Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV00415, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV00415, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV00415 Hearing Date: August 3, 2023 Dept: G

Defendant Cast Parts Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Victor Carpio

Defendant Cast Parts Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Victor Carpio

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Cast Parts Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendant Cast Parts Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART as to paragraph six of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and DENIED IN PART as to Plaintiff’s prayer for prejudgment interest.

BACKGROUND

This is a premises liability action. On October 9, 2022, Plaintiff Victor Carpio was removing copper wiring from a property in Walnut as part of a job for Machinery Resources International, Inc. (MRI). The Walnut property was owned, maintained, operated, managed, leased, or controlled by Cast Parts, Inc. (Defendant) and Caprock Acquisitions III, LLC (Caprock). Prior to Plaintiff starting, Defendant had shut off the electricity to the Walnut property. However, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to lock out and tag the breakers. As a result, the power to the Walnut property was turned on while Plaintiff was still working on the building’s wiring, resulting in an electrical explosion that occurred directly in front of Plaintiff.

On February 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Warburg Pincus and Does 1-50, alleging (1) premises liability and (2) general negligence.

On March 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendant, MRI, Caprock, and Does 1-50, alleging the same causes of action.

On May 10, 2023, Defendant filed the present demurrer and motion to strike. Prior to filing on May 5, Defendant’s counsel “spoke” with Plaintiff’s counsel and was unable to reach a resolution. (Reid Decl., ¶ 7.) On June 22, the court continued the hearings on Defendant’s motion due to insufficient meet-and-confer efforts.

A hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike is set for August 3, 2023, along with a case management conference and OSC Re: Failure to File Proof of Service.

ANALYSIS

Demurrer

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s entire FAC on the grounds that it fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim and is uncertain. For the following reasons, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer in its entirety.

Legal Standard

Demurrer

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

A special demurrer for uncertainty is appropriate where the pleading is so poorly drafted that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f); Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty is a disfavored ground for sustaining a demurrer. (Ibid.)

Negligence

The basic elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) “The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) As first established in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette), “an independent contractor’s hirer presumptively delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees.” (SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 600.) An employee of an independent contractor can only sue the independent contractor’s hirer for negligence “where the hirer either withholds critical information regarding a concealed hazard [Citation]; or retains control over the contractor’s work and actually exercises that control in a way that affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injury [Citation].” (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256, 264.)

Discussion

In this case, Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff was an employee or agent of Golden Bear Services. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Defendant contracted with MRI to collect the materials at Defendant’s property for auction. (FAC, ¶ 8.) In turn, MRI hired Golden Bear Services to perform the actual work. (FAC, ¶ 9.) Because Plaintiff was not employed by either Defendant or MRI, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s action is barred by the Privette rule and that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish either of the two exceptions noted above. The court disagrees since Plaintiff adequately alleged the existence of a concealed and hazardous condition.

“[A] landowner that hires an independent contractor may be liable to the contractor’s employee if the following conditions are present: the landowner knew, or should have known, of a latent or concealed preexisting hazardous condition on its property, the contractor did not know and could not have reasonably discovered this hazardous condition, and the landowner failed to warn the contractor about this condition.” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 932.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the circuit breaker and electrical system at the Walnut property was defective or inadequately maintained and that this hazard was concealed. (FAC, ¶ 11.) Thus, Plaintiff alleged the existence of a hazardous condition at the Walnut property. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant knew or should have known that the electrical system was defective or inadequately maintained and failed to inform Plaintiff’s employer of this condition. (FAC, ¶ 15, 18-19.) Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff’s employer neither knew nor should have known of this hazardous condition. (FAC, ¶ 19.)

In response, Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to allege specific facts showing Defendant knew of this defect and that this defect existed. However, such specificity is not required when Defendant is in an equal or better position than Plaintiff to have knowledge of the details surrounding the facts alleged. (See Randall v. Ditech Financial, LLC (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 804, 810.) Thus, the court finds Plaintiff adequately alleged the existence of a concealed hazard.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.

Motion to Strike

Defendant moves to strike punitive damages allegations and a request for prejudgment interest from Plaintiff’s FAC. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion as to the punitive damages allegations and DENIES Defendant’s motion as to the prayer for prejudgment interest.

Legal Standard

Upon a party’s motion or the court’s own motion, the court may strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

Discussion

In this case, Defendant first argues Plaintiff’s allegation regarding punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) in paragraph six is unsupported and improper. In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff agrees. (Opp. P. 2:16-25.) Thus, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion as to this allegation in paragraph six of the FAC.

Regarding Plaintiff’s prayer for prejudgment interest, Defendant contends prejudgment interest is not allowed in tort actions where the amount of damages is unliquidated and unknown to Defendant. (Curtis v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 668, 686.) However, the same authority cited by Defendant also states that Civil Code section 3288 gives a jury discretion to award prejudgment interest for unliquidated tort claims. (Ibid.) Furthermore, Civil Code section 3291 gives Plaintiff a right to obtain prejudgment interest for tort claims when a settlement offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 is made. Thus, the court finds Defendant’s argument is without merit, and DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike as to Plaintiff’s prayer for prejudgment interest.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC is OVERRULED.

Based upon the recommendations made on the demurrer, Defendant’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC is GRANTED IN PART as to paragraph six of Plaintiff’s FAC and DENIED IN PART as to Plaintiff’s prayer for prejudgment interest.

The court will hear from Plaintiff whether leave to amend should be granted as to paragraph six (punitive damages).