Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22PSCV01572, Date: 2023-04-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV01572    Hearing Date: April 3, 2023    Dept: G

Plaintiff Rebecca Castillo’s Application for Default Judgment

Respondent: NO OPPOSITION

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Rebecca Castillo’s Application for Default Judgment is DENIED without prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

This is a disability rights action. Plaintiff Rebecca Castillo is a visually-impaired and legally blind individual. Defendant Lalaland CA 189 The Grove LLC is a California limited liability company that operates a commercial website available to the public.

As early as September 2022, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website multiple times and alleges the following barriers to access existed: (1) graphics, links, and buttons on the website were mislabeled or lacked alternative text (alt-text) for screen-reading software to read out; (2) multiple pages contained insufficient navigational headings; (3) product links and descriptions were inaccessible to screen reading technology, and (4) the checkout system was inaccessible.

On October 31, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages and injunctive relief against Defendant and Does 1-10, alleging violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA). On November 22, Plaintiff’s registered process server personally served Defendant’s agent for the service of process in Sacramento.

On January 6, 2023, default was entered against the Defendant. On March 22, Plaintiff submitted the present application for default judgment.

An OSC Re: Default Judgment is set for April 3, 2023.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has filed to timely respond or appear.  A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (7) exhibits as necessary; and (8) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties.  (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1800.) 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendant in the total amount of $9,074, including $8,000 in damages, $570 in attorney fees, and $504 in costs. Because Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief under UCRA, Plaintiff’s application is DENIED without prejudice.

“If the complaint does not state a cause of action or the allegations do not support a claim for relief, a default judgment is erroneous and ‘cannot stand.’” (Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1015.) Thus, while all properly pled facts are deemed admitted by the defendant, allegations are not and “plaintiff must prove each essential element of the complaint entitling the plaintiff to a recovery against the defendant.” (Id., at p. 1013.)

Pursuant to UCRA, “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state . . . no matter what their . . . disability . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civil Code, § 51, subd. (b).) “A plaintiff can recover under the [UCRA] on two alternate theories: (1) a violation of the ADA [Civil Code section 51, subd. (f)]; or (2) denial of access to a business establishment based on intentional discrimination.” (Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059 (SDCCU).)

ADA Violations

To establish a violation of the ADA, “a plaintiff must show: (1) a covered disability; (2) ‘the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was¿denied¿public accommodations¿by the defendant because of [the] disability.’” (Id., at p. 1060, quoting Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 481 F.3d 724, 730.) Websites alone are not considered places of public accommodation under the ADA. (Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1043-1044, 1052-1053 (Cot’n Wash).) However, pursuant to the nexus test, courts will “consider whether the alleged website deficiencies impinge on the plaintiff's ability to have equal access to, and enjoyment of, the products and services offered at the physical location.” (SDCCU, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.)

For example, the Ninth Circuit found such a nexus between Domino’s website and physical locations where customers could place orders over the website for home delivery or in-store pickup and locate nearby restaurants. (Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (9th Cir. 2019) 913 F.3d 898, 905.) In another case, this nexus was found where a restaurant’s website included a menu and reservation system that were inaccessible to potential visually impaired customers. (Thurston v. Midvale Corp. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 634, 638, 646.) A nexus also exists if the website provided a list of locations and services that the customer could use to determine where to go. (SDCCU, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges the Defendant’s website “provides consumers with access to an array of goods, services, and information related to Defendant’s brick-and-mortar locations including menu descriptions, online ordering, contact options, location information, pricing details, career opportunities, merchandise descriptions, account sign-up, and many other benefits.” (Complaint, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff “was unable to fully and independently access the Website” and vaguely claims to have “encountered multiple unlabeled or mislabeled buttons and links,” and “multiple pages containing insufficient navigational headings,” as well as the inability “to browse products” and “to make a purchase because of an inaccessible checkout system.” (Complaint, ¶ 36-37.)

Even if there are accessibility issues however, “a plaintiff who fails to allege any connection between the website barriers and a physical location does not have an ADA claim.” (Gomez v. Trinitas Cellars, LLC (N.D. Cal. March 9, 2022) 3:21-cv-09006-WHO [2022 WL 704857, at *3], quoting Langer v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2021) 20-cv-06015-DMR [2021 WL 148237, at *5].) Here, Plaintiff does not allege the website was entirely inaccessible. While Plaintiff claims “multiple” barriers, Plaintiff does not specify how those barriers have a connection to Defendant’s physical store locations. The only specifics Plaintiff provides is that Plaintiff was unable to browse for products and make a purchase. Plaintiff does not show how these products and checkout systems are connected to Defendant’s physical stores or a separate online store, an important distinction given purely online retail sites are not covered under the ADA. (Cot’n Wash, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1043-1044, 1052-1053.)

Ultimately, Plaintiff only alleges the barriers “deterred Plaintiff from visiting” Defendant’s physical stores. (Complaint, ¶ 39.) While Plaintiff lists the benefits provided by the website to consumers, Plaintiff does not describe how the accessibility issues denied these benefits and the benefits mentioned (product descriptions and checkout system) are not pled as connected to Defendant’s physical stores. Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately pled that Defendant’s website is inaccessible to the extent prohibited by the ADA.

UCRA Violations

Pursuant to the UCRA, if a claim is not an ADA violation, the plaintiff must prove the discrimination was intentional or willful and affirmative misconduct. (Id., at p. 1036.) “A claimant may not ‘rel[y] on the¿effects¿of a facially neutral policy on a particular group . . . to infer¿solely¿from such effects a discriminatory intent.’” (Ibid, quoting Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 854.)

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts establishing Defendant’s website was intended to discriminate against the visually impaired. While Plaintiff claims Defendant’s actions were intentional discrimination, these allegations are conclusory without any facts pled as support. (Complaint, ¶ 48.) Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of UCRA.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s application for default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.