Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22PSCV02254, Date: 2023-05-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22PSCV02254 Hearing Date: May 25, 2023 Dept: G
Defendants St. Francis
Home for the Elderly, Inc., James McGee, and Barbara Boiston’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint
Respondent: Plaintiffs Janet Geller, individually and as
successor-in-interest to John Clonts; Barbara Clonts; Michael Clonts; and
Sharon Pettibone
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants St. Francis
Home for the Elderly, Inc., James McGee, and Barbara Boiston’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This is an action for
medical malpractice and wrongful death. In September 2019, John Clonts (Clonts)
was admitted to a residential care facility operated by St. Francis Home for
the Elderly, Inc. (St. Francis) for hospice care. At the time of Clonts’ admission,
Clonts was around 90 years of age and suffered from dementia, hearing
difficulties, and ambulatory issues. During Clonts’ stay, St. Francis allegedly
failed to follow health and safety standards, causing Clonts to develop
unstageable decubitus ulcers and sepsis. As a result, Clonts passed away on December
11, 2021.
On December 2, 2022,
Plaintiffs Janet Geller (individually and on the behalf of Clonts as
successor-in-interest), Barbara Clonts, Michael Clonts, David Clonts, and
Sharon Pettibone filed a complaint against Defendants St. Francis, James McGee
(McGee), Barbara Boiston (Boiston), Vitas Healthcare Corporation of California
(VHC), Dana Reedy (Reedy), and Does 1-250, alleging the following causes of
action: (1) elder abuse, (2) professional negligence, (3) negligence, (4)
wrongful death, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On April 5, 2023, St.
Francis, McGee, and Boiston (collectively, Defendants) filed the present motion.
Prior to filing on April 4, Defendants’ counsel met and conferred
telephonically with Plaintiffs’ counsel and was unable to reach a resolution. (Paez
Decl., ¶ 5.)
A hearing on the motion to
strike is set for May 25, 2023. A case management conference is also set for June
6.
ANALYSIS
Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’
request for punitive or exemplary damages, attorney fees, and treble damages.
For the following reasons, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion.
Legal
Standard
Upon a party’s motion or the
court’s own motion, the court may strike any irrelevant, false, or improper
matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court
may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall
appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the
court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd.
(a).)
Punitive
Damages
Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to establish recklessness, fraud, oppression, or malice and managing agent ratification that is required to seek punitive damages. The court disagrees.Civil Code section 3294 allows punitive damages when a plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) For the purposes of determining punitive damages, malice is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Lastly, fraud is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) “In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.) Furthermore, “[p]unitive damages may not be pleaded generally.” (Ibid.)
The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA) also allows for punitive damages when recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice are proven. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.) However, when the defendant is an employer, the conduct justifying punitive damages must have been ratified by an “an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)
Discussion
In this case, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ allegations amount to negligence claims and do not allege any intentional, conscious, or malicious plan to provide improper care to Clonts. However, Plaintiffs specifically allege St. Francis’s staff were “shockingly understaffed, underequipped, and undertrained.” (Complaint, ¶ 52) Plaintiffs also allege St. Francis’s staff ignored Clonts’ ulcers and tried to conceal them from Plaintiffs because they were aware the ulcers were evidence of their neglect. (Complaint, ¶ 59.) Defendants argue Plaintiffs need to allege additional facts to show why these facts are true. However, the court finds these ultimate facts are sufficient to support punitive damages. (Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 316-317.) Furthermore, these are not the only facts alleged to establish Defendants were reckless in caring for Clonts.
Plaintiffs allege McGee and Boiston were both aware of the understaffing issues and lack of training. (Complaint, ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs allege both McGee and Boiston allowed the understaffing and training issues because they wanted to ensure the profitability of St. Francis to the detriment of residents like Clonts. (Complaint, ¶ 98). In particular, Plaintiffs note that the failure to hire sufficient staff to provide care and treatment was a violation of Health and Safety Code section 1569.618, subdivision (b). (Complaint, ¶ 16, 40-41, 52.) In Fenimore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1339, the court noted that a knowing pattern of violating hospital staffing regulations in order to cut costs could support a jury finding that the Defendants endangered patients and acted recklessly, as opposed to being simply negligent. (Id., at p. 1350.)
Similarly here, Plaintiffs’ allegations that McGee and Boiston were aware of understaffing in violation of state law and a lack of training among staff could lead to a jury finding that St. Francis recklessly endangered its residents. To the extent Defendants suggest McGee and Boiston were not managing agents, this contention is without merit. Plaintiffs allege McGee was the administrator of St. Francis and a managing agent per se pursuant to Title 22, section 72501 of the California Code of Regulations. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs also allege Boiston was the house manager and responsible for ensuring St. Francis’s compliance with state law. (Complaint, ¶ 6, 97.) Thus, because Plaintiffs allege St. Francis’s managing agents were reckless in the hiring and training of staff, the court finds Plaintiffs sufficiently pled grounds for punitive damages.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages from the Complaint is DENIED.
Attorney Fees
Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to establish recklessness, fraud, oppression, or malice and managing agent ratification that is required to seek attorney fees pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657. However, as noted above, the court finds Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts establishing Defendants were reckless.
Accordingly, the grounds for this motion to strike fail as well and Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
Treble Damages
Defendants maintain Plaintiffs’ prayer for treble damages is inappropriate because it is a form of punitive damages. To the extent Defendants’ argument is based on their arguments regarding the Complaint’s punitive damages request, the court DENIES this motion to strike for the same reason.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DENIED.