Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case 21STCV02402 2023-04-27 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Defendant McKinley Children’s Center, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

Defendant McKinley Children’s Center, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

This is an action arising from the alleged sexual assault and bullying of a special needs student. Plaintiff D.C. is a minor diagnosed with a neurological disorder and epilepsy. In May 2009, West Covina Unified School District (WCUSD) determined Plaintiff was eligible for special education. During the 2012-2013 school year, Plaintiff spent the first grade at two different elementary schools where WCUSD allegedly failed to provide proper support for Plaintiff and Plaintiff was subjected to physical, verbal, and psychological abuse. During the summer of 2013, Plaintiff’s parents reached a settlement with WCUSD in which Plaintiff would be placed in a state licensed non-public school.

From 2015 to 2019, Plaintiff attended Canyon View School (Canyon View) in San Dimas, a non-profit K-12 school owned and operated by McKinley Children’s Center, Inc. or MCC for students with special needs. During Plaintiff’s time there, Plaintiff was bullied and sexually assaulted by fellow students on school campus and during school van rides. In May 2019, Plaintiff’s parents withdrew Plaintiff from Canyon View.

On January 20, 2021, Plaintiff, by and through guardian ad litem Olivia C., filed a complaint against WCUSD, Canyon View, MCC, East San Gabriel Special Education Local Planning Area (ESGSELPA), John Mann (Mann), Jeannie Ortiz (Ortiz), Jennifer Miller (Miller), Jorge Ramirez (Ramirez), Yolanda Cork-Anthony (Cork-Anthony), Diana Marie Casato (Casato), and Does 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) violation of the Ralph Act, (3) violation of the Bane Act, and (4) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

On February 10, 2023, MCC filed a motion for summary adjudication. A hearing on the motion is scheduled for April 27.

MCC moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA) on the ground that UCRA is inapplicable to private, non-profit schools like Canyon View. For the following reasons, the court DENIES MCC’s motion.

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication provides “courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) It must be granted “if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the opposing party must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

UCRA prohibits discrimination because of “sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status” in “accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) A violation of UCRA may be remedied by a civil action pursuant to Civil Code section 52. Whether one is a business establishment covered by UCRA is a question of law for the trial court. (Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club (1995) 10 Cal.4th 594, 607, fn. 7; Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 152.)

MCC argues UCRA is inapplicable to Canyon View and MCC because they are not business establishments as a matter of law. The court disagrees.

In Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662 (Brennon B.), our supreme court provided a detailed overview of UCRA’s legislative history. (Id., at p. 675-677.) The initial drafts of UCRA covered schools. (Id., at p. 676-677.) But the final version removed any reference to schools and instead applied to business establishments. (Id., at p. 677.) Thus, “in order to be a ‘business establishment’ under [UCRA] — an entity must operate as a business or commercial enterprise when it discriminates.” (Id., at p. 679.) Such business or commercial operations may include “performing business functions, protecting economic value, operating as the functional equivalent of a commercial enterprise, etc.” (Id., at 681.) Public schools are not business establishments because they do not operate as businesses or commercial enterprises, instead providing free public education. (Ibid.)

It is undisputed that Canyon View is a non-profit school operated by MCC, a non-profit organization. (PSSUF[1], ¶ 1-3.) On this basis, MCC argues it is not a business establishment and cites Doe v. California Lutheran High School Assn. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 828 (California Lutheran). In California Lutheran, a non-profit religious school did not qualify as a business establishment because the school had the specific purpose of providing a religious education, had a selective admissions process, and failed to engage in significant business transactions with nonmembers. (Id., at p. 838-841.)

Plaintiff distinguishes California Lutheran by noting the present case does not involve a private religious school. The holding in that case was also expressly narrow and acknowledged an entity’s non-profit status is not controlling. (Id., at p. 839, 841.) Plaintiff contends the court should instead follow Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72 (Isbister). There, a non-profit youth club for boys was a business establishment because it provided open recreational facilities to the public and did not have selective admissions like a private club. (Id., at p. 81, 84.) But as in California Lutheran, the holding in Isbister was expressly limited to organizations that operate facilities or programs open to the public. (Id., at p. 76-77.) While Brennon B. involved public schools and California Lutheran involved private religious schools, neither party points the court to any case involving a non-public sectarian school like Canyon View.

MCC argues Canyon View is not a business establishment because it is a non-profit school. (MSA, p. 9:5-10.) But Canyon View’s non-profit status is not controlling as a non-profit may be deemed a business establishment if “it has some significant resemblance to an ordinary for-profit business.” (California Lutheran, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 839.)

MCC’s separate statement identifies three undisputed material facts. First, Canyon View is a non-profit, non-public school that provides K-12 educational services to students with learning disabilities, behavior disorders, emotional disturbance, autism, and developmental delays. (DSSUF[2], ¶ 1.) Second, Canyon View is owned and operated by MCC. (DSSUF, ¶ 2.) Third, MCC is a California non-profit 501(c)(3) corporation. (DSSUF, ¶ 3.) However, none of these facts address whether MCC and Canyon View operate like a for-profit business. Undisputed material facts “must appear in the separate statement or be disregarded.” (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1214 (Parkview Villas); see also County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 331 & fn. 16.)

The court also notes Plaintiff’s separate statement is defective. At least thirteen of Plaintiff’s undisputed statements of fact cite to a 23-page deposition transcript or a 7-page deposition transcript without properly providing citations, including the transcript page number and line numbers for each supporting statement as required by Rule 3.1350, subdivision (f) of the California Rules of Court. (PSSUF, ¶ 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.) As the Second District Court of Appeal acknowledges, such “[o]verly general references to supporting evidence . . . may place an undue burden on busy trial courts [Citation] and need not be tolerated.” (Parkview Villas, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214.)

Despite the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s opposing separate statement, the court finds MCC failed to carry the initial burden of establishing why they are entitled to summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s UCRA cause of action as a matter of law. While MCC established they are a non-profit school providing services to a subset of the general student population, the court cannot determine if MCC operates as a business because MCC failed to provide any facts in the separate statement that establish (1) how they operate, (2) how they are funded, (3) how their relationship with WCUSD works, and (4) how students are admitted. The mere fact that they are a non-profit is insufficient as non-profits may still be business establishments. (California Lutheran, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 839; Isbister, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 81, 84.)

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES MCC’s motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s UCRA claim.

[1] Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts

[2] Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts