Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV00488, Date: 2024-06-12 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV00488    Hearing Date: June 12, 2024    Dept: G

Plaintiff Cassandra Ruiz’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees for Time Actually Expended and Reasonably Incurred

Respondent: Defendant Kia America, Inc.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Cassandra Ruiz’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees for Time Actually Expended and Reasonably Incurred is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $21,413 in attorney fees and costs in the amount of $1,206.14.

BACKGROUND

This is an action governed by the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. In March 2020, Plaintiff Cassandra Ruiz entered into a warranty contract with Defendant Kia America, Inc. (Kia America) by purchasing a 2021 Kia Seltos. Subsequently during the warranty period, Ruiz alleges the vehicle developed defects with its engine and warning light system.

On February 21, 2023, Ruiz filed a complaint against Kia America, Kia of Cerritos, and Does 1-50, alleging (1) breach of express warranty, (2) breach of implied warranty, (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b), and (4) negligent repair.

On February 9, 2024, Ruiz filed a notice of settlement. On March 5, 2024, Ruiz filed the present motion. A hearing on Ruiz’s motion is set for June 12, 2024, along with an OSC Re: Dismissal on June 20, 2024.

ANALYSIS

Ruiz moves the court for an award of reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $28,687.50 and costs in the amount of $1,206.14. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Ruiz’s motion in the reduced amount of $21,413 in attorney fees and costs in the amount of $1,206.14.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, a prevailing buyer “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) They have “the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) In granting their motion, “[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 (Morris), quoting Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Calculation of attorney fees begins with the lodestar approach in which the court fixes the lodestar at “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004, quoting Copeland v. Marshall (D.C. Cir. 1980) 641 F.2d 880, 891.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.) “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The factors to be considered include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)

“It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on “inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id., at p. 38.) But the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) And in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Discussion

In this case, Ruiz argues entitlement to a total of $28,687.50 in attorney fees. In opposition, Kia America argues Ruiz’s requested attorney fees should be reduced to $13,860, while not disputing Ruiz is a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees.

Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Ruiz’s counsel requests hourly rates of $695 per hour for Michael Saeedian, $525 per hour for Christopher Urner, and $250 per hour for Jorge L. Acosta. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 24.) In opposition, Kia America argues Ruiz failed to provide evidence that demonstrates these fees are the prevailing rate for similar non-contingent lemon law litigation in southern California. (Opp., p. 4:17-22.) Kia America also argues Saeedian failed to present evidence of lemon law experience that justifies an hourly rate of $695 and recommends the Court reduce the reasonable rate to a blended amount of $300 per hour. (Opp., p. 5:10-21.)

To determine if an hourly rate is reasonable, courts consider the rates of similar attorneys in the community as well as “the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Here, Saeedian’s declaration provides an overview of Saeedian, Urner, and Acosta’s experience and credentials. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 2-5.) In claiming these rates are reasonable, Ruiz’s counsel argues they are below the contingency rates reflected in the Laffey Matrix, which summarizes the rates charged by contingency attorneys. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 12.) This matrix, however, only provides billing rates for attorneys in the Washington, D.C. area and must be adjusted with data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics when applied to other areas. (Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1057, fn. 5.) Ruiz fails to establish how the data in Laffey Matrix is adjusted to the rates charged in southern California.

In this case, while Saeedian states Saeedian has been licensed to practice law in California since 2009, Saeedian does not describe Saeedian’s lemon law experience in detail. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 1-3.) Thus, based on the Court’s own experience with the billing rates of Los Angeles-area counsel in similar lemon law cases, the Court finds an hourly rate of $695 to be unreasonable and reduces Saeedian’s requested hourly rate to $450. As for Urner, Saeedian’s declaration states Urner has been licensed to practice law in California since 2016 and has more than five years of experience in litigating lemon law cases. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 4.) Based on the Court’s experience, the Court finds Urner’s hourly rate of $525 to be unreasonable and reduces Urner’s requested hourly rate to $390. Last, the Court finds Acosta’s hourly rate of $250 is reasonable and does not require adjustment.

Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Ruiz requests attorney fees for a total of 61.1 hours spent by counsel on this action including 26 hours for Saeedian, 6.7 hours for Urner, and 28.4 hours for Acosta. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 24.) In opposition, Kia America contends the Court should reduce the time requested by 14.9 hours. (Opp., p. 7:17.)

Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.) The Court addresses the parties’ contentions below.

Time Billed for Administrative Tasks

Kia America first contends Ruiz is seeking to recover fees for 31.2 hours of administrative tasks performed by non-attorneys. (Opp., p. 6:16-18.) Kia America requests the Court reduce the time requested by twenty-five percent or 7.8 hours. (Opp., p. 6:16-7:2.) But while Kia America generally cites to Saeedian’s declaration, Kia America fails to provide specific citations or references to the billing entries that should not be awarded. Because the Court is not in a position to guess which entries are included in Kia America’s total of 31.2 hours, Kia America’s requested reduction is denied.

Time Billed for Use of Form Documents

Kia America next contends Ruiz’s request should be reduced by 6.1 hours to account for the use of form documents by Ruiz’s counsel. (Opp., p. 7:3-16.) Kia America points to entries where counsel billed 2.3 hours for drafting the Complaint, 4.2 hours for drafting discovery requests, 3.0 hours to review discovery responses, and 4.6 hours on the present motion. (Opp., p. 7:9-16.) Kia America fails to provide, however, specific citations to the billing entries at issue, and the Court finds the subject entries do not appear to be excessive on their face. Thus, Kia America’s requested reduction is denied.

Accordingly, the Court awards attorney fees to Ruiz in the amount of $21,413, including $11,700 for Saeedian at an hourly rate of $450 for 26 hours, $2,613 for Urner at an hourly rate of $390 for 6.7 hours, and $7,100 for Acosta at an hourly rate of $250 for 28.4 hours.

Costs

Ruiz also requests the Court award costs in the amount of $1,206.14. Because Kia America has not objected to or opposed Ruiz’s requested costs, the Court awards costs in the amount requested.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Ruiz’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $21,413 in attorney fees and costs in the amount of $1,206.14.