Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV00199, Date: 2024-02-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV00199, Date: 2024-02-13 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV00199 Hearing Date: February 13, 2024 Dept: G

Defendants Jesus Alvarez and Carmen Alvarez’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Respondent: NO OPPOSITION

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Jesus Alvarez and Carmen Alvarez’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision. In June 2021, Plaintiffs Ricardo Banuelos Fierro and Francis Banuelos were involved in a motor vehicle collision with a vehicles operated by Defendants Manuel Marin Petatan, Hao Van Ly, and Jesus Alvarez on State Route 60 in Diamond Bar. Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos allege Marin Petatan was employed by Defendant Olmas Industries, Inc. (Olmas Industries).

On January 24, 2023, Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos filed a complaint against Olmas Industries, Marin Petatan, Ly, the Alvarezes, and Does 1-100, alleging the following causes of action: (1) motor vehicle negligence, (2) general negligence, (3) negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, and (4) loss of consortium.

On March 23, 2023, Ly filed a cross-complaint against Marin Petatan, Olmas Industries, and Roes 1-25, alleging causes of action for (1) indemnification, (2) apportionment of fault, and (3) declaratory relief.

On October 6, 2023, the Alvarezes filed the present motion for summary judgment. A hearing on the motion is set for February 13, 2024, with a post-mediation status conference/trial setting conference on June 6.

ANALYSIS

The Alvarezes move for summary judgment on the grounds that Jesus Alvarez did not operate a motor vehicle negligently and was not the cause of Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos’s injuries. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS their motion.

Legal Standard

Motion for Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication provides “courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) It must be granted “if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the opposing party must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Negligence

The basic elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) With regards to operators of motor vehicles, they are “under a duty, both by statute and common law, to operate [their] vehicle without negligence so as to abstain from injuring any other person or his property.” (Bewley v. Riggs (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 188, 194.)

Discussion

In this case, the following facts are undisputed. On June 23, 2021, Ly was travelling westbound on State Route 60 in lane four when the left side of Ly’s vehicle collided with the right side of Marin Petatan’s vehicle, which was traveling in lane three. (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (SSUMF), ¶ 1-2; MSJ, Ex. B, p. 8:15-20.) As a result, Ly’s vehicle veered to the right and collided with a vehicle operated by a non-party in lane five. (SSUMF, ¶ 3; MSJ, Ex. B, p. 8:22-24.) Meanwhile, Marin Petatan’s vehicle veered to the left and collided with Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos’s vehicle in lane two. (SSUMF, ¶ 3; MSJ, Ex. B, p. 8:22-24.) Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos then veered to the left and collided with Jesus Alvarez in the high occupancy vehicle lane. (SSUMF, ¶ 4; MSJ, Ex. B, p. 8:22-24.) At the time of the incident, Jesus Alvarez was travelling at approximately fifty-five miles per hour. (SSUMF, ¶ 7; MSJ, Ex. B, p. 7:37-41.) At the time of the collision, the Alvarezes were both the registered owners of the vehicle that Jesus Alvarez was operating. (SSUMF, ¶ 11; Ex. C.)

Based on these facts, the court finds no reasonable trier of fact could find Jesus Alvarez was operating his vehicle in a negligent manner. Furthermore, the facts establish the cause of Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos’s collision with Jesus Alvarez was being hit by Marin Petatan’s vehicle. Thus, the Alvarezes have established there are no triable issues of material fact regarding Jesus Alvarez’s negligence and causation. Because Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos have failed to oppose the Alvarezes’ motion and establish the existence of a triable issue of fact, the Alvarezes are entitled to summary judgment on Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos’s claims for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence.

This absence of disputed material facts is also fatal to Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos’s causes of action for negligent entrustment and loss of consortium. To establish negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos must establish that (1) Jesus Alvarez negligently operated the vehicle question, (2) that Carmen Alvarez owned or had possession of the vehicle in question, (3) that Carmen Alvarez either knew or should have known that Jesus Alvarez was not fit to operate the vehicle, (4) that Carmen Alvarez permitted Jesus Alvarez to drive the vehicle, and (5) that Jesus Alvarez’s unfitness was a substantial factor in causing harm to Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos. (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565-566.)

But as noted above, the undisputed material facts show Jesus Alvarez did not cause Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos’s injuries as they collided with Jesus Alvarez after being hit by a vehicle driven by another defendant. Thus, they cannot maintain a cause of action for negligent entrustment against Carmen Alvarez. Last, because a loss of consortium cause of action requires “a negligent or intentional injury to the other spouse by a third party,” this cause of action fails as no reasonable factfinder could find the Alvarezes caused Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos’s injuries. (See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 408.)

Accordingly, the Alvarezes’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS the Alvarezes’ motion for summary judgment.