Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22PSCV00799, Date: 2024-03-04 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 22PSCV00799    Hearing Date: April 8, 2024    Dept: G

Plaintiff Manuel Meza, Jr.’s Motion for Attorney Fee, Costs, and Expenses

Respondent: Defendant General Motors, LLC

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Manuel Meza, Jr.’s Motion for Attorney Fee, Costs, and Expenses is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $21,655.50 in attorney fees and $744.81 in costs.

BACKGROUND

In September 2018, Plaintiff Manuel Meza, Jr. entered into a warranty contract with Defendant General Motors, LLC (General Motors) by purchasing a 2018 Chevrolet Camaro. Subsequently during the warranty period, Meza alleges the vehicle developed defects with its transmission system.

On July 29, 2022, Meza filed a complaint against General Motors and Does 1-50, alleging (1)¿violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breach of express warranty; and (5) breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

On September 29, 2023, General Motors sent Meza a settlement offer that Meza accepted on October 31. On January 5, 2024, Meza submitted a memorandum of costs. On January 18, General Motors filed a motion to tax Meza’s memorandum of costs. On March 4, the court granted General Motors’ motion in part.

On March 15, 2024, Meza filed the present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for April 8, with a final status conference on May 13 and a jury trial on May 21.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Meza requests that the court take judicial notice of twenty trial court rulings on similar attorney fee motions. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), “[j]udicial notice may be taken of . . . . [r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.” Because these trial court rulings are records of state and federal courts, the court GRANTS Meza’s request. But in doing so, the court notes that these decisions and rulings are neither precedent nor binding authority for this court. (B.F. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 621, 627, fn. 2.)

ANALYSIS

Meza moves the court for an award of reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $44,204.50 and costs in the amount of $1,533.72. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Meza’s motion in the reduced amount of $21,655.50 in attorney fees and $744.81 in costs.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, a prevailing buyer “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) They have “the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) In granting their motion, “[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 (Morris), quoting Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Calculation of attorney fees begins with the lodestar approach in which the court fixes the lodestar at “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004, quoting Copeland v. Marshall (D.C. Cir. 1980) 641 F.2d 880, 891.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.) “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The factors to be considered include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)

“It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on “inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id., at p. 38.) But the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) And in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Discussion

In this case, Meza argues Meza is entitled to a total of $39,204.50 in attorney fees and an additional $5,000 in attorney fees for the present motion. In opposition, General Motors argues Meza’s requested fees and costs should be reduced to $18,457.81.

Prevailing Party

On September 29, 2023, General Motors sent Meza a settlement offer that Meza accepted on October 31 in which General Motors agreed to pay Meza $88,727.78 for Meza’s vehicle. Thus, Meza qualifies as the prevailing party in this action and is entitled to attorney fees and costs.

Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Meza’s counsel requests hourly rates of $515 per hour for Julian A. Moore and $350 per hour for Joseph Kowalski. (Moore Decl., ¶ 23.) In opposition, General Motors argues Meza failed to produce evidence showing that a court in Los Angeles County has approved these requested rates.

To determine if an hourly rate is reasonable, courts consider the rates of similar attorneys in the community as well as “the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Here, Moore’s declaration provides an overview of Moore and Kowalski’s experience. (Moore Decl., ¶ 23.) Based on this information and the court’s own experience, the court finds the requested rates of $515 per hour and $350 per hour to be reasonable. But despite Moore’s declaration, the billing statements show Moore charged an increased hourly rate of $530 for 12.9 hours. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 1, 4-6.) Thus, the court reduces the hourly rate charged for these hours to $515 and accordingly reduces the total amount by $193.50 ($6,837.00 reduced to $6,643.50).

In addition to Moore and Kowalski, Meza’s request also includes attorney fees of $35.00 for Arbre Kornley (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 19.) and $376.50 for Jessica Anvar (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 53.). Because Meza failed to provide any declarations that establish whether the rates charged by these attorneys were reasonable, the court declines to award any attorney fees incurred by these attorneys, which the court calculates at $411.50.

Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Meza contends that the 99.1 hours spent by counsel in this action was reasonable. (Motion, p. 9:20.) In opposition, General Motors contends that a total of 57.9 of the hours incurred were not actually and reasonably incurred.

Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.) The court reviewed the fee bill submitted by Meza and the proposed reductions by General Motors and addresses the parties’ contentions below.

Clerical Work

General Motors argues the court should decline to award fees for the 4.0 hours spent by paralegals on clerical work. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 1-3, 5.) Upon review of these entries, it appears this time was billed in the following manner.

On February 27, 2024, Katherine Carreno billed 0.10 hours for calendaring a motion to tax costs. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 1.) On February 20, Carreno billed 2.0 hours for filing Meza’s opposition to General Motors’ motion to tax costs (0.10 hours), emailing counsel (0.10 hours), drafting an opposition to “memo of cost” (1.10 hours), and reviewing invoices (0.70 hours). (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 1-2.) On February 2, Carreno billed 0.10 hours for conducting a review of a “docket audit.” (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 2.) On January 29, Carreno billed 0.50 hours for filing a notice of trial continuance (0.10 hours), emailing counsel regarding trial continuance (0.10 hours), receipt of drafted notice of trial continuance (0.20 hours), and receipt and review of calendared motion to tax costs (0.10 hours). (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 2.) On January 16, Carreno billed 0.50 hours for calendaring continued motion for attorney fees (0.20 hours) and finalizing motion for attorney fees (0.30 hours). (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 3.) Last, on January 5, Carreno billed 0.40 hours for filing memorandum of costs (0.10 hours), emailing memorandum of costs to counsel (0.10 hours), and saving drafted memorandum of costs to file (0.20 hours). (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 5.)

While the court agrees that many of these entries appear to be clerical or secretarial tasks rather than legal work, some of the entries do involve legal work including the 1.80 hours spent drafting an opposition to General Motors’ motion to tax costs and 0.30 hours spent finalizing the present motion. Accordingly, the court will only reduce Meza’s requested hours for these entries by 1.5 hours at an hourly rate of $200 per hour for a total reduction of $300.

General Motors also argues the court should strike 1.2 hours of clerical work that was billed by Meza’s counsel. But General Motors failed to provide specific citations and dates for these billing entries and instead references the entire billing statement. Thus, the court declines to make this requested deduction.

Discovery

General Motors contends the court should reduce fees awarded for Meza’s discovery requests, review of General Motors’ discovery responses, discovery motion practice, and Meza’s discovery responses.

First, Meza requests fees for 7.0 hours spent preparing discovery requests billed as follows: On September 8, 2022, Kowalski billed 1.8 hours for reviewing and analyzing technical service bulletins in preparation for drafting discovery requests. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 46.) On September 22, Kowalski billed 3.1 hours for reviewing repair orders to create a defect definition and drafting discovery requests. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 45-46.) On October 26, Kowalski billed 1.3 hours for continued drafting of discovery requests. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 45.) On the same day, Moore billed 0.4 hours for reviewing and editing the discovery requests. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 44.) On October 28, Kowalski billed 0.4 hours for finalizing the drafting of discovery requests. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 44.)

In opposition, General Motors contends the court should reduce the time spent drafting the discovery requests to 1.0 hour billed at Kowalski’s hourly rate as the discovery requests submitted were templated discovery requests. Upon review of Meza’s discovery requests, the court agrees with General Motors’ analysis. The discovery requests included a request for admissions, request for production of documents, special interrogatories, and a notice of deposition for General Motors’ person most qualified, all of which appear to be standard Song-Beverly Act discovery requests with minimal edits tailored to the subject vehicle. (Quezada Decl., Ex. A, C.) Given the experience of counsel with lemon law cases, the court finds a request of 8.0 hours is unjustified and reduces the time requested to 2.0 hours with 1.6 hours billed at Kowalski’s hourly rate and 0.4 hours billed at Moore’s hourly rate. Accordingly, the court reduces the total requested fees by $1,750.

