Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case 22PSCP00302 2022-10-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22PSCP00302, Date: 2022-10-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCP00302 Hearing Date: October 12, 2022 Dept: A

Petitioner Guadalupe Gonzalez’s PETITION FOR AN ORDER FOR RELIEF FROM CLAIM STATUTE

Respondent: County of Los Angeles

TENTATIVE RULING

Petitioner Guadalupe Gonzalez’s Petition for an Order for Relief from Claim Statute is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This matter arises from alleged personal injuries sustained by Petitioner from tripping on a public sidewalk on September 2, 2021. Petitioner filed a claim on September 27, 2021, with the City of La Puente, which denied her claim in a letter dated September 29, 2021. The City of La Puente advised Petitioner that denial of her claim was based on the fact that the incident did not occur in the City of La Puente. Pursuant to Government Code section 945.6, subd. (a), the City of La Puente advised Petitioner that she had six (6) months from the date of the mailing of the denial to file a court action on her claim.

On March 31, 2022, Petitioner’s counsel discovered the injury occurred in unincorporated Los Angeles County, instead of the City of La Puente. On April 1, 2022, more than six months after Petitioner sustained her injury, Petitioner filed an Application for Leave to File Late Tort Claim with Los Angeles County that was denied on April 20, 2022. The Petitioner then filed this Petition for relief from claim statute on June 23, 2022.

The hearing on the petition is set for October 12, 2022. The CMC is set for November 28, 2022.

ANALYSIS

Legal Standard

Government Code section 946.6, subdivision (a) provides that “[i]f an application for leave to present a claim is denied or deemed to be denied pursuant to Section 911.6, a petition may be made to the court for an order relieving the petitioner from Section 945.4 [requiring a claim to be presented to a public entity before an action may be brought against the public entity].”

The petition must be filed within six months after the application to the board is denied. (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (b).)

The court shall grant the petition if the court finds:

(1) that the application to the board was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year under Section 911.4, subdivision (b);

(2) was denied or deemed denied; and

(3) that one or more of the enumerated reasons apply. (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (c).)

One of the enumerated reasons is “[t]he failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim” if relief is granted. (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (c)(1).)

Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect

Here, Petitioner argues she is entitled to relief under Government Code section 946.6 because her attorney failed to present a timely claim against Los Angeles County due to excusable neglect, having mistakenly filed a claim against the wrong public entity. As set forth below, however, Petitioner fails to demonstrate her attorney’s neglect was excusable.

“Relief on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is available only on a showing that the claimant's failure to timely present a claim was reasonable when tested by the objective ‘reasonably prudent person’ standard.” (N.G. v. County of San Diego (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 63, 73-74, quoting Dept. of Water & Power v. Superior Court (2000), 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293 (Dept. of Water & Power).) “A person seeking relief must show more than just failure to discover a fact until too late; or a simple failure to act,” instead showing “by a preponderance of the evidence that in the use of reasonable diligence, he could not discover the fact or could not act upon it.” (Dept. of Water & Power, at p. 1296.) Because Government Code section 946.6 “is a remedial statute intended ‘to provide relief from technical rules that otherwise provide a trap for the unwary claimant,’” courts construe it “in favor of relief whenever possible” in line with the judicial policy of favoring trials on the merits. (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 275-276, quoting Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435.)

Nevertheless, “[w]here the lateness of the claim is attributable to the failure of the claimant or [claimant’s] counsel to conduct a reasonably prudent investigation of the circumstances of the accident, relief from the claims filing statute is not available.” (Dept. of Water & Power, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1296.) “[T]he preference for a trial on the merits does not warrant relief if based on a perfunctory recital of diligence in support of excusable neglect.” (DeVore v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 454, 459.) Similarly, “[t]he general policy favoring trial on the merits cannot be applied indiscriminately so as to render ineffective the statutory time limits.” (Dept. of Water & Power, supra, at p. 1293.) Instead, “a petitioner must show more than his or her failure to discover a fact until too late; the petitioner must establish that in the use of reasonable diligence he or she failed to discover it.” (Munoz v. State (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1784 (Munoz).) And “[w]hen there is a readily available source of information from which the potential liability of a government entity may be discovered, a failure to use that source is deemed inexcusable.” (Dep’t of Water & Power, supra, at p. 1294.)

In Dept. of Water & Power, supra, at pp. 1295-1296, the Court of Appeal held the petitioner was not entitled to relief because the petitioner and his counsel failed to conduct any investigation into the liability of government entities. After the petitioner was involved in a car accident where there was water on the roadway, a police report regarding the incident noted the flooding was caused by city utility workers. (Id., pp. 1291-1292.) Because the petitioner and counsel had easy access to a copy of the police report that could have alerted them of potential city liability and they conducted no investigation, the court in Dept. of Water & Power held “[t]here was a total failure to act with due diligence during the claims filing period.” (Id., at p. 1295.)

