Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22PSCV03108, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22PSCV03108    Hearing Date: June 22, 2023    Dept: G

Plaintiff John Doe J.R.’s Motion for Pre-Trial Discovery (Pitchess/Brady)  

Respondent: Defendants John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff John Doe J.R.’s Motion for Pre-Trial Discovery (Pitchess/Brady) is GRANTED IN PART as to the discovery of records pertaining to complaints or information involving Doe 1’s inappropriate behavior or interactions with minors and sexual predation or attempted sexual predation and DENIED IN PART as to the remaining categories sought.

BACKGROUND 

This action arises from the alleged sexual abuse of a minor by a police officer. In 1993, while Plaintiff John Doe J.R. was a student at a junior high school in Baldwin Park, Plaintiff joined a DARE program for students that was supervised by John Doe 1 (Doe 1), a police officer. During Plaintiff’s participation in the program, Plaintiff alleges Doe 1 took Plaintiff on “ride alongs” and bought Plaintiff ice cream and alcohol. After one such ride along, Plaintiff alleges Doe 1 bought Plaintiff wine coolers and took Plaintiff to Doe 1’s house. While Plaintiff was unconscious after consuming the alcoholic beverage, Plaintiff alleges Doe 1 sexually assaulted Plaintiff.

On December 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Doe 1, John Doe 2 (Doe 2), John Doe 3 (Doe 3, collectively Defendants), and Does 1-100, alleging the following causes of action: (1) childhood sexual assault, (2) battery, (3) assault, (4) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, (5) negligent failure to warn, train, or educate, and (6) negligent supervision of a minor.

On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against same defendants alleging the same causes of action.

On May 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed the present motion. A hearing on the motion and a case management conference are set for June 22.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff moves for the disclosure of Doe 1’s personnel records and any information involving Doe 1’s inappropriate conduct with minors. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s motion.

Legal Standard

There is a special two-step procedure for securing disclosure of peace officer personnel records. (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019 (Warrick).) First, the party seeking disclosure must file a motion that identifies the peace officer, the agency in possession of the records, a description of the records, and the party who is seeking the records, as well as time and place of the hearing. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subds. (b)(1)-(2).) The motion must be accompanied by a declaration showing “good cause” for disclosure of the records, setting forth the materiality of the records, and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency has the requested documents. (Evid. Code § 1043, subd. (b)(3).)

The “good cause” declaration must be sufficiently specific “to preclude the possibility of [the movant] simply casting about for any helpful information.” (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226 (Mooc).) However, an attorney declaration based upon information and belief may be used to evidence good cause in support of a Pitchess motion. (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086.) The moving party need only show a “plausible factual foundation” for discovery—that is, a scenario of officer misconduct that might occur or could have occurred. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1025-1026.) All that is required is the presentation of a scenario that might have or could have occurred, which is a “relatively low threshold.” (Uybungco v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048.)

Turning to the second step, if the court finds good cause, then an in-camera hearing must be held. (Slayton v. Superior Court (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 55, 60.) After personally examining the records in camera, the court shall order disclosure of peace officer personnel records that are “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” (See Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (a); Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) If disclosure is ordered, the court must also order that the disclosed information may not be used “for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1045, subd. (e).)

Discussion

In this case, Plaintiff requests any record of information or complaints from seven (7) categories involving Doe 1’s: “(1) inappropriate behavior and/or improper interactions with minors; (2) sexual predation and/or attempted sexual predation; (3) failure to follow departmental policies and/or the law; (4) morally corrupt character and tendency to take advantage of authority; (5) acts indicating inaccuracy or dishonesty; (6) fabrication, misrepresentation, suppression in reports; and (7) fabrication, misrepresentation, suppression and/or embellishment of evidence.

Plaintiff’s counsel alleges there is good cause for the discovery of these records given Plaintiff’s allegations against Doe 1, the allegation that Plaintiff’s mother reported the incident to Defendants, and the allegation that Doe 1 also sexually assaulted another minor in a similar manner. (Ulrich Decl., ¶ 10(j)-(m).)

