Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case 22STCV33065 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 22STCV33065, Date: 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV33065 Hearing Date: April 13, 2023 Dept: G

Defendant John D. Rimpau’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Helen Long

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant John D. Rimpau’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

This is a premises liability action. On September 2, 2021, Plaintiff Helen Long visited Roady’s Family Restaurant (Roady’s) in San Dimas. After dining in, Plaintiff was attempting to leave when Plaintiff allegedly tripped on the doorway threshold of the restaurant’s rear entrance and fell onto the pavement. As a result of Plaintiff’s fall, Plaintiff suffered a fractured ankle, abrasions, lacerations, torn right shoulder and bicep tendons, and a bruised knee. Plaintiff subsequently had to receive medical treatment at the Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center. Plaintiff alleges the doorway was dangerous and unsafe.

On October 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Roady’s, John D. Rimpau (Defendant), and Does 1-10 inclusive, alleging the following causes of action: (1) premises liability, (2) negligence, (3) violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and (4) violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA).

On December 13, 2022, Roady’s filed a cross-complaint against Roes 1-50 for indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief.

On December 23, 2022, Defendant filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing on December 21, Defendant’s counsel emailed a “meet and confer letter” to Plaintiff’s counsel. (Muller Decl., ¶ 3.) On March 14, 2023, the court continued a hearing on the demurrer for failure to adequately meet and confer. On March 17, Defendant’s counsel met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel over the telephone. (Muller Suppl. Decl., ¶ 2.)

A hearing on the demurrer and case management conference is set for April 13, 2023.

ANALYSIS

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for violation of the ADA and fourth cause of action for violation of UCRA.

For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action with leave to amend.

Legal Standard

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

Discussion

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s causes of action fail because (1) Defendant is not a business established pursuant to UCRA and (2) Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. The court is not persuaded by the first argument but finds merit in the second argument.

Business Establishment

UCRA mandates “full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever” and prohibits discrimination based on protected characteristics including disability or medical condition. (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Whether an entity is a business establishment is a question of law. (Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1050.) The term “business establishment” is broadly construed, “embraces everything about which one can be employed, and it is often synonymous with calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for the purpose of making a livelihood or gain.” (Harris v. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 16, 21, quoting O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 795.)

In this case, Defendant argues Defendant “indisputably is not a ‘business establishment,’ but an individual person” and does not provide goods or services to the general public. (Demurrer, p. 4:25-5:3.) But Defendant fails to provide any legal authority for the proposition that an individual cannot qualify as a business establishment. Recent case law suggests the opposite.

In Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, a company representative was hosting a product presentation at another company when the representative made racist and offensive comments. (Id., at p. 142-143.) Because the representative was educating the other company’s employees about a product, the court held the representative “acted as a ‘business establishment’ while giving his presentation.” (Id., at p. 152.)

While Defendant claims Defendant provides no goods or services to the public, UCRA applies to business establishments “in the course of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers.” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500.) Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant is the owner of the property where Roady’s is located and where Plaintiff was injured. (Complaint, ¶ 23.) Thus, Plaintiff is in the business of providing facilities for restaurants and their customers. Although Plaintiff only alleges Plaintiff was Roady’s customer, Plaintiff need not be a paying customer of Defendant to pursue “an accommodation, advantage or privilege” offered by Defendant. (See Jackson v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 936, 942 (Jackson).) In Jackson, the court held a plaintiff could bring an UCRA claim against a bank for racially discriminating against plaintiff where plaintiff was merely accompanying other individuals to the bank and was not a customer. (Id., at p. 939, 941.) Accordingly, Defendant’s argument that Defendant is not a business establishment fails.

Sufficiency of Pleadings

Next, Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to allege a connection between Plaintiff’s disability (diabetes) and Plaintiff injury (tripping and falling over doorway threshold). (Complaint, ¶ 9, 29.) To establish injury pursuant to the ADA, Plaintiff must show “show some causal relationship between” the disability and injury suffered. (Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 934 F.3d 1089, 1092.)

Here, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to show how Plaintiff’s disability caused Plaintiff to trip over the doorway threshold and how this case is any different from a standard trip-and-fall case. Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish a claim pursuant to the ADA. Furthermore, because Plaintiff’s UCRA claim is based on a violation of the ADA, it necessarily fails as well.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend as to the third and fourth causes of action.