Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22PSCV01339, Date: 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 22PSCV01339    Hearing Date: March 8, 2023    Dept: G

Defendant Elizabeth Turrietta’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Lauren Turrietta

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Elizabeth Turrietta’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is OVERRULED. 

BACKGROUND

This is an action arising from a family dispute over real property. Plaintiff Lauren Turrietta, formerly known as Lauren Medina, is a sister-in-law of Defendant Elizabeth Turrietta. In July 2019, Plaintiff wanted to purchase a property in Pomona but was unable to qualify for a loan to finance the purchase. Plaintiff then came to an agreement with Defendant in which Defendant agreed to co-sign for the loan and Plaintiff agreed to let Defendant live with Plaintiff for free until Defendant found another place. Plaintiff would then remove Defendant from the title and loan.

Plaintiff and Defendant then entered into a purchase agreement with a third party to purchase the Pomona property for $510,000. Defendant paid a portion of the down payment in the amount of $3,000 and Plaintiff reimbursed Defendant for the amount. Defendant lived with Plaintiff at the Pomona property for nine months without making any payments for mortgage, taxes, insurance, or rent before finding other living arrangements and moving out. When Plaintiff decided to sell the property in March 2022 for a listing price of more than $780,000, Defendant claimed a 50% ownership interest in the property.

On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint against Defendant and Does 1-20, alleging the following causes of action: (1) partition, (2) quiet title, and (3) breach of oral agreement. On December 5, Defendant filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing, Defendant’s counsel set a “meet and confer” to Plaintiff’s counsel explaining Defendant’ grounds for demurrer on November 10. On November 15, Plaintiff’s counsel responded and disagreed.

On January 4, 2023, the court continued the hearing on Defendant’s demurrer due to counsel’s failure to adequately meet and confer. On January 6, Defendant’s counsel met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel over the telephone but was unable to come to an agreement. (Vokshori Supp. Decl., ¶ 2-3.) A hearing on the demurrer and case management conference have been set for March 8.

ANALYSIS

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s second cause of action (­quiet title) and third cause of action (breach of oral agreement).

For the following reasons, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer in its entirety.

Legal Standard

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

Breach of Oral Agreement (Third Cause of Action)

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s third cause of action for breach of oral agreement is (1) time-barred, (2) barred by the statute of frauds, and (3) insufficiently pled. The court disagrees.

Statute of Limitations

“A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403.) The statute of limitations for breach of an oral agreement is two years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 339.) Furthermore, the period in which to commence an action does not begin “until ‘the last element essential to the cause of action’ occurs.” (Spear v. California State Auto. Assn. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1035, 1040, quoting Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 187.)

In this case, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into the oral agreement at issue in July 2019. (Complaint, ¶ 35) Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached the oral agreement in March 2022 when Defendant refused to allow the sale of the Pomona property. (Complaint, ¶ 19, 42-43.) However, Defendant claims Defendant did not breach the agreement in March 2022 because Plaintiff breached the agreement earlier, on January 2020 by failing to refinance the loan. This argument fails because it relies on a misinterpretation of parties’ oral agreement.

According to the Complaint, the parties “agreed that [Plaintiff] would thereafter refinance to remove [Defendant] from the title and loan, as time would permit, or take other reasonable measures to remove [Defendant] from the title and the loan. It was understood that [Plaintiff] would not be able to refinance based on the initial loan terms until at least Six (6) months after funding/purchase of [the Pomona property].” (Complaint, ¶ 11.) While Defendant suggests Plaintiff had to refinance the loan within six months of purchase, this language suggests Plaintiff had to refinance “as time would permit or take other reasonable measures.” Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff was unable to refinance the loan due to the COVID-19 pandemic and instead sought to sell the property so Defendant could be taken off the title. (Complaint, ¶ 17-19.)

Thus, because the Complaint adequately alleges Plaintiff performed under the oral agreement and that this cause of action accrued when Defendant allegedly breached the agreement in March 2022, the court finds that Plaintiff’s cause of action is not time-barred.

Statute of Frauds

Pursuant Civil Code section 1624, certain enumerated “contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent.” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a).) One such agreement is “[a]n agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein.” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).) However, one exception to this rule is the doctrine of part performance. (Sutton v. Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415, 422.) “Under the doctrine of part performance, the oral agreement for the transfer of an interest in real property is enforced when the buyer has taken possession of the property and either makes a full or partial payment of the purchase price, or makes valuable and substantial improvements on the property, in reliance on the oral agreement.” (Ibid, quoting 1 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate 2d (1989) § 1:60, p. 168.)

In this case, Defendant claims the Complaint fails to allege Plaintiff “performed anything in regard to the purported agreement.” (Demurrer, p. 8:1-5.) However, a review of the Complaint demonstrates this argument has no merit. In fact, the Complaint alleges Plaintiff performed by paying closing costs of $17,000 and allowing Defendant to live at the Pomona property for nine months without paying any rent, mortgage, taxes, or insurance. (Complaint, ¶ 13, 16) The only condition Plaintiff has not been able to arguably perform is removal of Defendant from the property title. While Defendant tries to argue that allowing Defendant to live at the Pomona property was required under the loan’s conditions, this argument ignores the fact that Defendant did not have to provide any financial contribution to mortgage payments, taxes, or insurance and that the closing costs Defendant had to pay were reimbursed by Plaintiff.

Thus, because Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently alleged Plaintiff’s partial performance, Defendant cannot rely on the statute of frauds defense as grounds for a demurrer.

Sufficiency of Pleading

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

In this case, Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to establish the terms of the oral agreement with certainty. First, to the extent Defendant suggests Plaintiff’s pleadings actually establish Plaintiff was the one who breached the agreement, the court rejects this argument as set forth above. Defendant also argues the terms of the agreement are uncertain in that the agreement does not define how long Defendant was to reside at the Pomona property, how down payment contributions were to be made, and what was the remedy for Plaintiff being unable to refinance.

Regarding the length of Defendant’s stay, the Complaint alleges the agreement allowed for Defendant to live at the Pomona property “until she was able to find a place of her own.” (Complaint, ¶ 11.) While the agreement did not specify the division of down payment obligations, the Complaint alleges Plaintiff agreed to cover 100% of the down payment and loan obligations. (Complaint, ¶ 36.) Defendant’s last contention is based on a misinterpretation of the agreement, as Plaintiff obtaining refinancing was not a term or condition of the agreement. Rather, Plaintiff agreed to remove Defendant from the title and the loan by refinancing or through some other reasonable measures. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) Thus, Plaintiff adequately pled the terms of the alleged oral agreement to establish a breach of contract claim.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action is OVERRULED.

Quiet Title (Second Cause of Action)

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s second cause of action for quiet title fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim and is time-barred. The court disagrees.

To prevail on a claim to quiet title, Plaintiff must allege “(1) a description of the property that is the subject of the action; (2) the title of the plaintiff as to which a determination is sought and the basis of the title; (3) ‘[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought’; (4) the date as of which the determination is sought; and (5) a prayer for the determination of plaintiff's title ‘against the adverse claims.’” (Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 294, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subds. (a)-(e).) 

In this case, Defendant contends Plaintiff failed to plead facts establishing the invalidity of Defendant’s title. However, as noted above, Plaintiff pled adequate facts to establish Defendant breached the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant. In particular, Plaintiff alleges Defendant refused to allow the sale of the property and demanded fifty percent of the sale proceeds, despite the parties previously agreeing that Defendant lacked any interest in the Pomona property and that Defendant’s “bare legal title” would be eventually extinguished when the loan was refinanced or through other “reasonable measures.” (Complaint, ¶ 11, 34, 42.) Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts establishing the invalidity of Defendant’s title.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action is OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is OVERRULED in its entirety.

Defendant to answer the Complaint in twenty (20) days.