Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 21STCV39394, Date: 2023-07-10 Tentative Ruling

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Plaintiff/Plaintiff-in-Intervention Sara Sierra’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff/Plaintiff-in-Intervention Sara Sierra’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

This is a consolidated wrongful death action arising from a multi-vehicle collision in El Monte. In the early morning of November 17, 2019, Rachel Connie De Lara was traveling westbound on Interstate 10 in El Monte when De Lara collided with the center median. After the collision disabled De Lara’s vehicle, Garrett Martin Shaw collided with De Lara’s stopped vehicle. Anthony Sierra[1] then collided with Shaw’s disabled vehicle. As a result of the collisions, De Lara and Anthony Sierra both died.

On October 16, 2021, Mariah Sierra, individually and as a successor-in-interest to Anthony, filed a complaint against Shaw, EAN Holdings, LLC (EAN), De Lara, and Does 1-50, alleging (1) wrongful death, (2) general negligence, and (3) negligent entrustment.

On November 5, 2021, Timothy De Lara, Amanda De Lara, Shante Trejo, and Julian De Lara (collectively, the De Lara Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Shaw, EAN, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. (Enterprise Inc.), Enterprise Holdings, LLC (Enterprise LLC), and Does 1-20, alleging a cause of action for wrongful death.

On May 16, 2022, Sara Sierra, individually and as the successor-in-interest to Anthony’s estate, filed a complaint against Shaw, De Lara’s estate, and Does 1-20, alleging a cause of action for wrongful death.

On January 23, 2023, Sara filed a complaint in intervention for declaratory relief against Mariah.

On June 1, 2023, Sara filed the present motion for summary judgment. A hearing on the motion is set for August 21 along with a further status conference and two orders to show cause. A hearing on a protective order is also set for October 10.

Mariah’s evidentiary objections to Sara’s declaration and exhibits are OVERRULED. To the extent Mariah objects to Sara’s reply brief, misidentified as a “supplemental brief,” the court finds this objection meritless as the reply brief does not introduce any additional evidence or exhibits and Sara had a right to file a reply pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(4).

Sara moves for summary judgment on Sara’s declaratory relief action against Mariah, arguing Mariah lacks standing as Sara is the only legal representative for Anthony’s estate. For the following reasons, the court DENIES Sara’s motion.

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication provides “courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) It must be granted “if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the opposing party must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

In an action for wrongful death caused by neglect or wrongful acts, standing is conferred on the decedent’s personal representative or any of the following individuals: “[t]he decedent’s surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of deceased children, or, if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons, including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subd. (a).) Standing is also conferred on individuals “[w]hether or not qualified under [Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60, subdivision (a)], if they were dependent on the decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative spouse, stepchildren, parents, or the legal guardians of the decedent if the parents are deceased.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subd. (b)(1).)

Pursuant to intestate succession laws, if a decedent dies without a will and has no surviving spouse, the decedent’s entire estate passes to decedent’s children. (Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (a).) If decedent has no surviving children, decedent’s entire estate then passes to decedent’s parents in equal portion. (Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (b).) If there are no surviving parents, decedent’s estate then passes to decedent’s siblings in equal portions “if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the decedent, but if of unequal degree those of more remote degree take in the manner provided in Section 240.” (Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (c).)

In this case, it undisputed that Sara was Anthony’s mother. (MRSSUMF[2], ¶ 4.) It also undisputed that Mariah was one of Anthony’s four siblings. (MRSSUMF, ¶ 5.) Because it is undisputed that Anthony did not have a spouse, Sara argues Sara is the only party with standing to represent Anthony’s estate in this action as Anthony’s surviving mother. (MRSSUMF, ¶ 8.) Mariah responds in opposition by arguing Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60, subdivision (a) allows the parents and children of the parents to have standing as they are individuals who could be entitled to property pursuant to intestate succession law. (Opp., p. 6:7-11.)

“In construing a statute, a court’s objective is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citation.] To determine legislative intent, a court begins with the words of the statute, because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) The court “give[s] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [Citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute’s purpose [Citation].” (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 529-530.) “If there is no ambiguity in the language, [the court] presume[s] the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.” (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215.) “Only when the statute’s language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, may the court turn to extrinsic aids to assist in interpretation.” (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.)

If decedent has no surviving children, Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60, subdivision (a) confers standing on any “persons, including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession.” In identifying the different classes of successors, intestate succession law makes clear each class only qualifies upon the unavailability of the previous class. For example, parents become equal successors only “if there is no surviving issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 6402, subd. (b).) And the decedent’s siblings become equal successors only “[i]f there is no surviving issue or parent.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 6402, subd. (c).)

In this case, because Anthony’s mother, Sara, is alive, Mariah would not be entitled to Anthony’s property as Anthony’s sibling through intestate succession. Although Mariah contends Mariah could become entitled to Anthony’s property, this interpretation conflicts with the plain language of Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60, subdivision (a) which states “would be entitled to the property of the decedent.” To the extent Mariah also points to extrinsic aids such as legislative history and policy considerations, the court need not consider them in its analysis as the plain language of the statute controls here. Because only Sara would be entitled to Anthony’s property pursuant to the rules of intestate succession, only Sara then has standing to assert claims on Anthony’s behalf pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60, subdivision (a).

But standing may also be conveyed to a plaintiff if the plaintiff was dependent on decedent pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60, subdivision (b)(1). Dependency in the context of this statute generally refers to financial dependence and “generally presents a question of fact, which ‘should be determined on a case-by-case basis.’” (Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1445, quoting Perry v. Medina (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 603, 610.) Sara did not address this ground for standing in Sara’s initial motion. And while Mariah noted this ground for standing in the opposition brief, Sara’s reply also failed to address it. Furthermore, Sara’s separate statement also does not address this ground for standing.

Because Sara is the moving party, Sara bears the initial burden of establishing there is no triable issue of material fact. Sara’s failure to address this ground for standing and point to an absence of disputed material facts with regards to Mariah’s alleged financial dependence on Anthony is fatal to Sara’s motion. (See Mariah Complaint, ¶ 13-14 [alleging pecuniary losses and losses of support and services].) Accordingly, Sara’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Sara’s motion for summary judgment.

[1] Because they have the same last name, the court will refer to Anthony Sierra, Mariah Sierra, and Sara Sierra by their first names.

[2] Mariah’s Response to Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts