Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22PSCV01233, Date: 2025-03-18 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 22PSCV01233    Hearing Date: March 18, 2025    Dept: G

Defendants Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center and Ray Inge’s Motion for Protective Order and Request for Sanctions

Respondent: Plaintiff Shaunette Miller

Plaintiff Shaunette Miller’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant Ray Inge to Reappear for Deposition

Respondent: Defendant Ray Inge

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center and Ray Inge’s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.  The Motion for a Protective Order is GRANTED IN PART as to witness Garcia, and DENIED IN PART as to witnesses Perkins and Ramnarain.

Plaintiff Shaunette Miller’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Plaintiff Shaunette Miller’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant Ray Inge to Reappear for Deposition is GRANTED, WITH LIMITATIONS.

BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination action. In June 2019, Plaintiff Shaunette Miller was hired as a human resources director for Defendant Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center (PVHMC) under the direct supervision of Defendant Ray Inge, PVHMC’s vice president of human resources. Soon afterwards, Miller alleges Inge began sexually harassing Miller by making lewd and inappropriate comments to Miller about Inge’s private life and Miller’s appearance. Miller also alleges Inge singled out Miller by commenting on Miller’s attire, including scolding Miller for wearing leggings.

As a result of Miller’s refusal to give in to or entertain Inge’s alleged sexual harassment, Miller alleges Inge began to retaliate against Miller by yelling at Miller, speaking to Miller in a condescending manner, and undermining Miller’s authority. Miller further alleges that Inge discriminated against Miller’s disability by attempting to make Miller feel bad about using sick days, contacting Miller’s primary care physician to verify accommodations, and demanding proof of Miller’s physical therapy and chiropractor visits.

In response to this alleged harassment and discrimination, Miller made complaints to recruitment supervisor Sandra Shea and benefits specialist Krystal Garcia. On August 5, 2021, Inge gave Miller a performance evaluation that allegedly contained untruthful statements about Miller. When Miller submitted a rebuttal to the evaluation, Inge stated an independent third party would conduct a review of the performance evaluation and rebuttal. Miller then alleges the review was conducted by Naomi Nightingale, one of Inge’s close friends, and that the final report absolved Inge of responsibility. A week afterwards on August 10, 2022, Inge fired Miller.

On October 12, 2022, Miller filed a complaint against PVHMC, Inge, and Does 1-100, alleging the following causes of action: (1) sexual harassment in violation of Government Code sections 12940 et seq.; (2) discrimination in violation of Government Code sections 12940 et seq.; (3) retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (4) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (5) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (6) failure to prevent sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (7) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress. On February 1, 2023, the court partially sustained and overruled a demurrer to Miller’s Complaint by PVHMC and Inge.

On February 21, 2023, Miller filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same Defendants alleging the following causes of action: (1) sexual harassment in violation of Government Code sections 12940 et seq.; (2) discrimination in violation of Government Code sections 12940 et seq.; (3) retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (4) failure to prevent sexual harassment, discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress.¿On June 30, 2023, the court overruled a demurrer to Miller’s FAC by PVHMC and Inge.

On June 26, 2024, the court denied PVHMC and Inge’s motion for summary judgment or adjudication.

On December 26, 2024, PVHMC and Inge filed the present motion for a protective order. On February 24, 2025, Miller filed the present motion to compel Inge’s deposition.

A hearing on the present motions is set for March 18, 2025, along with a CMC.

ANALYSIS

Motion for Protective Order

PVHMC and Inge move for a protective order to preclude Miller’s deposition of Kathy Perkins, Janet Garcia, and Narissa Ramnarain. For the following reasons, the court DENIES their motion.

Legal Standard

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) Such orders may include barring the taking of a deposition entirely or limiting the scope of inquiry. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b)(1), (5), (6).) The court has considerable discretion in granting and crafting protective orders. (Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588.)

