Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 21STCV01296, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 21STCV01296    Hearing Date: January 30, 2024    Dept: G

Plaintiff L.R.’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues

Respondent: Defendants Walnut Valley Unified School District and Susan Arozla

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff L.R.’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues is GRANTED IN PART as to the issue of duty and DENIED IN PART as to the issue of breach and causation.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from the alleged sexual assault of a middle school student. Plaintiff L.R. is a minor diagnosed with autism and ADHD. From August 2019 to March 2020, L.R. attended South Pointe Middle School (South Pointe) in the Walnut Valley Unified School District (WVUSD) as a sixth grader. During this time, another sixth-grade special needs student named Student X sexually assaulted L.R. in restrooms at South Pointe during the school day on multiple occasions. Student X also exchanged sexually explicit messages, photographs, and videos with L.R. After L.R.’s mother learned of these messages and sexual assaults from L.R., L.R.’s mother reported Student X to the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and Susan Arzola, South Pointe’s principal.

On January 12, 2021, L.R., through guardian ad litem Jennifer Butler, filed a complaint against WVUSD, Arzola, and Does 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) negligent hiring, retaining, supervision, and training; (3) negligent failure to supervise and careless failure to guard, maintain, inspect, and manage the school premises; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On May 17, 2021, L.R. filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendants, omitting the fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On September 27, 2022, WVUSD and Arzola filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. On April 13, 2023, the court denies their motion.

On August 2, 2023, L.R. filed the present motion. A hearing on L.R.’s motion and a case management conference are set for January 30, 2024.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

WVUSD and Arzola’s request for judicial notice of this court’s prior ruling on their motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

ANALYSIS

L.R. moves for summary judgment or adjudication on the grounds that (1) WVUSD and Arzola owed L.R. a mandatory duty to protect L.R. from sexual assault by a fellow student in school bathrooms during school hours, (2) WVUSD and Arzola breached their mandatory duty, and (3) WVUSD and Arzola’s breach of duty resulted in L.R. being sexually assaulted on multiple occasions by Student X. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS L.R.’s motion as to the issue of duty but DENIES it as to the issue of breach and causation.

Legal Standard

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication provides “courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) It must be granted “if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the opposing party must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p).) The plaintiff is not required to disprove defenses asserted by the defendant. (WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC v. Cooper (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 525, 531-532.) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

The basic elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 480 (Leslie G.).) Foreseeability of harm is not an element of negligence, but it is a factor for establishing the elements of duty, breach, and causation. (See Laabs v. Southern California Edison Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1272-1273 (Laabs).)

Duty

L.R. argues WVUSD and Arzola had a mandatory duty of care for L.R. that arose from their special relationship with L.R. The court agrees.

Legal Standard

The law imposes a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others in one’s activities. (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 768, citing Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) To determine if public policy requires an additional duty of care, courts consider the following factors: “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Id., at p. 771, quoting Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.) The existence of duty is a question of law “particularly amenable to resolution by summary judgment.” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 465.)

An entity or person does not generally owe a duty to protect an individual from third party harm but such a duty may arise if the entity or person is in a special relationship with the victim or dangerous third party. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 215.) This special relationship “is one that ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that ‘entails an ability to control [the third party’s] conduct.’” (Id., at p. 216, quoting Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619.) The relationship between students and their school is one such relationship, given “the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869.)

“The existence of a duty of care of a school district toward a student depends, in part, on whether the particular harm to the student is reasonably foreseeable.” (M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 518 (M.W.).) “Foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances and does not require prior identical events or injuries.” (Id., at p. 519.) Foreseeability “is established if a reasonable prudent person would foresee that injuries of the same general type would be likely to happen in the absence of such safeguards.” (Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 594, 600.)

The foreseeability of sexual assault in the school setting in not a novel question of law. “Where school officials allow a hidden area to be maintained on campus, it is foreseeable that other students may use the hiding place to take advantage of a ‘special needs’ student.” (Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1328 (Jennifer C.).) The vulnerability of special needs students to bullying by their peers “gives rise to the duty to adequately supervise and to eliminate hidden areas where victimization can occur.” (Ibid; see also M.W., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 521 [“Given the foreseeability of harm to special education students, . . . the District owed the minor a duty of care to protect him from an assault [in school restrooms] on campus.”].)

Discussion

In this case, L.R. argues WVUSD and Arzola owed a duty to prevent L.R. from being sexually assaulted on school grounds due to L.R.’s position as a vulnerable student. It is undisputed that L.R. was a special needs student with special education status. (DRPSSUMF[1], ¶ 1.) It is also undisputed that some of the alleged sexual assaults occurred while L.R. was lone with Student X in school restrooms. (DRPSSUMF, ¶ 2, 4, 7.) Based on these undisputed facts, the court finds it is reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law that L.R.’s vulnerable status could have led to L.R. being victimized while alone in school restrooms. Thus, L.R. established WVUSD and Arzola owed L.R. a duty to protect L.R. from sexual assaults in school restrooms during school hours as a matter of law.

Accordingly, L.R.’s motion for summary adjudication on the issue of duty is GRANTED.

Breach and Causation

Next, L.R. contends WVUSD and Arzola breached their duty of care to L.R. by (1) failing to supervise and monitor bathrooms during lunchtime, (2) failing to designate special bathrooms or times for special needs students to use the bathroom, (3) failing to sufficiently monitor students during the lunch period, (4) failing to chaperone or escort students with special needs to the bathrooms, and (5) failing to lock one of the bathrooms where L.R. was allegedly assaulted. L.R. also contends these breaches resulted in L.R.’s sexual assault by Student X.

But a court can only grant a motion for summary adjudication “only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); see DeCastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 421.) While L.R.’s notice of motion seeks summary adjudication of the issues of breach and causation, it fails to seek summary adjudication of the issue of damages which is one of the elements of L.R.’s negligence claims. Thus, the court lacks the authority to grant L.R.’s motion as to these issues. (Cf. McCaskey v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 975 [“[T]here can be no summary adjudication of less than an entire cause of action. . . . If a cause of action is not shown to be barred in its entirety, no order for summary judgment—or adjudication—can be entered.”].)

Accordingly, L.R.’s motion for summary adjudication of these grounds is DENIED.  Additionally, the court determines that the adequacy of the level of supervision is a question of fact for the jury to decide.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS L.R.’s motion for summary adjudication on the issue of the duty and DENIES L.R.’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication on breach and causation grounds.