But even if a petitioner or their counsel take some action to investigate, they still must exercise reasonable diligence to qualify for relief from claim statutes. (See Greene v. State (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 117, 122-123 (Greene); Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1783-1784.) In Greene, supra, at p. 119, the petitioner was involved in an accident on a highway and sought to bring suit based on faulty road construction. The petitioner first filed an untimely claim with the county that was denied and subsequently, the petitioner was informed by the county that the state oversaw the highway. (Id., at p. 119.) The petitioner argued he exercised reasonable diligence to discover who owned the highway at issue when his counsel’s secretary was informed by city and county employees that the highway was in Orange County and that the petitioner needed to file a claim with the county. (Id., at p. 119.) However, the court noted that the county and city employees did not answer nor did the petitioner’s legal staff ask the real question which was who owned the highway. (Id., at p. 122) The court also pointed to other facts that should have alerted petitioner’s counsel of the state’s ownership, including the fact that state highway patrol officers responded to the accident and the existing statutes that give the state department of transportation control over state highways. (Id., at pp. 121-122.)

In Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1772-1773, 1782, the court also determined that petitioner was not entitled to relief from the claim statute when petitioner’s attorney failed to act with due diligence. Munoz involved a claim for the wrongful death of an inmate against the state. The petitioner requested relief from the claim statute because she was unable to access prison medical records in a timely manner. In denying relief, the court noted that other than occasional attempts at mail correspondence, the petitioner’s attorney did not attempt to obtain the medical records by calling or visiting in person and that the attorney did not show due diligence. (Id., at p. 1783.)

In cases where relief is granted, courts identify action by the government entity that precludes petitioner’s ability to comply in a timely manner with the claim statute. Lawrence v. State (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 242 (Lawrence) is instructive. In Lawrence, the court held it was reasonably prudent for the petitioner to rely on county staff’s claim that the location of the injury was within their jurisdiction without independently verifying. (Supra, at p. 246.) There, the petitioner cut his foot while walking down a sidewalk alongside Pacific Coast Highway. (Id., at p. 244.) The secretary for the petitioner’s counsel contacted a local sheriff’s station that advised her the location was not in an incorporated city and was under county jurisdiction. (Id.) After the petitioner filed a claim with the county, the county provided a late denial on the grounds that the location was under the control of the state government, by which time the deadline to file a claim with the state had passed. (Id.) In coming to its decision, the court noted the county’s failure to timely disclaim responsibility “would have lulled any attorney into a false sense of security” and that the “crazy-quilt geography of our state's political subdivisions and its stringently short claims statute create a deadly trap for even the most wary.” (Id., at p. 246.)

Here, Petitioner Gonzales fails to establish proper grounds for the court to find excusable neglect because she failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that her attorney was reasonably diligent. In a supporting declaration, Petitioner’s counsel stated when he received the City of La Puente’s response in October 2021 that directed him “to file in the City of West Puente Valley,” he reasonably believed the City of La Puente had denied the claim until April 1, 2022. (Ayrapetyan Decl., ¶ 6-8.) However, the denial letter that Petitioner’s counsel references states, after denying the Petitioner’s claim, that “the sidewalk in question is within the jurisdiction of the City of West Puente Valley, an unincorporated community and a wholly separate entity than the City of La Puente.” (Ex. 6.) Unlike Lawrence where the petitioner was provided inaccurate jurisdictional information, here Petitioner’s counsel was on notice as of October 5, 2021, that the location was within an “unincorporated community and a wholly separate entity than the City of La Puente.” And unlike Lawrence where the county delayed in giving its response to the detriment of the petitioner, the City of La Puente responded within two (2) days to the Petitioner’s request and even sent her a second notice explicitly stating the location of the accident was within unincorporated Los Angeles County.

Petitioner’s counsel does not explain to the court why there was a delay until the end of March 2022 to file the Petitioner’s suit. (Ayrapetyan Decl., ¶ 8-9). In Greene, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 122, where the court denied relief from claim statute, the court noted that counsel was aware of facts establishing the government entity’s potential liability yet delayed filing a claim for nearly five months. Similarly, here, counsel delayed the filing of the claim for months and failed to demonstrate reasonable prudence.

Furthermore, even if the City of La Puente was the correct entity, Petitioner’s counsel still would not have timely filed a complaint in court. Petitioner’s counsel argues the deadline to file was April 4, 2022, because the denial of claim was on October 5, 2021. (Ayrapetyan Decl., ¶ 6-7) However, the City of La Puente explicitly denied Petitioner’s claim in its September 29, 2021, letter as well as its October 5, 2021, letter. Thus, the deadline to file a complaint was March 28, 2022 (six (6) months from September 29, 2021), and not April 4, 2022.

In addition to misunderstanding the City of La Puente’s denial of claim, Petitioner’s counsel also failed to exercise due diligence in researching the facts of Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner contends her counsel relied on a Google Maps result that located “628 Vineland Avenue” in La Puente, California. (See Ex. 7.) While this demonstrates Petitioner’s counsel did conduct some research, this does not satisfy the reasonable prudence standard. (See Dept. of Water & Power, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 177 (“When there is a readily available source of information from which the potential liability of a government entity may be discovered, a failure to use that source is deemed inexcusable.”).) A Google search of “West Puente Valley” reveals it is an unincorporated community and census-designated place northwest of La Puente. (Opposition Ex. B.) Similarly, a search of the address on Los Angeles County’s online planning maps displays the location in unincorporated West Puente Valley between La Puente and the City of Industry. (Opposition Ex. B.) Therefore, the failure of the Petitioner’s counsel to be put on notice by the City of La Puente’s denial of claim letter and the failure to properly research the location of the incident, beyond a cursory Google Maps query, does not properly meet the standard of excusable neglect.

Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.