Discussion

On December 2, 2024, Miller served PVHMC and Inge with deposition notices for Perkins and Ramnarain. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 8.) On December 4, 2024, PVHMC and Inge served objections to the deposition notices and provided a meet-and-confer letter that argued it would be a waste of the parties’ time and resources for depositions to occur prior to mediation that was scheduled for January 6, 2025. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 8.) After back-and-forth discussions between the parties over whether the depositions were necessary, Miller refused to withdraw the deposition notices and cancelled the scheduled mediation, while PVHMC and Inge proceeded with the present motion. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 9-12.)

Perkins

PVHMC and Inge claim Perkins is PVHMC’s compliance officer and main point of contact for PVHMC’s counsel. (Motion, p. 2:6-8.) They object to Perkins’ deposition on the grounds that all information in Perkins’s knowledge is covered by attorney-client privilege and work product privilege. (Motion, p. 2:8-9, 7:7-11.) PVHMC and Inge fail, however, to provide any evidence that supports these claims. Absent such a showing a proof, the mere hypothetical possibility that claims of attorney-client privilege or work product privilege could be invoked is insufficient to block Perkins’ deposition, especially where any issues can be adequately addressed by the proper objections.

PVHMC and Inge also argue any information Perkins may provide is irrelevant and intended to harass PVHMC. (Motion, p. 8:13-16.) In opposition, Miller states Miller seeks testimony involving Perkins’ role in investigating Inge’s alleged sexual harassment of Miller, Perkins’ role in investigating Ramnarain’s alleged sexual harassment claims against Inge, and Perkins’ personal knowledge of sources and discovery responses that Perkins verified on PVHMC’s behalf. (Opp., p. 5:10-14.) In reply, PVHMC and Inge point to deposition testimony from Garcia and PVHMC’s own discovery responses to establish that Dr. Naomi Nightingale was the only person to investigate Miller’s claims. (Reply, p. 3:1-10.) But such evidence does not prevent Miller from testing the veracity of Garcia and PVHMC’s statements by questioning other PVHMC staff members who may be involved, including Perkins. And Miller also seeks information from Perkins with regards to the investigation of Ramnarain’s allegations.

PVHMC and Inge also argue Perkins’ verification of discovery responses does not entitle Miller to Perkins’s deposition. (Reply, p. 3:27-4:10.) But as noted above, to the extent Miller asks for information covered by attorney-client privilege or work product privilege, PVHMC and Inge may assert the proper objections and decline to answer these questions. Thus, the court declines to issue a protective order limiting or barring Perkins’ deposition.

Ramnarain

PVHMC and Inge claim Ramnarain is an employee of PVHMC. (Motion, p. 2:12-13.) They object to Ramnarain’s deposition on the grounds that Ramnarain has never been previously mentioned or disclosed in the pleadings or discovery. (Motion, p. 8:17-21.) PVHMC and Inge fail to point to any authority, however, that directs the court to grounds that state a potential witness cannot be deposed if they were never mentioned in prior pleadings or discovery. Such a requirement would contravene a party’s ability to prepare their case for trial since discovery is required for the development of their claims. In opposition, Miller contends Ramnarain is another victim of Inge’s alleged misconduct and will testify as to Inge’s actions, interactions with Miller, and PVHMC’s subsequent investigation. (Opp., p. 9:4-13.)

PVHMC and Inge respond that such evidence is inadmissible because it is irrelevant, harassing, improper character evidence, and prejudicial. (Reply, p. 5:3-8:16.)  But admissibility is not the test for discoverability at this stage of litigation which only requires that such evidence be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Ultimately, the parties will have an opportunity to challenge the admissibility of evidence prior to trial through properly noticed motions in limine.  While PVHMC and Inge may renew these objections prior to trial, PVHMC and Inge have not provided the court with proper grounds upon which to prevent Miller from investigating Ramnarain’s. Thus, the court declines to issue a protective order limiting or barring Ramnarain’s deposition.

