Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case 21STCV01296 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Defendants Susan Arozla and Walnut Valley Unified School District’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

Defendants Susan Arozla and Walnut Valley Unified School District’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication is DENIED.

This action arises from the alleged sexual assault of a middle school student. Plaintiff L.R. is a minor diagnosed with autism and ADHD. From August 2019 to March 2020, Plaintiff attended South Pointe Middle School (South Pointe) in the Walnut Valley Unified School District (WVUSD) as a sixth grader. During this time, another sixth-grade special needs student named Student X sexually assaulted Plaintiff in restrooms at South Pointe during the school day on multiple occasions. Student X also exchanged sexually explicit messages, photographs, and videos with Plaintiff. After Plaintiff’s mother learned of these messages and sexual assaults from Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s mother reported Student X to the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and Susan Arozla (Arozla), South Pointe’s principal.

On January 12, 2021, Plaintiff, through guardian ad litem Jennifer Butler, filed a complaint against WVUSD, Arozla, and Does 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) negligent hiring, retaining, supervision, and training; (3) negligent failure to supervise and careless failure to guard, maintain, inspect, and manage the school premises; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On May 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendants, omitting the fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On September 27, 2022, WVUSD and Arozla (collectively, Defendants) filed the present motion for summary judgment or adjudication. A hearing on the motion is set for April 13, 2023, along with a case management conference.

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to Defendants’ evidence are OVERRULED as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.

Defendants move for summary judgment or summary adjudication on the grounds that (1) Defendant does not owe Plaintiff a duty to prevent unforeseeable sexual assaults, (2) Defendant did not breach any such duty, and (3) Plaintiff cannot establish causation. For the following reasons, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion.

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication provides “courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) It must be granted “if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the opposing party must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

The basic elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) Foreseeability of harm is not an element of negligence, but it is a factor for establishing the elements of duty, breach, and causation. (See Laabs v. Southern California Edison Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1272-1273 (Laabs).)

Defendants argue they did not have a duty to protect Plaintiff from unforeseeable sexual assaults on school grounds during school hours. The court disagrees.

The law imposes a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others in one’s activities. (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 768, citing Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) To determine if public policy requires an additional duty of care, courts consider the following factors: “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Id., at p. 771, quoting Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.) The existence of duty is a question of law “particularly amenable to resolution by summary judgment.” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 465.)

An entity or person does not generally owe a duty to protect an individual from third party harm but such a duty may arise if the entity or person is in a special relationship with the victim or dangerous third party. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 215.) This special relationship “is one that ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that ‘entails an ability to control [the third party’s] conduct.’” (Id., at p. 216, quoting Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619.) The relationship between students and their school is one such relationship, given “the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869.)

Defendants do not deny they owe a duty to protect their students. Instead, they argue such a duty is not subject to strict liability. They are correct. “The existence of a duty of care of a school district toward a student depends, in part, on whether the particular harm to the student is reasonably foreseeable.” (M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 518 (M.W.).) “Foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances and does not require prior identical events or injuries.” (Id., at p. 519.) Foreseeability “is established if a reasonable prudent person would foresee that injuries of the same general type would be likely to happen in the absence of such safeguards.” (Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 594, 600.)

The foreseeability of sexual assault in the school setting in not a novel question of law. “Where school officials allow a hidden area to be maintained on campus, it is foreseeable that other students may use the hiding place to take advantage of a ‘special needs’ student.” (Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1328 (Jennifer C.).) The vulnerability of special needs students to bullying by their peers “gives rise to the duty to adequately supervise and to eliminate hidden areas where victimization can occur.” (Ibid; see also M.W., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 521 [“Given the foreseeability of harm to special education students, . . . the District owed the minor a duty of care to protect him from an assault [in school restrooms] on campus.”].)

Defendants argue there is no evidence that Student X posed a risk of committing sexual assault or that Defendants’ staff were aware any sexual assaults had occurred. But as noted above, foreseeability does not require identical injuries or events. (M.W., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 519.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a special needs student. (PSSAUMF[1], ¶ 1.) It also undisputed that some of the sexual assaults occurred while Plaintiff was alone with Student X in school restrooms. (PSSDMF[2], ¶ 8, 9-10, 15-16.) Therefore, it was reasonably foreseeable that Plaintiff’s vulnerable status could have led to Plaintiff being victimized while alone in school restrooms. Thus, Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to protect Plaintiff from sexual assaults in school restrooms.

Next, Defendants contend they did not breach their duty because (1) their supervision was reasonable, (2) Student X’s conduct was a superseding cause of Plaintiff’s injury, and (3) Plaintiff failed to establish a lack of consent. The court disagrees.

“The elements of breach of duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury’s determination.” (Hernandez v. Jensen (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1056, 1064.) “[I]f the circumstances permit a reasonable doubt whether the defendant’s conduct violates the standard of due care, the doubt must be resolved by the jury as an issue of fact rather than of law by the court.” (Musgrove v. Ambrose Properties (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 44, 53.) And the court may only decide causation as a matter of law where there is no reasonable dispute. (Constance B. v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 200, 207.)

The adequacy of supervision is generally a question of fact for determination by the jury. (Rodrigues v. San Jose Unified School Dist. (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 842, 848.) And “foreseeability in evaluating negligence and causation requires a ‘more focused, fact-specific’ inquiry that takes into account a particular plaintiff’s injuries and the particular defendant's conduct [Citations.].” (Laabs, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273; see also Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572, fn. 6 [“[T]he jury may consider the likelihood or foreseeability of injury in determining whether, in fact, the particular defendant’s conduct was negligent in the first place. Second, foreseeability may be relevant to the jury’s determination of whether the defendant’s negligence was a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”].)

“An independent intervening act is a superseding cause relieving the actor of liability for [their] negligence only if the intervening act is highly unusual or extraordinary and hence not reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.] Reasonable foreseeability in this context is a question for the trier of fact.” (Cline v. Watkins (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 174, 178.) The existence of a superseding cause is an affirmative defense that Defendants must establish. (Green v. Healthcare Services, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 407, 415.)

Relying on the declarations of school staff, Defendants contend Plaintiff and Student X never demonstrated a propensity to engage in inappropriate or sexual conduct. (Troudy Decl., ¶ 4, 6; Yi Decl., ¶ 15-16; Arozla, ¶ 5-6) Although Plaintiff objected to this evidence, Plaintiff did not otherwise point to any contradicting facts that place these observations in dispute. But it has already been established that Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of care arising from Plaintiff’s vulnerable status, not the existence of prior incidents. Thus, the mere fact that Plaintiff and Student X did not openly demonstrate sexual interests does not excuse Defendants from their duty to protect and supervise vulnerable students like Plaintiff.

Defendants also contend requiring constant supervision of student restrooms and escorting special education students is an excessive requirement contrary to public policy. Arozla stated it is not school policy to chaperone or escort special needs students to the restroom absent extraordinary circumstances. (Arozla Decl., ¶ 7.) Students are allowed to use the restroom alone or in groups and any staff supervision “would be from outside.” (Arozla Decl., ¶ 8.)

Ultimately, this court determines that the adequacy of the level of supervision is a question of fact for the jury to decide. A reasonable factfinder could determine adult supervision over school restrooms is appropriate. While Defendants suggest a restroom monitor would remove supervision elsewhere, Defendants fail to present any evidence that addresses the feasibility of restrooms monitors. (Reply, p. 13:1-6.) Defendants admit notice of other misconduct such as fighting, groping, or drug activity in the restroom that would have triggered a school response. (Reply, p. 12:4-11.) A jury could find such a reactive approach to be a breach of Defendants’ duty to protect minor students. Instead, the jury could find that Defendants’ duty and special relationship with their students require an active approach to discourage sexual assault, bullying, or illegal activity in restrooms. Thus, the court finds a triable issue of fact facts remains with respect to whether Defendants’ supervision policy constitutes a breach of their duty to protect Plaintiff.

Defendants’ claim that Student X’s misconduct was a superseding cause also fails. As determined above, whether Student X’s misconduct was reasonably foreseeable is a triable issue of fact. Because it is undisputed the alleged sexual assaults occurred when Plaintiff and Student X were alone in the restroom, it can be reasonably inferred that Student X would not have sexually assaulted Plaintiff if other students or staff were present. (PSSDMF, ¶ 8, 9-10, 15-16.) Defendants even admit that the presence of multiple students in a restroom stall together would have been a red flag. Thus, whether Student X’s misconduct was a superseding cause is a disputed question of fact for the jury to determine and not appropriate for resolution by summary judgment or summary adjudication.

Defendants’ reply brief appears to suggest Plaintiff did not establish a lack of consent to Student X’s advances and introduces evidence of communications between Student X and Plaintiff. Although the court may consider additional evidence and arguments raised in reply, the court finds it concerning that Defendants failed to raise this issue in their moving papers, thereby denying Plaintiff the opportunity to respond in Plaintiff’s opposition. (See Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 449.) The argument also ignores the fact that Defendants, not Plaintiff, bear the burden of establishing grounds for summary judgment. Last, to the extent Defendants are suggesting that a sixth grader may consent to sexual activity, Defendants do not cite the court to any authority for this proposition.

Additionally, excerpts from Plaintiff’s own deposition indicate Plaintiff did not consent to Student X’s advances. In Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff stated Student X “grabbed my wrist and made me try to touch his body part.” (MSJ, Ex. B, p. 23:24-24:1.) In another incident, Student X threatened to tell another student not to be Plaintiff’s friend if Plaintiff told anyone about Student X being in the restroom stall with Plaintiff. (MSJ, Ex. B, p. 26:23-27:5.) In the same incident, Student X tried to unsuccessfully trap Plaintiff in the restroom stall and remove Plaintiff’s pants. (MSJ, Ex. B, p. 27:7-24.) On another occasion, Student X entered Plaintiff’s restroom stall and blocked Plaintiff from escaping before pulling down Plaintiff’s pants or shorts and “put[ting] his body part in my rear end.” (MSJ, Ex. B, p. 49:3-11, 51:6-11.) Even if the message history between Plaintiff and Student X could be interpreted as evidence of consensual sexual activity between Plaintiff and Student X, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony establishes a triable issue of fact with regards to Plaintiff’s consent. Thus, the court finds Defendants’ argument is without merit that Plaintiff failed to establish a lack of consent.

Accordingly, the court finds triable issues of material fact exist. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or adjudication is DENIED.

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or adjudication on Plaintiff’s claims.

[1] Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts (starting on page 15 of Plaintiff’s Separate Statement).

[2] Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Disputed Material Facts (starting on page 1 of Plaintiff’s Separate Statement).