-guessed by a concurrent superior court action addressing the same issue.” (Barnett v. Delta Lines, Inc. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 674, 681.) But California law also allows a private action against utilities for damages caused by violations of state laws or PUC decisions. (Pub. Util. Code, § 2106.) Thus, superior courts have jurisdiction over such claims unless the claim involved (1) the PUC’s authority to adopt a regulatory policy, (2) the exercise of that authority, and (3) a hinderance or interference with the PUC’s exercise of that authority. (PegaStaff v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1315.)

In arguing PUC jurisdiction bars Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendants maintain the PUC has exclusive authority to approve designs for railroad crossings pursuant to Public Utilities Code section 1202. Defendants further maintain that it is undisputed the PUC approved the design for the Cogswell railroad crossing in 1992. (MSSOMMSJ, ¶ 73-75.) The PUC’s order required automatic flashing light signals with gates. (Quinn Decl., Ex. 1, p. 4-5.)

In response, Plaintiffs maintain they are not challenging the design of the Cogswell railroad crossing. Instead, they claim the southwest quadrant of the Cogswell railroad crossing across from where Moreno entered had a signal mast without back-mounted flashing lights. (Metrolink MSJ Opp., p. 14:6-9; Moreno Exhibits, Ex. 6-7; Steigler Decl., ¶ 6; Ogden Decl., ¶ 11.) According to the Plaintiffs’ expert, the lack of back-facing flashing lights on the southwest signal mast did not comply with industry standards and Metrolink’s own safety manual. (Ogden Decl., ¶ 11.)

As noted above, the PUC has sole jurisdiction over the design of railroad crossings. While the PUC required automatic flashing light signals with gates, it did not specifically require signal masts with flashing lights facing both ways. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs fail to point to any PUC order that requires such signals. Therefore, this court finds that a judgment finding Defendants negligent for failing to include signal types not required by the PUC would constitute interference with the PUC’s authority to design railroad crossings. Thus, the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain claims regarding which type of signal was appropriate for the Cogswell railroad crossing.

Nevertheless, even assuming Defendants breached a duty of care in failing to install this type of signal, Plaintiffs cannot establish causation. As previously noted, the absence of causation becomes a question of law “where the facts are such that the only reasonable conclusion is an absence of causation.” (State Dept., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 353.) Although the signal mast across the tracks from Moreno did not have any signal lights facing Moreno, the signal mast also had a gate. (Moreno Exhibits, Ex. 6-7.) Furthermore, the signal mast on the northwest corner where Moreno entered the railroad crossing also had signal lights that faced Moreno. (Moreno Exhibits, Ex. 6-7.) Given the existence of these other signals and indicators, the court determines that no reasonable factfinder could find this breach was the cause of Moreno’s death.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligent design and dangerous condition claims is GRANTED.

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS LA Metro’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The court GRANTS IN PART Metrolink’s motion for summary judgment on the Morenos’ claims for dangerous condition and negligent design, training, hiring, and supervision, but also DENIES IN PART Metrolink’s motion as to claims involving Lagana’s operation of the train. Last, the court DENIES Lagana’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

Each Defendant to submit an order on their respective motion consistent with this ruling.

[1] Morenos’ Separate Statement in Opposition to Lagana’s Motion for Summary Judgment

[2] Morenos’ Separate Statement in Opposition to Metrolink’s Motion for Summary Judgment

[3] Morenos’ Separate Statement in Opposition to LA Metro’s Motion for Summary Judgment