Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22STCV19883, Date: 2023-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV19883    Hearing Date: November 8, 2023    Dept: G

Defendants Aurora Charter Oak – Los Angeles, LLC and Signature Healthcare Services, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Jacob Rodriguez

Defendants Aurora Charter Oak – Los Angeles, LLC and Signature Healthcare Services, LLC’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Jacob Rodriguez

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Aurora Charter Oak – Los Angeles, LLC and Signature Healthcare Services, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendants Aurora Charter Oak – Los Angeles, LLC and Signature Healthcare Services, LLC’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED IN PART without leave to amend as to the punitive damages allegations and DENIED IN PART as to all other grounds.

Defendants to answer Plaintiff’s Complaint, with punitive damages stricken, within ten (10) days.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury action arising from an alleged attack that occurred in a psychiatric hospital. In July 2019, Plaintiff Jacob Rodriguez was an in-patient at Aurora Charter Oak Hospital which was under the control of Defendants Aurora Charter Oak – Los Angeles, LLC (Aurora) and Signature Healthcare Services, LLC (Signature). On July 25, Rodriguez was participating in a group counseling session at Aurora Charter Oak Hospital when hospital staff asked Rodriguez to leave after Rodriguez allegedly used offensive language. After Rodriguez left the session, Rodriguez alleges three hospital staff members including Defendants Jovan Thompson, Marc Torres, and Roberto Sotelo took Rodriguez back to Rodriguez’s room where they attacked Rodriguez. When Rodriguez’s mother learned of Rodriguez’s injuries, Rodriguez alleges hospital staff told Rodriguez’s mother that the injuries were self-inflicted. Rodriguez’s mother then got law enforcement involved which resulted in Thompson being charged with child abuse and battery. In July 2021, Thompson pled guilty to the battery charge.

On June 17, 2022, Rodriguez, by and through guardian ad litem Sabrina Rodriguez, filed a complaint against Aurora, Signature, Thompson, Torres, Sotelo, and Does 1-30, alleging the following causes of action: (1) assault and battery, (2) negligence, (3) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention of unfit employees, (4) negligence per se, (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and (7) false imprisonment.

On September 28, 2023, Aurora and Signature (collectively, Aurora Defendants) filed the present demurrer and motion to strike. Prior to filing on September 27, the Aurora Defendants’ counsel attempted to meet and confer with Rodriguez’s counsel by calling counsel’s office and received no response. (Charles Decl., ¶ 4.)

A hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike is set for November 8, 2023.

ANALYSIS

Demurrer

The Aurora Defendants demur to Rodriguez’s entire Complaint. For the following reasons, the court OVERRULES the demurrer in its entirety.

Legal Standard

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

Assault and Battery (First Cause of Action)

The Aurora Defendants argue Rodriguez’s first cause of action for assault and battery fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim because (1) Rodriguez failed to establish the Aurora Defendants are vicariously liable for the actions of Thompson, Torres, and Sotelo, and (2) Rodriguez failed to establish the Aurora Defendants ratified the alleged assault and battery. The court disagrees with regards to the first issue.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to “the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for his employee’s torts committed within the scope of the employment.” (Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 967 (Perez).) Furthermore, “an employee’s willful, malicious and even criminal torts may fall within the scope of his or her employment for purposes of respondeat superior, even though the employer has not authorized the employee to commit crimes or intentional torts.” (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296.) But such torts must “have a causal nexus to the employee’s work” and must be foreseeable considering the tortfeasor’s duties. (Id., at p. 297, 299.) “Generally, the issue of scope of employment is a question of fact. [Citation] However, the issue becomes a question of law when the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible.” (Perez, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 968.)

Discussion

In this case, the Aurora Defendants argue Rodriguez failed to allege it was predictable or foreseeable that their staff would assault Rodriguez. But while Rodriguez did not specifically make that allegation, Rodriguez alleged sufficient facts to establish the required causal nexus between the hospital staff’s duties and the alleged assault. Rodriguez alleged Thompson, Torres, and Sotelo committed the assault and battery as part of the business that they were authorized to transact for the Aurora Defendants. (Complaint, ¶ 32.) Specifically, Rodriguez alleged the incident occurred after another hospital staff member told Thompson that Rodriguez “needed to be taught a lesson.” (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Furthermore, Rodriguez alleged Rodriguez was under the exclusive control of all defendants. (Complaint, ¶ 10.)

In Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 85, the court held whether a mental hospital’s staff member was acting within the scope of employment when the staff member sexually abused a patient was a question for the jury. (Id., at p. 108.) And here, a jury could also find the battery and assault of Rodriguez occurred with the scope of the Aurora Defendants’ hospital staff’s duty to control and care for patients. To the extent Rodriguez failed to allege the specific duties and responsibilities for these staff members, the court finds such specificity is not required where “the allegations indicate that ‘the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy’” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158, quoting Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 825) or if “the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Ibid, quoting Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 658.)

Accordingly, the court finds Rodriguez adequately alleged the Aurora Defendants are vicariously liable for the alleged assault and battery committed by their staff.  Therefore, the Aurora Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Negligence (Second Cause of Action)

The Aurora Defendants contend Rodriguez’s second cause of action for negligence failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim since it should be a cause of action for professional negligence. The court finds Defendants’ assertion an improper ground for a demurrer.

“Since the standard of care remains constant in terms of ‘ordinary prudence,’ it is clear that denominating a cause of action as one for ‘professional negligence’ does not transmute its underlying character. For substantive purposes, it merely serves to establish the basis by which ‘ordinary prudence’ will be calculated and the defendant’s conduct evaluated. Nor does it distinguish a claim separate and independent from some other form of negligence. As to any given defendant, only one standard of care obtains under a particular set of facts, even if the plaintiff attempts to articulate multiple or alternate theories of liability.” (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 998 (Flowers).)

Instead, the distinction between ordinary and professional negligence only becomes an issue when dealing with the different statutes of limitations or the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act’s (MICRA) limitations on professional negligence claims. (Id., at p. 998-999.) Here, the Aurora Defendants failed to argue how Rodriguez’s negligence claim is barred by MICRA or the applicable statute of limitations. Additionally, the Aurora Defendants failed to articulate how this cause of action failed to state a claim for negligence.

In fact, the court notes that none of the authorities cited by the Aurora Defendants in their argument on this ground address demurrers. (See id., at p. 996 [summary judgment]; Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 393 [summary adjudication on applicability of MICRA]; Lathrop v. HealthCare Partners Medical Group (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1417-1418 [ruling on applicability of MICRA after jury verdict]; Murillo v. Good Samaritan Hospital (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 50, 52 [summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds].) Thus, the court finds the Aurora Defendants ailed to demonstrate how any distinction between professional and ordinary negligence is material to Rodriguez’s ability to state a claim.

Accordingly, the Aurora Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision, and Retention (Third Cause of Action)

The Aurora Defendants maintain Rodriguez’s third cause of action for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim because it is duplicative of Rodriguez’s second cause of action. The court disagrees.

The court acknowledges there is a split of authority on whether a demurrer can be sustained on grounds that a cause of action is duplicative. In Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858 (Blickman Turkus), the Sixth District Court of Appeal held a demurrer could not be sustained on grounds that it is duplicative pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10. (Id., at p. 890.) In Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268 (Palm Springs Villas), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held the opposite, noting a duplicative cause of action is grounds upon which a demurrer may be sustained according to Rodrigues v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 501 (Rodrigues). (Palm Springs Villas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 290.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 authorizes a party to bring a demurrer on eight different grounds, none of which explicitly include grounds that a cause of action is duplicative or superfluous. In Rodrigues, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted the cause of action at issue merely combined all the previous causes of action and did not add anything to the complaint by way or fact or theory of recovery. (Rodrigues, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at p. 498, 501.) However, this court finds the reasoning of Blickman Turkus more persuasive. Noting the jurisprudential maxim that “superfluity does not vitiate” (Civ. Code, § 3537), the court held “[t]his is the sort of defect that, if it justifies any judicial intervention at all, is ordinarily dealt with most economically at trial, or on a dispositive motion such as summary judgment.” (Blickman Turkus, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.)

Accordingly, because a duplicative cause of action is not grounds for demurrer, the Aurora Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Negligence Per Se (Fourth Cause of Action)

The Aurora Defendants argue Rodriguez’s fourth cause of action for negligence per se failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim because it is duplicative. But as the court noted previously, this is not proper grounds for a demurrer. (Ibid.)

Accordingly, the Aurora Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

NIED (Fifth Cause of Action)

The Aurora Defendants contend Rodriguez’s fifth cause of action for NIED failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim because it is duplicative. But as the court noted previously, this is not proper grounds for a demurrer. (Ibid.)

Accordingly, the Aurora Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

IIED (Sixth Cause of Action)

The Aurora Defendants maintain Rodriguez’s sixth cause of action for IIED failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim because Rodriguez did not alleged intentional conduct on the behalf of the Aurora Defendants.  The court disagrees.

As noted above with regards to the first cause of action for assault and battery, the court found the Complaint adequately alleged the Aurora Defendants vicarious liability for Thompson, Torres, and Sotelo’s alleged assault and battery of Rodriguez. For the same reasons, the court finds Complaint also adequately alleged intentional conduct by Aurora Defendants when Thompson, Torres, and Sotelo’s committed the alleged assault and battery as part of the business that they were authorized to transact for the Aurora Defendants.

Accordingly, the Aurora Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

False Imprisonment (Seventh Cause of Action)

Although the Aurora Defendants’ demurrer stated it demurred to Rodriguez’s seventh cause of action for false imprisonment, the demurrer only briefly mentioned the cause of action in the introduction, failed to discuss it further, and failed to cite any legal authority. The Aurora Defendants also briefly mentioned the cause of action in their reply but again failed to include any legal authority to support their argument.

Thus, the court finds the Aurora Defendants failed to adequately develop their argument on this issue and summarily OVERRULES the demurrer to this cause of action.

Motion to Strike

The Aurora Defendants move to strike punitive damages and all evidentiary, conclusory, or irrelevant allegations from Rodriguez’s Complaint. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion as to the punitive damages without leave to amend, and DENIES the motion on all other grounds.

Legal Standard

Upon a party’s motion or the court’s own motion, the court may strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

Punitive Damages

The Aurora Defendants argue the striking of punitive damages is appropriate on the grounds that Rodriguez failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13. The court agrees.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, subdivision (a): 

“In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider, no claim for punitive damages shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court may allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive damages on a motion by the party seeking the amended pleading and on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code. The court shall not grant a motion allowing the filing of an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages if the motion for such an order is not filed within two years after the complaint or initial pleading is filed or not less than nine months before the date the matter is first set for trial, whichever is earlier.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.13, subd. (a)

In this case, the Aurora Defendants argue Rodriguez’s action arises out of the alleged professional negligence of a healthcare provider. In opposition, Rodriguez argues the Complaint does not include any allegation involving medical care. But Rodriguez misconstrues Rodriguez’s own Complaint which specifically alleges the Aurora Defendants were negligent in addressing Rodriguez’s behavior during the subject therapy session. (Complaint, ¶ 38.)

Rodriguez also contends there are no allegations that Thompson, Torres, or Sotelo were licensed medical professionals or were rendering care. But in Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75 (Flores), our supreme court already rejected such a narrow approach by noting “[a] medical professional or other hospital staff member may commit a negligent act in rendering medical care, thereby causing a patient’s injury, even where no particular medical skills were required to complete the task at hand.” (Id., at p. 85.) Examples of such negligent acts that involve professional services include failing to prevent a janitor from accidently disconnecting a patient’s oxygen ventilator while cleaning the patient’s room, failing to prevent a hospital employee from accidently giving the wrong type of food to a patient with a special diet, and failing to properly secure a patient to a hospital gurney. (Id., at p. 85-86.)

Ultimately, by alleging the Aurora Defendants were negligent by improperly addressing Rodriguez’s therapy session behavior and were negligent in failing to implement policies for patient safety and security, the court finds Rodriguez’s action is one arising out of the alleged professional negligence of a healthcare provider.

Accordingly, because the court finds Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 is applicable to Rodriguez’s Complaint, the court GRANTS the Aurora Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages allegations from the Complaint.

Irrelevant Allegations

The Aurora Defendants also argue the court should strike all evidentiary, conclusory, inflammatory, and irrelevant allegations from the Complaint. But while the Aurora Defendants list the challenged paragraphs in their notice of motion, they failed to provide specific argument and legal authority for why each paragraph should be stricken. Thus, the court finds Defendants failed to adequately develop their argument and summarily DENIES their motion to strike as to these allegations.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Aurora Defendants’ demurrer to Rodriguez’s Complaint is OVERRULED in its entirety.

Furthermore, the Aurora Defendants’ motion to strike portions of Rodriguez’s Complaint is GRANTED IN PART without leave to amend as to the punitive damages allegations and DENIED IN PART on all other grounds.  

Defendants to answer Plaintiff’s Complaint, with punitive damages stricken, within ten (10) days.