Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV00288, Date: 2023-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV00288    Hearing Date: January 23, 2024    Dept: G

Defendants Adam Torres, Lisa Torres, Rosie Gutierrez, and Joshua Gutierrez’s Demurrer to the Verified First Amended Complaint

 

Respondent: Plaintiffs Lucinda Uzeta Hernandez

 

Defendants Rosa Torres, Florentino Torres, Juan Jose Uzeta, and Marrisa I. Uzeta’s Demurrer to the Verified First Amended Complaint

 

Respondent: Plaintiffs Lucinda Uzeta Hernandez

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

Defendants Adam Torres, Lisa Torres, Rosie Gutierrez, and Joshua Gutierrez’s Demurrer to the Verified First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

 

Defendants Rosa Torres, Florentino Torres, Juan Jose Uzeta, and Marrisa I. Uzeta’s Demurrer to the Verified First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED IN PART as to the sixth cause of action against Defendant Rosa Torres and is otherwise SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

 

BACKGROUND

 

This is an action to quiet title involving a residential property in La Puente (La Puente Property). On January 5, 1973, Defendants Rosa Torres and Florentino Torres purchased the La Puente Property on behalf of Rosa Torres’s minor sister. On May 22, 1976, they transferred title for the La Puente Property through a grant deed to Rosa Torres’s mother, Plaintiff Lucinda Uzeta Hernandez.

 

On September 14, 2000, Uzeta Hernandez alleges Rosa Torres falsely told Uzeta Hernandez that Uzeta Hernandez could not collect Social Security and Medicare benefits if Uzeta Hernandez still held title to the La Puente Property. In response to Rosa Torres’s alleged misrepresentations, Uzeta Hernandez transferred title for the La Puente Property through a quitclaim deed to Rosa Torres and Defendant Juan Jose Uzeta, Uzeta Hernandez’s youngest son. Uzeta Hernandez alleges Rosa Torres and Juan Uzeta had agreed to hold the La Puente Property in trust for Uzeta Hernandez and all of Uzeta Hernandez’s children.

 

From November 2004 to July 2012, Uzeta Hernandez alleges Rosa Torres and Juan Uzeta obtained a series of loans from Defendant Jaime Carrea and others secured by deeds of trust on the La Puente Property without Uzeta Hernandez’s knowledge or consent. In 2012, Rosa Torres allegedly requested Uzeta Hernandez provide financial assistance so Rosa Torres could keep a house in Rowland Heights (Rowland Heights Property). Uzeta Hernandez agreed to move into the Rowland Heights Property so Rosa Torres could collect rent on the La Puente Property and collect money from the government for claiming to be Uzeta Hernandez’s caregiver.

 

In August 2020, after the Rowland Heights Property was sold, Uzeta Hernandez, Rosa Torres, and Florentino Torres moved back into the La Puente Property. While Uzeta Hernandez paid for the La Puente Property’s costs from 2012 to August 2020, Rosa Torres allegedly promised to cover the costs when they moved back into the La Puente Property. However, Uzeta Hernandez alleges Rosa and Florentino Torres refused to cover any costs or pay rent after moving into the La Puente Property. On March 30, 2022, Rosa Torres and Juan Uzeta transferred their interest through a grant deed to Defendants Adam Torres and Rosie Gutierrez without Uzeta Hernandez’s knowledge or permission. In April 2022, Uzeta Hernandez moved out of the La Puente Property after Rosa Torres refused to deed the La Puente Property back to Uzeta Hernandez.

 

On January 31, 2023, Uzeta Hernandez filed a complaint against Rosa and Florentino Torres, Juan Uzeta, Marrisa I. Uzeta, Adam and Lisa Torres, Rosie and Joshua Gutierrez, Carrea, Does 1-100, and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, or interest in the La Puente Property, alleging the following causes of action: (1) quiet title, (2) imposition of a constructive trust, (3) imposition of a resulting trust, (4) declaratory relief, (5) slander of title, (6) physical and financial elder abuse, (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), (8) fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud, (9) conversion, and (10) false imprisonment.

 

On July 7, 2023, Uzeta Hernandez filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendants alleging the same causes of action except for the ninth cause of action for conversion which was omitted.

 

On August 8, 2023, Adam and Lisa Torres and Rosie and Joshua Gutierrez (collectively, Torres-Gutierrez Defendants) filed one of the present demurrers. On August 9, Rosa and Florentino Torres and Juan and Marrisa Uzeta (collectively, Torres-Uzeta Defendants) filed the other present demurrer. On October 2, the court continued the hearing for the demurrers in order for parties to further meet and confer. Subsequently, counsel for the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants attempted to contact Uzeta Hernandez’s counsel by email and telephone but was unsuccessful. (Martinez Suppl. Decl., ¶ 4-10.)

 

A hearing on the present demurrers and a case management conference are set for January 23, 2024.

 

ANALYSIS


The Torres-Gutierrez Defendants demur to Uzeta Hernandez’s fifth (slander of title), sixth (physical and financial elder abuse), and seventh (IIED) causes of action. The Torres-Uzeta Defendants demur to Uzeta Hernandez’s fifth (slander of title), sixth (financial and elder abuse), seventh (IIED), eighth (fraud), and ninth (false imprisonment) causes of action. For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants’ demurrer to Uzeta Hernandez’s FAC in its entirety with leave to amend.

 

The court OVERRULES IN PART the Torres-Uzeta Defendants’ demurrer to Uzeta Hernandez’s FAC as to the sixth cause of action against Rosa Torres and otherwise SUSTAINS the demurrer in its entirety with leave to amend.

 

Legal Standard


A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

 

Slander of Title (Fifth Cause of Action)

 

The Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants both argue Uzeta Hernandez’s fifth cause of action for slander of title fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. The court agrees.

 

Legal Standard

 

A cause of action for slander of title is established by “each of the following four elements: (1) a publication, (2) which is without privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss.” (Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1051.) In other words, it “occurs when there is an unprivileged publication of a false statement which disparages title to property and causes pecuniary loss.” (Stalberg v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 925, 929.)

 

Discussion

 

In this case, the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants argue Uzeta Hernandez failed to allege how they made a misrepresentation regarding Uzeta Hernandez’s title to the La Puente Property. Uzeta Hernandez’s FAC alleges the false publication was the Torres-Uzeta Defendants’ recording of a grant deed in 2022 that conveyed the La Puente Property to the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants. (FAC, ¶ 27, 53.) But Uzeta Hernandez failed to demonstrate how this was a false statement disparaging Uzeta Hernandez’s title to the La Puente Property when Uzeta Hernandez did not hold title to the property in the first place. Instead, Uzeta Hernandez has alleged that Uzeta Hernandez transferred the La Puente Property’s title to Rosa Torres and Juan Uzeta in 2000 and that they were holding the La Puente Property’s title in trust for Uzeta Hernandez. (FAC, ¶ 19, 53.) To the extent Uzeta Hernandez argues the original transfer in 2000 was procured through fraud, a deed procured through fraud is voidable and not automatically void. (See Fallon v. Triangle Management Services, Inc. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1106.) Uzeta Hernandez failed to allege any facts establishing the 2000 deed had been voided prior to the Torres-Uzeta Defendants’ recording of the grant deed in 2022.

 

Accordingly, the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

 

Elder Abuse (Sixth Cause of Action)

 

The Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants both contend Uzeta Hernandez’s sixth cause of action for elder abuse fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. The court disagrees as to Rosa Torres but agrees as to the other Torres-Uzeta Defendants and Torres-Gutierrez Defendants.

 

Legal Standard

 

Pursuant to the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA), an elder or dependent adult may bring a civil action for physical abuse, neglect, or abandonment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657. An elder or dependent adult may also bring a civil action for financial abuse pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5. For the purposes of the EADACPA, “elder” is defined as “any person residing in this state, 65 years of age or older.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.27.) “Dependent adult” is defined as any person “regardless of whether the person lives independently, between the ages of 18 and 64 years who resides in this state and who has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights, including, but not limited to, persons who have physical or developmental disabilities, or whose physical or mental abilities have diminished because of age.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §15610.23, subd. (a).)

 

Discussion

 

In this case, the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants contend Uzeta Hernandez failed to adequately allege how they engaged in financial abuse. The EADACPA defines financial abuse as the taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining of an elder or dependent adult’s real or personal property “for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a).) Property is deemed taken for a wrongful use if “the person or entity knew or should have known that this conduct is likely to be harmful to the elder or dependent adult.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (b).) Financial abuse may also occur when the taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining of an elder or dependent adult’s real or personal property is the result of undue influence as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(3).)

