Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22PSCV01739, Date: 2025-03-10 Tentative Ruling
The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.
Case Number: 22PSCV01739 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: G
Plaintiffs Quanyi Wang and Ruoxuan Li’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees, Costs and Expenses
Respondent: Defendants Ford
Motor Company and Hemborg Ford
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiffs Quanyi Wang and Ruoxuan Li’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses is GRANTED in the reduced amount of
$27,340.50 in attorney fees and $7,797.68 in costs.
BACKGROUND
This
is a Song-Beverly action. In November 2021, Plaintiffs Quanyi Wang and
Ruoxuan Li entered into a warranty contract with Defendant Ford Motor Company
(Ford) by purchasing a 2021 Ford Explorer from Defendant Hemborg Ford.
Subsequently, Wang and Li’s vehicle manifested engine defects.
On
November 8, 2022, Wang and Li filed a complaint against Ford, Hemborg Ford, and
Does 1-10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of express
warranty, (2) breach of implied warranty, and (3) negligent repair. On April 6,
2023, the court sustained a demurrer to the Complaint by Hemborg Ford with
leave to amend.
On
April 26, 2023, Wang and Li filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the
same defendants alleging the same causes of action. On June 29, 2023, the court
sustained Hemborg Ford’s demurrer to the FAC without leave to amend.
On October
15, 2024, Wang and Li filed a notice of settlement. On December 17, 2024, they
filed the present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for March 10,
2025, along with an OSC Re: Dismissal.
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Wang and Li’s evidentiary
objections are OVERRULED.
ANALYSIS
Wang
and Li move the court for an award of reasonable attorney fees in the amount of
$49,212.00 and costs in the amount of $7,797.68. For the following reasons, the
court GRANTS their motion in
the reduced amount of $27,340.50 in attorney fees and $7,797.68 in costs.
Legal
Standard
Pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, a prevailing buyer “shall be allowed by the court to recover as
part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses,
including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court
to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the
commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) They
have “the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to
the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v.
Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785,
817.) In granting their motion, “[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request
for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.”
(Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 (Morris),
quoting Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) “If the
time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not
reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into
account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai
Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)
Calculation of attorney fees
begins with the lodestar approach in which the court fixes the lodestar at “the
number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”
(Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004,
quoting Copeland v. Marshall (D.C. Cir. 1980) 641 F.2d 880, 891.)
“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a
case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of
an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.) “The lodestar figure may
then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in
order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”
(PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The factors to be
considered include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of
money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the
attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (EnPalm,
LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)
“It is appropriate for a
trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a
routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant
inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on
“inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id., at p.
38.) But the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general
notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose
(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) And in conducting the analysis, courts are not
permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the
buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)
Discussion
In this case, Wang and Li argue
they are entitled to $32,808.00 in attorney fees with a lodestar multiplier of
1.5 for total fees of $49,212.00. In opposition, while Ford and Hemborg Ford do
not dispute Wang and Li are prevailing parties entitled to attorney fees, they
argue Wang and Li’s requested attorney fees should be reduced to $14,239.50.
Reasonableness of
Hourly Rate
Wang and Li’s counsel
requests hourly rates as laid out in the following table. (Kirnos Decl., ¶
27-28.)
Name |
Position |
Years of Practice |
2022 Rate |
2023 Rate |
2024 Rate |
Roger Kirnos |
Manag. Partner |
12 |
|
|
$550 |
Russell Huggins |
Partner |
21 |
|
|
$550 |
Amy Morse |
Partner |
11 |
$425 |
$450 |
$500 |
Jeffery Mukai |
Sen. Attorney |
14 |
|
$495 |
|
Zachary Powell |
Sen. Attorney |
11 |
|
|
$450 |
Maite Colon |
Sen. Associate |
13 |
$395 |
$425 |
|
Deepak Devabose |
Sen. Associate |
10 |
|
|
$450 |
Marisa Melero |
Sen. Associate |
9 |
|
$395 |
|
Timothy Lupinek |
Associate |
11 |
|
|
$450 |
Danielle L. Manning |
Associate |
8 |
|
$475 |
|
Armando Lopez |
Associate |
6 |
$325 |
$375 |
$400 |
Sundeep Samra |
Associate |
6 |
|
|
$400 |
Caitlin Rice |
Associate |
4 |
|
$350 |
|
Maxwell Kreymer |
Associate |
4 |
$295 |
$350 |
|
Elvira Kamosko |
Associate |
3 |
|
|
$350 |
To determine if an hourly
rate is reasonable, courts consider the rates of similar attorneys in the community
as well as “the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting
fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
972, 1009.) Here, Kirnos’s declaration provides an overview of the experience
and credentials for each of the above-listed counsel. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 27-28.) Based
on Kirnos’s declaration and the court’s own experience with the billing rates
of Los Angeles-area counsel in similar Song-Beverly cases, the court finds the
rates reasonable.
Reasonableness of Hours
Billed
Wang and Li request attorney
fees for a total of 78.6 hours spent by counsel on this action. (Kirnos Decl.,
Ex. A.) In opposition, Ford and Hemborg Ford argue
this request is excessive, inefficient, and unreasonable.
Although
a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services
listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167
Cal.App.3d 677, 682), counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the
reasonableness of charges. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.) The court reviewed the fee bill submitted by Wang
and Li and the proposed reductions by Ford and Hemborg Ford. The parties’ contentions are addressed below.[1]
Demurrer to Negligent
Repair Cause of Action
Ford and Hemborg Ford first
contend the court should decline to award any fees relating to their demurrer
to Wang and Li’s cause of action for negligent repair on the grounds that those
fees do not directly relate to their Song-Beverly Act claims. (Opp., p.
10:21-11:12.)
“When a cause of action for
which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of
action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may
recover only on the statutory cause of action.” (Akins v. Enterprise
Rent-A-Car Co. of San Francisco (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133.) “Such
fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue
common to both causes of action in which fees are proper and those in which
they are not. [Citation.] Apportionment is not required when the claims for
relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to
separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units.” (Bell
v. Vista Unified School District (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687.)
Here, Wang and Li’s counsel
billed a total of $2,767.50 for opposing Hemborg Ford’s two demurrers to their
cause of action for negligent repair. This includes $32.50 for 0.1 hours spent
meeting and conferring on Hemborg Ford’s demurrer on December 28, 2022 (Kirnos
Decl., Ex. A, p. 1); $525.00 for 1.4 hours spent drafting an opposition to
Hemborg Ford’s demurrer on February 13, 2023, and February 14, 2023 (Kirnos
Decl., Ex. A, p. 1); $165.00 for 0.4 hours spent reviewing the court’s
tentative ruling on Hemborg Ford’s demurrer on April 5, 2023 (Kirnos Decl., Ex.
A, p. 2); $375.00 for 1.0 hours spent preparing for and attending the hearing
on Hemborg Ford’s demurrer on April 6, 2023 (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A, p. 2); $262.50
for 0.7 hours spent drafting the FAC on April 26, 2023 (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A, p.
2), $337.50 for 0.9 hours spent drafting an opposition to Hemborg Ford’s second
demurrer to the FAC on June 15, 2023 (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A, p. 2); $45.00 for
0.1 hours spent reviewing the court’s tentative ruling on Hemborg Ford’s
demurrer on June 28, 2023 (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A, p. 2); $350.00 for 1.0 hours
spent preparing for the hearing on Hemborg Ford’s demurrer on June 29, 2023
(Kirnos Decl., Ex. A, p. 2); $525.00 for 1.5 hours spent attending the hearing
on Hemborg Ford’s demurrer on June 29, 2023 (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A, p. 2); and $150.00
for 0.4 hours spent drafting and reviewing summary of demurrer hearing on June
29, 2023 (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A, p. 2).