Doe 1 opposes Plaintiff’s motion, arguing (1) Plaintiff fails to establish good cause and materiality, (2) Plaintiff fails to adequately describe the records requested, (3) Plaintiff’s request violates Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2) and Penal Code section 832.8, and (4) Plaintiff’s request is barred by the deliberative process privilege, official information privilege, and Doe 1’s own privacy rights.

In arguing Plaintiff fails to establish good cause and materiality, Doe 1 argues the requests are overbroad, irrelevant, and inadmissible. With regards to records involving Doe 1’s inappropriate behavior or interactions with minors and sexual predation or attempted sexual predation, the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel establishes good cause as there is a plausible factual foundation for the existence of these records given Plaintiff’s allegations. The court also finds these records are material to the allegations against all three Defendants. However, the court finds requests for records of failure to follow departmental policies or law; acts indicating inaccuracy or dishonesty; and fabrication, misrepresentation, or suppression of evidence or reports are impermissibly overbroad and not supported by good cause. The declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel does not point to any probability of these other records existing or explain how they are material to the causes of action alleged. As for evidence of morally corrupt character and a tendency to abuse authority, the court finds these to be overbroad and vague requests for which Plaintiff does not establish good cause or materiality.

Second, Doe 1 contends Plaintiff fails to adequately describe the records requested. However, Doe 1’s contention does not address the request for records of inappropriate behavior with minors or sexual predation and the court finds these requests have been adequately described.

Third, Doe 1 maintains Plaintiff’s requests violate Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), and Penal Code section 832.8. Doe 1 maintains Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1) prohibited disclosure of “information consisting of complaints concerning conduct occurring more than five years before the event or transaction that is the subject of the litigation in aid of which discovery or disclosure is sought.” However, as Doe 1 also admits, this language has since been removed from the statute and Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1) only applies to criminal proceedings. While Doe 1 also cites to Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) to argue the court must exclude the disclosure of any conclusions in an investigation of a peace officer, this code section does not say so. Instead, it only requires the facts disclosed be relevant and prohibits disclosure of facts “that are so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.”

Ultimately, Evidence Code section 1045 does not provide grounds for denying Plaintiff’s motion but rather sets the standard for the court’s in-camera review of such records once Plaintiff’s motion has been granted. (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1087.) Doe 1 also maintains Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (e) protects investigations of complaints and requires Plaintiff to first demonstrate that any complainants were unavailable for interview. However, the court notes that subsection does not exist and appears to be a typo or error. While courts will limit the disclosure of third-party complaint statements in instances prior to the incident in question, this is a question determined during the in-camera review of records and not in the initial motion. (See id., at p. 1090.)

Fourth and last, Doe 1 argues the requested records or information are barred by deliberative process privilege, official information privilege, and Doe 1’s own privacy rights. Doe 1 argues the deliberative process privilege applies because Plaintiff’s broad requests could include documents that involve official decision-making. Given the court’s decision to limit Plaintiff's overbroad discovery requests, the court finds this discovery objection is no longer relevant. With regards to the official information privilege and Doe 1’s privacy rights, Doe 1 argues Plaintiff broadly requests records that are protected and Plaintiff fails to demonstrate relevance. As noted above, however, the court has already limited Plaintiff’s request to those records that are relevant to the present action.  To the extent Doe 1 suggests there are public and privacy interests involved in this disclosure, Doe 1 does not develop this conclusory argument.

Accordingly, the court finds Plaintiff established good cause for the discovery of records pertaining to complaints or information involving Doe 1’s inappropriate behavior or interactions with minors and sexual predation or attempted sexual predation, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion in part.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Pitchess motion is GRANTED IN PART as to the discovery of records pertaining to complaints or information involving Doe 1’s inappropriate behavior or interactions with minors and sexual predation or attempted sexual predation and DENIED IN PART as to the remaining categories sought.

The court intends to proceed with an in-camera hearing as to records pertaining to complaints or information involving Doe 1’s inappropriate behavior or interactions with minors and sexual predation or attempted sexual predation.