Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22PSCV00615, Date: 2023-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV00615    Hearing Date: May 22, 2023    Dept: G

Plaintiff Harold Lara’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Respondent: Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Harold Lara’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This is a lemon law action. On July 15, 2019, Plaintiff Harold Lara purchased a certified pre-owned 2019 Nissan Pathfinder and alleges express warranties from Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. accompanied the sale, including that Defendant undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of Plaintiff’s vehicle and provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. Plaintiff alleges the vehicle has serious defects and nonconformities including engine, electrical, emission, transmission, suspension, structural, and steering system defects.

On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant and Does 1-10, alleging (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty, (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty, and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2.

On September 2, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims that the court granted on January 30, 2023. On April 14, Plaintiff filed the present motion to reconsider the court’s prior ruling.

A hearing on the motion is set for May 22, 2023, with a post-arbitration status conference on October 23.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff moves for the court to reconsider its previous order granting Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration because of a new change in the law. For the following reasons, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 sets out two means by which a party can seek reconsideration of a prior trial court order. First, “[w]hen an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) Second, “A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (b).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 “specifies the court's jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (e).)

Discussion

In this case, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the court’s order to compel arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivisions (a) and (c). As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot seek reconsideration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) as the present motion was not filed within ten days of February 3, 2023, when written notice was given of this court’s order to compel arbitration.

While Plaintiff also cites Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c), this subdivision does not provide authority for Plaintiff to bring a motion for reconsideration. Instead, it states “[i]f a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (c).) This provision merely codifies the court’s inherent power to reconsider prior rulings on its own motion and does not authorize parties to file written motions on this ground. (See Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is without legal authority and DENIED.

Last, for the following reasons, the court declines to exercise its discretion and reconsider its previous decision. As “change of law” is not defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c), the court has “very broad power” to determine if a change of law warrants an exercise of its discretion. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106 (Farmers Ins.).) In doing so, courts “may consider a number of factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion, including the importance of the change of law, the timing of the motion, and the circumstances of the case.” (Id., at p. 107.)

In previous cases where a change of law occurred, the case law relied on the by the court originally was abrogated or the issue was addressed by the recent decision for the first time. (See, e.g., State of California v. Superior Court (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 94, 100-101 [new Court of Appeal case addressed whether California Highway Patrol towing records could be disclosed in their entirety]; Farmers Ins., supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 109 [Court of Appeal case relied on by court was subsequently depublished]; Phillips v. Sprint PCS (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 758, 768-769 [legal standard from case relied on by court was abrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court]; Valdez v. Himmelfarb (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1275-1276 [no previous decision held statute of limitations applied to the statute at issue].

In the present case, Plaintiff suggests Ford Motor Warranty Cases (Apr. 4, 2023, B312261) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2023 WL 2768484] has changed the law on equitable estoppel and third-party beneficiaries in arbitration agreements that was previously established by Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (Felisilda). However, while Ford Motor Warranty Cases expressly disagrees with the analysis in Felisilda, it does not overrule or abrogate that decision as “there is no horizontal stare decisis in the California Court of Appeal.” (Sarti v. Salt Creek Ltd. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1193.) Unlike the previous cases in which the cases relied on were later abrogated or de-published, Felisilda remains in effect.

Furthermore, even if the court considered Ford Motor Warranty Cases to constitute a change in the law, other factors militate against reconsidering the court’s prior order. More than two months have passed between when the court compelled Plaintiff to arbitration and when the Appellate Court decided Ford Motor Warranty Cases. While the ten-day limit in Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) does not cabin the court’s discretion, the court nonetheless finds it problematic for parties to seek reconsideration of rulings based on a new appellate decision months after the ruling, unless that appellate decision abrogates the authorities the court had previously relied on.

Where, as here, the appellate decision comes months later and does not completely abrogate the legal support for the court’s ruling, this court declines to exercise its discretion to reconsider the decision.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.