In contending apportionment
is not required, Wang and Li point to Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 334 (Santana). (Reply, p. 4:3-17.) In that case, the court
declined to apportion fees between Song-Beverly Act claims and fraud claims on
the grounds that the causes of action encompassed a single set of facts. (Id.,
at p. 349.) The procedural posture of Santana, however, is
distinguishable since that case involved a jury verdict on both claims. (Id.,
at p. 338.) And the court in Santana noted there was no practical method
of apportioning fees spent on fraud issues and Song-Beverly Act issues. (Id.,
at p. 350.) Such issues are not present here where the fees at issue involved
demurrers that only challenged the negligent repair cause of action. Thus, the
court declines to award $2,767.50 in fees
related to Wang and Li’s cause of action for negligent repair.
Excessive and Unnecessary
Fees
Ford and Hemborg Ford contend
Wang and Li’s request includes excessive and unreasonable work that was based
on templates. (Opp., p. 11:15-22.) As an example, Ford and Hemborg Ford claim
that Wang and Li’s counsel billed $1,155.00 for 3.3 hours of drafting discovery
responses that purportedly included objections and similar responses. But Ford
and Hemborg Ford do not provide any copy of such responses. And even if Wang
and Li’s responses were similar, that does not foreclose the fact that Wang and
Li’s counsel still had to conduct a review of their case files to ensure each
response was proper and thorough.
Ford and Hemborg Ford also
claim counsel billed $281.70 for 1.0 hours for drafting four (4) supplemental
responses to their interrogatories and requests for production on August 19,
2024. (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A, p. 4.) Again, however, Ford and Hemborg Ford fail to provide copies
of such responses. And, on their face, the court does not find these billing
entries to be excessive or unreasonable.
To the extent Ford and
Hemborg Ford also argue the court should exclude unnecessary billing that
involves internal, block-billed, and clerical tasks, the court finds Defendants
failed to develop their argument, instead making general arguments without
specific citations to the billing item challenged. (Opp., p. 12:18-14:8.) And,
as noted above, the court declines to consider Defendants’ line-by-line
objections included in separate exhibits.
Motion for Attorney
Fees
Ford and Hemborg Ford contend
Wang and Li’s request for fees in bringing the present motion are unreasonable.
(Opp., p. 11:24-12:15.) Specifically, Wang and Li’s counsel billed a total of $4,410.00
for the present motion including $1,035.00 for 2.3 hours spent reviewing
billing and drafting the present motion on December 8, 2024; $2,700.00 in
anticipated fees for 6.0 hours spent reviewing Ford and Hemborg Ford’s
opposition and drafting a reply; and $675.00 in anticipated fees for 1.5 hours
spent preparing for and attending the hearing on the present motion. (Kirnos
Decl., Ex. A, p. 6.)
The court agrees that these
amounts are excessive and reduces the request to 2.3 hours for drafting the
present motion, 1.0 hours for drafting the reply, and 0.5 hours for attending
the hearing for a total reduction of $2,700.00.
Reasonableness of
Multiplier
Wang and Li contend their
counsel is entitled to a multiplier of 1.5 as requested in their notice of
motion or a multiplier of 0.5 as requested in their memorandum of points and
authorities. (Motion, p. 11:26-27.) They maintain such a multiplier is
appropriate based on the contingent risks inherent in pursuing this case.
(Motion, p. 11:16-28.) The factors that courts look at to determine if a
multiplier is reasonable are: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which
the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and]
(4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132).
Here, while Wang and Li point
to the contingent nature of the present fee award, they fail to establish how any
of the other factors in Ketchum support the award of a multiplier. Thus,
the court declines to award a multiplier and will limit the award to $32,808.00
minus the above reductions for a total amount of $27,340.50.
Costs
Wang and Li also request the
court award in $7,797.68 in costs pursuant to a memorandum of costs filed
December 17, 2024. Because Ford and Hemborg Ford did not file a timely motion
to tax or strike such costs pursuant to Rule 3.1700, subdivision (b) of the
California Rules of Court, the court awards the costs as requested.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Wang
and Li’s motion for attorney fees and costs is GRANTED in the reduced
amount of $27,340.50 in attorney fees and $7,797.68 in costs.
________________________________________________
[1] The court will not address additional arguments raised
by Ford and Hemborg Ford in Exhibit F and will limit its consideration to the
grounds raised in Ford and Hemborg Ford’s opposition brief.