 

The FAC alleges Uzeta Hernandez is 93 years of age and a resident of California. (FAC, ¶ 3, 57.) Thus, Uzeta Hernandez meets the definition of an elder pursuant to the EADACPA. The FAC also alleges that all Defendants fraudulently deprived Uzeta Hernandez of the La Puente Property. (FAC, ¶ 58.) To establish fraud, one must allege “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638, quoting 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 676, p. 778.)

 

Here, the FAC alleges Rosa Torres made intentional misrepresentations to Uzeta Hernandez on September 14, 2000. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Rosa Torres allegedly stated that Uzeta Hernandez would not be able to collect Social Security and Medicare benefits while holding title to the La Puente Property. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Rosa Torres also allegedly stated that the government would take the La Puente Property upon Uzeta Hernandez’s death. (FAC, ¶ 19.) The FAC alleges these representations were false and that Rosa Torres intentionally made these misrepresentations with the intent of defrauding Uzeta Hernandez out of the La Puente Property’s title. (FAC, ¶ 19.) The FAC also alleges Uzeta Hernandez justifiably relied on these representations in entrusting the La Puente Property to Rosa Torres and Juan Uzeta. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Last, the FAC alleges Rosa Torres damaged Uzeta Hernandez by transferring the La Puente Property to Adam Torres and Rosie Gutierrez in 2022 without Uzeta Hernandez’s consent. (FAC, ¶ 27.)

 

Based on these facts, the court finds the FAC adequately alleged Rosa Torres used fraud to deprive Uzeta Hernandez of the La Puente Property. Thus, the FAC has also alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for financial elder abuse against Rosa Torres pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30, subdivision (a)(1).

 

With regards to other Defendants, the court finds the FAC failed to allege any facts establishing their involvement in fraud. While Uzeta Hernandez also conveyed an interest in the La Puente Property to Juan Uzeta, the FAC failed to establish how Juan Uzeta induced Uzeta Hernandez to do so. Instead, while the FAC stated Uzeta Hernandez included Juan Uzeta in the property transfer because Uzeta Hernandez believed Juan Uzeta would protect Uzeta Hernandez’s interests, the FAC failed to establish how Juan Uzeta induced Uzeta Hernandez into believing this. (FAC, ¶ 19.)

 

Last, while the FAC also alleges Rosa Torres engaged in physical abuse by physically isolating Uzeta Hernandez, there are no specific allegations of physical abuse against the other Defendants. (FAC, ¶ 30, 58.) Accordingly, Rosa Torres’ demurrer is OVERRULED while the demurrers of the other Torres-Uzeta Defendants and the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants are SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

 

IIED (Seventh Cause of Action)

 

The Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants both maintain Uzeta Hernandez’s seventh cause of action for IIED failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. The court agrees.

 

Legal Standard

To establish a claim of IIED, one must show “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, quoting Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593.) Extreme and outrageous conduct is defined as exceeding “all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society” and intending to cause mental distress. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 618.)

 

Discussion

 

In this case, the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants maintain the FAC failed to allege how they engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct. The FAC alleged their extreme and outrageous conduct was the alleged elder abuse and fraud. (FAC, ¶ 62.) But as noted above and below, the FAC has only adequately alleged a cause of action for elder abuse and fraud against Rosa Torres. Thus, with regards to the other Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants, the FAC failed to adequately allege a cause of action for IIED.

 

As for Rosa Torres, the court finds the allegations of elder abuse and fraud are sufficient to establish extreme and outrageous conduct. (See Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 203-205 [holding mortgage lender’s actions in inducing a borrower to skip a loan payment, refusing to accept further payments, and foreclosing on borrower’s home could support cause of action for IIED].) Rosa Torres also maintains the FAC failed to establish Rosa Torres intended to cause Uzeta Hernandez to suffer emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the risk of such. But the FAC does so, alleging the conduct “was directed at [Uzeta Hernandez] with the intent to cause severe emotional distress, or with reckless disregard of the realization that the injury was substantially certain to cause [Uzeta Hernandez] to suffer severe emotional distress of substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (FAC, ¶ 62.)

