Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV00321, Date: 2024-01-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV00321    Hearing Date: March 28, 2024    Dept: G

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Elizabeth Turriaga

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Elizabeth Turriaga

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED IN PART with ten (10) days leave to amend as to the Fifth Cause of Action and OVERRULED IN PART as to all other causes of action.

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is deemed MOOT.

BACKGROUND

This is a lemon law action. On March 9, 2018, Plaintiff Elizabeth Turriaga entered into a warranty contract with Defendant General Motors, LLC (General Motors) by purchasing a 2017 Cadillac CTS. Subsequently, Turriaga alleges the vehicle exhibited transmission defects.

On February 2, 2023, Turriaga filed a complaint against General Motors and Does 1-10, alleging (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breached of the implied warranty of merchantability; (5) concealment; (6) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA); and (7) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

On April 7, 2023, General Motors filed a demurrer and motion to strike. In response on May 23, Turriaga filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendants alleging the same causes of action minus the sixth and seventh causes of action.

On July 21, 2023, General Motors filed the present demurrer and motion to strike. Prior to filing on July 5, General Motors’ counsel met and conferred telephonically with Turriaga’s counsel and was unable to reach a resolution. (Yaraghchian Decl., ¶ 2.) On January 25, 2024, the court continued a hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike in order for parties to submit additional briefing.

A hearing on the present demurrer and motion to strike is set for March 28, 2024, along with a case management conference.

ANALYSIS

General Motors demurs to Turriaga’s entire FAC. For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS General Motors’s demurrer with leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action and OVERRULES it as to all other causes of action on the grounds of mootness.

Legal Standard

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

Breach of Warranty Claims (First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action)

General Motors argues Turriaga’s first, second, and third causes of action for breach of express warranty and fourth cause of action for breach of implied warranty fail to plead sufficient facts to state a claim as the FAC fails to allege Turriaga’s vehicle was “new” for the purposes of the Song-Beverly Act. But in supplemental briefing filed on February 15, 2024, General Motors agreed to withdraw these arguments.

Accordingly, General Motors’s demurrer to these causes of action is OVERRULED as moot.

Concealment (Fifth Cause of Action)

General Motors contends Turriaga’s fifth cause of action for concealment is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. The court agrees it is insufficiently pled.

Legal Standard

“[T]he elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: ‘(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.’” (Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 830, 850, quoting Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 665-666.)

For a cause of action based on fraud, the statute of limitations is three years from when the Plaintiff discovers “the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) Pursuant to the delayed discovery rule, defendant’s fraudulent concealment of a cause of action tolls the statute of limitations but “only for that period during which the claim is undiscovered by plaintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it” unless Plaintiff has already discovered the cause of action independently. (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1979) 18 Cal.3d 93, 99.)

“A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403.)

Discussion

In this case, General Motors first contends Turriaga’s cause of action is time-barred as it was not filed within three years of Turriaga’s purchase of the subject vehicle on March 9, 2018. But, the FAC does not allege Turriaga discovered the true nature of the allegedly concealed defects on this date. Instead, the FAC alleges Turriaga did not discover General Motors’s alleged concealment of the true nature of these defects until right before Turriaga filed the present action. (FAC, ¶ 39, 42.) Thus, Turriaga’s fifth cause of action is not time-barred on its face.

Next, General Motors contends the FAC failed to allege concealment with the requisite specificity. In particular, General Motors contends the FAC failed to allege (1) the identity of the individuals at General Motors who purportedly concealed material facts or made untrue representations, (2) their authority to speak and act on behalf of General Motors, (3) General Motors’s knowledge about alleged defects at the time of purchase, (4) any interactions with General Motors before or during the purchase of Turriaga’s vehicle, and (5) General Motors’s intent to induce reliance by making the alleged concealment. But, the specificity requirement is relaxed “when the allegations indicate that ‘the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy’” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158, quoting Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 825), or if “the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Ibid, quoting Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 658.)

In this case, the FAC alleges that General Motors knew of transmission defects before Turriaga purchased the vehicle at issue. (FAC, ¶ 68-70.) The FAC also alleges that General Motors had exclusive knowledge of these defects and intentionally concealed them. (Complaint, ¶ 78-79.) But, the FAC fails to allege General Motors’s alleged concealment was intended to induce Turriaga’s reliance or defraud Turriaga.

Accordingly, General Motors’s demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, General Motors’s demurrer to Turriaga’s FAC is SUSTAINED IN PART with the (10) days leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action and OVERRULED N PART as moot as to all other causes of action.

Furthermore, based upon the recommendations made on the demurrer, General Motors’s motion to strike is DEEMED MOOT.