Garcia

PVHMC and Inge claim Garcia is PVHMC’s Vice President of Human Resources. (Motion, p. 2:9-11.) They argue Miller has already taken Garcia’s deposition as PVHMC’s person most knowledgeable (PMK) and in an individual capacity. (Motion, p. 9:2-5.) In opposition, Miller states Garcia’s initial deposition was only as PVHMC’s PMK and that PVHMC’s counsel prevented Garcia from testifying in an individual capacity. (Opp., p. 7:3-8:4; Taylor Decl., Ex. 2, p. 68:17-19, 69:1-10.) In reply, PVHMC and Inge maintain Miller misrepresents Garcia’s deposition. (Reply, p. 4:12-27.) Specifically, they point to at least four instances during the deposition where Garcia continued answering questions after PVHMC and Inge’s counsel lodged an individual capacity objection. (Johnson Suppl. Decl., Ex. B, p. 68:13-25, 83:11-84:7, 88:5-9, 89:21-22.) In fact, Miller’s own evidence establishes PVHMC and Inge’s counsel did not prevent Garcia from testifying in an individual capacity and merely lodged objections. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 2, p. 68:17-25, 83:1-21.)

Here, Garcia responded to deposition questions in an individual capacity, although PVHMC and Inge objected on the record. Since a party generally is not allowed to conduct a subsequent deposition of a deponent, a party may do so when the deponent was previously examined as a designee of an organization. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.610, subd. (c)(1).) Here, however,PVHMC and Inge permitted Miller to depose Garcia as a PMK and in Garcia individual capacity.  Given PVHMC and Inge permitted Garcia to answer questions in an individual capacity, outside the scope of Garcia’s PMK designation, Miller is precluded from a second deposition.

Thus, the Motion for a Protective Order by PVHMC and Inge as to witness Garcia is GRANTED.  The court issues a protective order barring a second session of witness Garcia’s deposition.

Sanctions

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivision (h), “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

In this case, Miller argues the court should impose sanctions against PVHMC and Inge for unsuccessfully bringing the present motion for a protective order. Since the court GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART the motion for a protective order by PVHMC and Inge, Miller’s request for sanctions is DENIED. 

Motion to Compel Second Deposition of Inge

Miller moves to compel a second deposition of Inge. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Miller’s motion.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.610, subdivision (a), “[o]nce any party has taken the deposition of any natural person, including that of a party to the action, neither the party who gave, nor any other party who has been served with a deposition notice pursuant to Section 2025.240 may take a subsequent deposition of that deponent.” But “for good cause shown, the court may grant leave to take a subsequent deposition, and the parties, with the consent of any deponent who is not a party, may stipulate that a subsequent deposition be taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.610, subd. (b).)

In this case, Miller argues there is good cause to allow a second deposition of Inge based upon new allegations of misconduct. (Motion, p. 3:17-27.) Specifically, Miller argues that since Inge’s first deposition, Inge has left PVHMC and been accused of sexually harassing another employee named Narissa Ramnarain. Although PVHMC and Inge repeat their inadmissibility arguments made in their motion for a protective order to prohibit Ramnarain’s deposition, those arguments fail for the same reasons noted above.  Accordingly, the court GRANTS Miller’s motion. 

Notwithstanding the above, the court limits the second deposition of Inge to the alleged new allegations only.  Miller is not permitted to revisit areas which were known to Miller at the first deposition or that Miller omitted at the first deposition.  Further, the court does not limit the objections which PVHMC and Inge may assert during the deposition.   

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, PVHMC and Inge’s motion for a protective order is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.  The Motion for a Protective Order is GRANTED IN PART as to witness Garcia, and DENIED IN PART as to witnesses Perkins and Ramnarain.

Furthermore, Miller’s motion to compel Inge’s second deposition is GRANTED, with the limitation that Miller is not permitted to revisit areas which were known to Miller at the first deposition or that Miller omitted at the first deposition.