 

While the FAC sufficiently alleges extreme and outrageous conduct against Rosa Torres, it must also adequately allege that Uzeta Hernandez suffered severe emotional distress. (Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 617.) Severe emotional distress is defined as “emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Ibid, quoting Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.) Here, the FAC alleges Uzeta Hernandez suffered “humiliation, embarrassment, and mental anguish.” (FAC, ¶ 62.) But these allegations on their own are insufficient to establish severe emotional distress without further factual explanation. (Pitman v. City of Oakland (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1047 [“The allegation that plaintiff suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment without further factual explanation does not meet the requirement of specificity called for in Bogard.”].) Thus, the FAC’s cause of action for IIED against Rosa Torres is also insufficiently pled.

 

Accordingly, the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants and Torres-Uzeta Defendants’ demurrers to this cause of action are SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

 

Fraud (Eighth Cause of Action)

 

The Torres-Uzeta Defendants argue Uzeta Hernandez’s eighth cause of action for fraud failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. The court agrees.

 

As noted above with regard to Uzeta Hernandez’s sixth cause of action for elder abuse, the FAC has only adequately alleged a cause of action for fraud against Rosa Torres. But the Torres-Uzeta Defendants also argue this cause of action is time-barred. The statute of limitations for fraud actions is three years and “is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) “[I]f an action is brought more than three years after commission of the fraud, plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving that he did not make the discovery until within three years prior to the filing of his complaint.” (Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412, 437.) “In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808, quoting McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160, disapproved on another ground in Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 633, fn. 3.)

 

Here, the alleged fraud occurred in September 2000, which is more than three years before Uzeta Hernandez filed the present action. (FAC, ¶ 19.) But the FAC failed to carry its burden of pleading sufficient facts to invoke the discovery rule. Nowhere does the FAC allege when and how Uzeta Hernandez discovered the alleged fraud. Nor does the FAC allege how Uzeta Hernandez was unable to discover the fraud earlier despite the exercise of reasonable diligence. Instead, it merely alleges that Rosa Torres refused to deed the La Puente Property back to Uzeta Hernandez in April 2022 which itself is insufficient to establish how Uzeta Hernandez discovered the fraud. (FAC, ¶ 30.)

 

Accordingly, the Torres-Uzeta Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

 

False Imprisonment (Ninth Cause of Action)

 

The Torres-Uzeta Defendants contend Uzeta Hernandez’s ninth cause of action for false imprisonment failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. The court agrees.

 

Legal Standard

 

“False imprisonment involves the intentional confinement of another against the person’s will.  The elements are (1) nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief. [Citations.]” (Bocanegra v. Jakubowski (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 848, 855, quoting 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts § 426, pp. 642-643.) Confinement “may be effectuated by means of physical force [Citation], threat of force or of arrest [Citation], confinement by physical barriers [Citation], or by means of any other form of unreasonable duress. [Citation]” (Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 715.)

 

Discussion

 

In this case, the Torres-Uzeta Defendants contend the FAC failed to allege how they confined Uzeta Hernandez in the La Puente Property. In particular, while the FAC alleged Rosa Torres and Florentino Torres falsely imprisoned Uzeta Hernandez at the La Puente Property and refused to let Uzeta Hernandez leave the property, the FAC does not state how they confined Uzeta Hernandez to the La Puente Property. (FAC, ¶ 68.) The FAC also does not describe how long the confinement lasted for beyond implying it started in August 2020 when Uzeta Hernandez returned to the La Puente Property and ended in April 2022 when Uzeta Hernandez apparently left the property. (FAC, ¶ 29-30, 68.) Last, as to Juan Uzeta, there are no allegations establishing how Juan Uzeta participated in this alleged confinement. Thus, this cause of action is insufficiently pled.

 

Accordingly, the Torres-Uzeta Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

 

CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, the Torres-Gutierrez Defendants’ demurrer to Uzeta Hernandez’s FAC is SUSTAINED in its entirety with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

 

Furthermore, the Torres-Uzeta Defendants’ demurrer to Uzeta Hernandez’s FAC is OVERRULED IN PART as to the sixth cause of action against Rosa Torres and otherwise SUSTAINED in its entirety with twenty (20) days leave to amend.