Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV00103, Date: 2023-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV00103, Date: 2023-10-17 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV00103 Hearing Date: April 4, 2024 Dept: G

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Motion to Strike Counsel’s Memorandum of Costs

Respondent: Plaintiff Interior Wall Systems

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Motion to Strike Counsel’s Memorandum of Costs is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court strikes $979.99 in costs from Plaintiff Interior Wall Systems’s requested award of $2,961.41 for a total award of $1,981.42.

BACKGROUND

In July 2022, Plaintiff Interior Wall Systems (IWS) entered into a warranty contract with Defendant General Motors, LLC (General Motors) by purchasing a 2022 GMC Sierra 1500. Subsequently, IWS alleges the vehicle developed defects with its check engine light, engine, ECM, and fuel system.

On January 12, 2023, IWS filed a complaint against General Motors and Does 1-10, alleging a violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

On May 11, 2023, IWS filed a motion to compel the deposition of General Motors’ person most qualified. On June 8, the court granted IWS’s motion in part and denied in part.

On June 20, 2023, IWS filed a motion to compel further discovery responses. On August 21, IWS filed a motion for sanctions that the court denied on October 17.

On November 3, 2023, IWS filed a notice of settlement with General Motors. On February 14, 2024, IWS filed a memorandum of costs. On February 15, IWS filed a motion for attorney fees. On February 26, General Motors filed the present motion. On March 11, the court granted IWS’s motion for attorney fees.

A hearing on the present motion is set for April 4, 2024, along with an OSC Re: Dismissal.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

IWS’s objections to the declaration of General Motors’s counsel are SUSTAINED as to Nos. 1 and 2 and OVERRULED as to Nos. 3, 4, and 5.

ANALYSIS

General Motors moves to strike IWS’s memorandum of costs. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS its motion in part.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Rule 3.1700, subdivision (b) of the California Rules of Court, a party may contest costs through a motion to strike or tax costs. “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774 (Ladas).) In addition to items allowable as costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a), the court has discretion to award other costs if not prohibited by Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b) and “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 774, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).)

Discussion

As an initial matter, General Motors argues IWS’s memorandum of costs should be stricken on the grounds that it is untimely. Pursuant to Rule 3.1700, subdivision (a)(1) of the California Rules of Court, “[a] prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first.”

In this case, the court entered judgment pursuant to IWS’s acceptance of General Motors’s offer to compromise on November 3, 2023. On January 29, 2024, IWS served notice of the entry of judgment on General Motors by electronic service. On February 14, IWS filed a memorandum of costs. Because IWS’s memorandum of costs was filed within 180 days of the court’s entry of judgment and within seventeen days of notice of the entry of judgment, the court finds it was timely. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B) [time to respond or act after electronic service extended by two court days].)

General Motors argues the court should treat the judgment as “entered” on the date when IWS signed the settlement or filed a notice of settlement. In support of this argument, General Motors cites to Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 385, review granted August 30, 2023, S280598, for the premise that a Section 998 compromise is the “legal equivalent of a judgment.” But that case is inapposite here as it dealt with whether a settlement agreement constituted a “more favorable judgment or award” pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (c). (Id., at p. 399-400.) Because General Motors fails to point to any other case or statute that authorizes such deviation from the plain language of Rule 3.1700, the court does not find persuasive General Motors’s argument.

Next, General Motors argues the court should strike IWS’s requests for $180.81 in filing fees for discovery motions, $99.99 in filing fees for IWS’s terminating sanctions motion, and $880 for deposition expenses. The court addresses each request below.

Discovery Motion Costs

IWS’s memorandum of costs claims $180.81 in filing and reservation fees for a motion to compel deposition and motion to compel further discovery responses. General Motors argues these costs should be stricken because the costs were optional and IWS’s discovery motion practice was one-sided and unnecessary.

In previously ruling on IWS’s motion for attorney fees, the court rejected a similar argument by General Motors with regards to the motion to compel deposition. (3/11/2024 Ruling, p. 4.) As the court noted there and in originally ruling on the motion to compel deposition, General Motors forced IWS to bring the motion by refusing to agree to dates for a deposition despite agreeing to provide a person most qualified. (3/11/2024 Ruling, p. 4.) Here, the court finds that IWS’s costs incurred in the filing the motion to compel deposition were not optional, one-sided, or unnecessary.

As to IWS’s motion to compel further discovery responses that was filed on June 20, 2023, there is nothing in the motion that demonstrates it was not a cost reasonably incurred. In it, IWS sought to compel General Motors to provide further responses for document requests that included information related to General Motors’s lemon law rules, procedures, and policies concerning vehicle purchase refunds or replacements. While IWS’s counsel detailed attempts to meet and confer with General Motors on these issues, General Motors purportedly ignored IWS’s communications. (Motion to Compel Further, Sanjur-Van Brande Decl., ¶ 4-5.) Based on these facts and a review of the motion, the court finds these costs were reasonably incurred.

Terminating Sanctions Motion Costs

IWS’s memorandum of costs claims $99.99 in filing and reservation fees for a motion for terminating sanctions. General Motors contends these costs were unnecessary. In previously denying attorney fees for the same motion, the court found the filing of this motion was not a necessary or reasonable expense as IWS inappropriately sought the harshest discovery sanction available without first attempting to compel answers or seeking lesser sanctions. (3/11/2024 Ruling, p. 4.) For the same reasons, the court also declines to award IWS’s requested $99.99 in costs.

Deposition Expenses

IWS’s memorandum of costs claims $880.00 in fees for a non-appearance at a deposition. General Motors maintains these costs were unnecessary as General Motors had previously informed IWS of its non-appearance. In July 2023, IWS scheduled a deposition of General Motors’s person most qualified for August 18. (Motion for Terminating Sanctions (MTS), Sanjur-Van Brande Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2.) At 4:08 PM on August 17, General Motors’s counsel notified IWS’s counsel that they would not be able to appear for the deposition and requested the deposition be rescheduled to September. (MTS, Sanjur-Van Brande Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 5.) Nonetheless, IWS’s counsel proceeded with holding the deposition on August 18. (MTS, Sanjur-Van Brande Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 5.)

In that declaration and the declaration submitted with the present motion, IWS’s counsel fails to explain why counsel could not reschedule the deposition and instead decided to incur an $880 fee for a deposition where they did not expect General Motors to appear. (MTS, Sanjur-Van Brande Decl., ¶ 6 [“As expected, [General Motors] did not appear at the deposition.”].) The court finds this expense unreasonable and declines to award costs for a deposition that should have been rescheduled and should not have gone forward.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, General Motors’s motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART and the court strikes $979.99 in costs from IWS’s requested award of $2,961.41 for a total award of $1,981.42.