Second, Meza requests fees for 4.5 hours spent preparing for depositions of third-party dealers billed as follows. On September 22, 2022, Kowalski billed 1.0 hours for reviewing repair orders to identify dealerships and technicians and for drafting deposition materials. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 45.) On September 23, Kowalski billed 0.5 hours for continuing to draft dealership subpoenas and for two dealerships and three technicians. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 45.) On October 31, Kowalski billed 2.2 hours for finalizing the drafting of the deposition notices and subpoenas. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 44.) On November 14, Kowalski billed 0.5 hours addressing service issues with regards to one of the dealership deposition subpoenas. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 42.) On November 15, Moore billed 0.3 hours for reviewing and analyzing deposition objections by Culver City Chevrolet. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 42.) In opposition, General Motors contends the court should eliminate this request as the depositions were never confirmed and would not have materially advance the parties’ claims or defenses. The court agrees as Meza failed to demonstrate why these depositions were reasonably necessary. Accordingly, the court declines to award the requested fees in the amount of $1,624.50.

Third, Meza requests fees for 7.0 hours spent reviewing General Motors’ discovery responses and drafting meet-and-confer correspondence billed as follows. On December 12, 2022, Kowalski billed 3.0 hours for reviewing General Motors’ responses for a discovery plan and drafting a meet-and-confer letter. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 38.) On the same day, Kowalski billed another 4.0 hours for reviewing discovery responses which included several hundred pages of repair orders, technical service bulletin lists, warranty information, and manuals. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 38.) In opposition, General Motors contends the court should reduce the amount of spent by 5.0 hours as General Motors contends it should not have taken more than two hours to review documents and make changes to a templated meet-and-confer letter. While the court agrees that 7.0 hours for reviewing discovery responses and drafting a meet-and-confer letter is excessive in a standard lemon law case, the court declines to make General Motors’ requested reduction and instead reduces the time awarded by 2.5 hours and reduces the total requested fees by $875.

Fourth, Meza requests fees for 28.3 hours spent on discovery motion practice by Kowalski including 8.3 hours billed for drafting a motion to compel deposition of General Motors’ person most qualified (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 34 (3/27/2023), 36 (1/13/2023), 37 (1/4/2023)), 12.0 hours billed for drafting a motion to compel requests for production (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 30 (4/19/2023), 31 (4/18/2023)), and 8.0 hours drafting a reply in support of Meza’s motion to compel (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 24 (7/3/2023 and 7/5/2023). In opposition, General Motors contends these motions were templated and should be reduced to 0.5 hours for the motion to compel deposition, 1.0 hour for the motion to compel, and 1.0 hour for the reply in support of the motion to compel. The court agrees these discovery motions appear to be boilerplate lemon law discovery motions and accordingly reduces the time requested to 2.0 hours for the motion to compel deposition, 2.0 hours for the motion to compel, and 1.0 hour for the reply in support of the motion to compel. Thus, the court reduces the total requested fees by $8,155.

Last, Meza requests fees for 3.0 hours billed by Kowalski for responding to General Motors’ discovery requests. (Moore Decl., Ex. 24, p. 26 (5/22/2023).) In opposition, General Motors contends these were templated responses that should not have taken more than thirty minutes. But upon review, the court disagrees and finds the amount of time spent on these responses was not excessive. Accordingly, the court declines to reduce the fees incurred for Meza’s responses to General Motors’ discovery.

Fees for the Present Motion

General Motors maintains counsel’s billing of 21.1 hours for the drafting of the present motion as well as the drafting of a reply and attending a hearing on the motion is excessive. The court agrees and reduces the time to 2.0 hours of drafting, 1.0 hour of drafting the reply, and 0.5 hours attending the hearing at Moore’s hourly rate of $515. Accordingly, the court reduces counsel’s requested fees of $11,042 ($6,042 + estimated $5,000) by $9,239.50.

Costs

Meza also requests the court award costs in the amount of $1,533.72. In granting General Motors’ previous motion to tax costs in part, the court struck $788.91 in costs. (3/4/2024 Ruling, p. 2.) Accordingly, the court awards costs to Meza in the reduced amount of $744.81.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Meza’s motion for attorney fees and costs is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $21,655.50 in attorney fees and $744.81 in costs.