Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 21PSCV00097, Date: 2023-03-10 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 21PSCV00097    Hearing Date: March 10, 2023    Dept: G

Defendants San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments and City of Industry’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

Respondent: Plaintiff GS Bates Enterprises, Inc.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments and City of Industry’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This is an action for inverse condemnation. Plaintiff GS Bates Enterprises, Inc. owned and operated a Jersey Mike’s restaurant franchise in the City of Industry. Plaintiff alleges the San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments (SGVCOG), City of Industry (City), and Alameda Corridor-East Construction Authority (ACECA) were responsible for the Fullerton Road Grade Separation Project (Fullerton Road Project) which allegedly eliminated access to Plaintiff’s store.

On February 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint against SGVCOG, the City, ACECA, and Does 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) inverse condemnation, (2) negligence, and (3) declaratory relief. On November 29, Plaintiff dismissed the second cause of action against SGVCOG and the City.

On February 15, 2022, SGVCOG and the City (collectively, Defendants) filed a motion to bifurcate trial so that the issue of liability could be tried first. On March 30, the court granted Defendants’ motion.  

On December 6, 2022, Defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment or adjudication. A hearing on the motion is set for February 22, 2023. A final status conference is also set for March 10 with a non-jury trial for the liability phase scheduled March 24.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The court OVERRULES Defendants’ evidentiary objections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 12 and SUSTAINS evidentiary objections 8, 9, and 10.

ANALYSIS

Defendants moves for summary judgment or adjudication on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff’s first cause of action for inverse condemnation fails as a matter of law and (2) Plaintiff’s second cause of action for declaratory relief fails for the same reason. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.

Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues[;] the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, quoting FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App.3d 367, 381-382.) 

“A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on¿the¿cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Then, “the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to¿the¿cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Discussion

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s causes of action fail as a matter of law because access to Plaintiff’s business was not substantially impaired. The court agrees.

Pursuant to article I, section 19, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution, “Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when just compensation . . . has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.” A claim for inverse condemnation arises “when: (1) the property has been physically invaded in a tangible manner; (2) no physical invasion has occurred, but the property has been physically damaged; or (3) an intangible intrusion onto the property has occurred which has caused no damage to the property but places a burden on the property that is direct, substantial, and peculiar to the property itself.” (Olive v. AT&T Wireless Services (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 521, 530, italics omitted.)

“An action for inverse condemnation can be based on substantial impairment of the right of ingress and egress, also known as the easement of access.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1167 (Today’s IV).) While the extent of such impairment is a matter of fact, “[t]he determination of whether such substantial impairment has been established must be reached as a matter of law.” (Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 664.) “[I]n an inverse condemnation action, the property owner must first clear the hurdle of establishing the public entity has, in fact, taken his or her property before he or she can reach the issue of ‘just compensation.’” (Beaty v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 897, 903.)

In this case, Plaintiff’s business was located in a commercial plaza along the southside of Gale Avenue, an east-west roadway. (MSJ, Ex. A.) To the east of the commercial plaza, Gale Avenue intersects with Fullerton Road, a north-south roadway. (MSJ, Ex. B.) During the course of the Fullerton Road Project, Fullerton Road was closed north of the Gale Avenue-Fullerton Road intersection. (MSJ, Ex. D-1, D-2; Christoffels Decl., ¶ 4; Bates, ¶ 5.) Fullerton Road remained opened to the south of Gale Avenue where it connected with California State Route 60. (MSJ, Ex. D-1, D-2; Christoffels Decl., ¶ 4.) Gale Avenue also remained opened, although it was reduced from two lanes each way to one lane each way. (MSJ, Ex. H; Christoffels Decl., ¶ 5.)

The commercial plaza here was accessible from the southside of Gale Avenue in three locations. (MSJ, Ex. H; Christoffels Decl., ¶ 6, 8.) While all three entrances were accessible for traffic going eastbound on Gale Avenue, westbound traffic could only access the commercial plaza through an entrance at the western end of the plaza. (MSJ, Ex. H; Christoffels Decl., ¶ 8.) While Plaintiff claims “[t]he road closures resulted in an effective total restriction of vehicle and foot traffic to the restaurant,” Plaintiff also admits that “technically, portions of Gale Avenue remained open and no ‘official’ restriction was placed on vehicular and pedestrian traffic entering the mall’s parking lot or the restaurant.” (Bates Decl., ¶ 6-7.)

Instead, Plaintiff argues the Fullerton Road Project “created a traffic gridlock so significant that its effect was to eliminate all such traffic.” (Bates Decl., ¶ 7.) However, Plaintiff does not detail how the gridlock restricted access to the commercial plaza. While Plaintiff provides two photographs of gridlocked traffic along Gale Avenue “directly in front of the restaurant,” Plaintiff does not authenticate the photographs by describing who took them, where they were taken along Gale Avenue (the exact location of Plaintiff’s restaurant in the commercial plaza was not provided), and when they were taken. (Opp., Ex. A, B.) Furthermore, even if the gridlock affected or prevented access to the commercial plaza’s entrances marked “B” and “C” on Defendants’ Exhibit H, Plaintiff does not state if the gridlock affected the westernmost entrance marked as “A.” (MSJ, Ex. H.)

Ultimately, even if Plaintiff had established traffic gridlock limited access to the commercial plaza, that would be insufficient to establish substantial impairment as a matter of law. As our supreme court has previously noted:

“[T]he right of a property owner to ingress and egress is not absolute. He cannot demand that the adjacent street be left in its original condition for all time to insure his ability to continue to enter and leave his property in the same manner as that to which he had become accustomed. Modern transportation requirements necessitate continual improvement of streets and relocation of traffic. The property owner has no constitutional right to compensation simply because the streets upon which his property abuts are improved so as to affect the traffic flow on such streets. If loss of business or of value of the property results, that is noncompensable. It is simply a risk the property owner assumes when he lives in modern society under modern traffic conditions.” (People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Ayon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 217, 222-223.) 

What was true then in 1960 is no less true today. As a result, “street alterations which cause significantly increased traffic or which reduce but do not eliminate access to a property do not give rise to a compensable taking.” (Today’s IV, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 1170, quoting Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1554.) Because it is undisputed that access to Plaintiff’s business was not eliminated and only restricted by nearby road closures and traffic, Plaintiff has not suffered a substantial impairment.

While the decision in Today’s IV involved a demurrer to a complaint as opposed to a motion for summary judgment, it remains applicable here. In that case, the plaintiff alleged traffic detours impaired access to plaintiff’s business because they were “unreasonably complex and sometimes irrational” to the point of making it difficult for plaintiff’s patrons to reach plaintiff’s business. (Id., at p. 1169.) The court held this was insufficient because even at the pleading stage where all well-pled facts are taken as true, plaintiff’s allegations never established access was eliminated. (Id., at p. 1169-1170.) In this case, while Plaintiff’s complaint alleged the Fullerton Road Project eliminated access to Plaintiff’s business (Complaint, ¶ 10), the evidence provided by both parties establishes the opposite.

Because Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first cause of action for inverse condemnation, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s third cause of action for declaratory relief as it is duplicative of the first cause action. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or adjudication is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or adjudication on Plaintiff’s claims.