Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV00541, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV00541    Hearing Date: March 13, 2025    Dept: G

Plaintiff Brett M. Cyprus’s Motion for Attorney Fees

Respondent: Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Brett M. Cyprus’s Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $34,513.50 in attorney fees and $2,515.95 in costs.

BACKGROUND

This is a Song-Beverly action. On February 23, 2023, Plaintiff Brett M. Cyprus filed a complaint against Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (JLR), Penske Jaguar Land Rover Puente Hills (JLR Puente Hills), and Does 1-40, alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of express warranty, (2) breach of implied warranty, (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2, and (4) negligent repair.

On June 27, 2024, Cyprus filed a notice of settlement. On December 17, 2024, Cyprus filed the present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for March 13, 2025.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Cyprus’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.

ANALYSIS

Cyprus moves the court for an award of reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $66,234.75 and costs in the amount of $2,515.95. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Cyprus’s motion in the reduced amount of $34,513.50 in attorney fees and $2,515.95 in costs.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, a prevailing buyer “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) They have “the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) In granting their motion, “[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 (Morris), quoting Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Calculation of attorney fees begins with the lodestar approach in which the court fixes the lodestar at “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004, quoting Copeland v. Marshall (D.C. Cir. 1980) 641 F.2d 880, 891.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.) “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The factors to be considered include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)

“It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on “inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id., at p. 38.) But the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) And in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Discussion

In this case, Cyprus argues Cyprus is entitled to $44,156.50 in attorney fees with a lodestar multiplier of 1.5 for total fees of $66,234.75. In opposition, while JLR does not dispute Cyprus is a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees, they argue Cyprus’s requested attorney fees should be reduced to $24,000.00.

Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Cyprus’s counsel requests hourly rates as laid out in the following table. (Taylor Decl., ¶ 12, 13; Wirtz Decl., ¶ 17-22, Ex. 1, p. 13.)

To determine if an hourly rate is reasonable, courts consider the rates of similar attorneys in the community as well as “the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Here, the declarations of Norman F. Taylor and Richard M. Wirtz provide an overview of the experience and credentials for Taylor, Amy R. Rotman, Jessica R. Underwood, Laura R. Schwartz, Nick McNaughton, and Lusine Musat. (Taylor Decl., ¶ 12, 13; Wirtz Decl., ¶ 17-22, Ex. 1, p. 13.) Based on these declarations and the court’s own experience with the billing rates of Los Angeles-area counsel in similar lemon law cases, the rates for these attorneys and paralegals are reasonable.

As to Alana Mellgren, Wirtz’s declaration does not state when Mellgren was first admitted to practice law. (Wirtz Decl., ¶ 22.) Instead, based on the statement that Mellgren graduated from law school in 2022 and left Wirtz’s law firm on May 15, 2024, it appears Mellgren had no more than two years of experience practicing law which the court finds does not justify an hourly rate of $450. Because Mellgren’s experience is unclear, the court will reduce Mellgren’s rate to the minimum hourly rate of $250. With regards to Rebecca Evans and Dalia Zaki, Wirtz’s declaration is also unclear as to their experience. While Wirtz states Evans completed a paralegal program in 2015 and has several years of experience in civil litigation, Wirtz does not state how many total years of experience Evans has as a paralegal. (Wirtz Decl., ¶ 19.) Wirtz also does not state how many total years of experience Zaki has as a paralegal and because Wirtz states Zaki completed a paralegal program in June 2023, it appears Zaki has less than two years of experience. (Wirtz Decl., ¶ 20.) In light of this ambiguity, the court will reduce Evans and Zaki’s rate to the minimum hourly rate of $150.

Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Cyprus requests attorney fees for a total of 96.3 hours spent by counsel and staff on the present action. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 7; Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1, p. 13.) In opposition, JLR challenges this request as unreasonable and excessive. Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.) The court has reviewed the fee bills submitted by Cyprus and the proposed reductions by JLR and addresses the parties’ contentions below.

Drafting of Complaint and Discovery

JLR contends Cyprus’s counsel overbilled for drafting the Complaint, discovery requests, and discovery responses. (Opp., p. 6:9-7:3, 7:11-7:19.) As to the Complaint, JLR contends Cyprus’s counsel billed a total of $5,409.50 up until the filing of the Complaint although JLR fails to identify the specific entries JLR is challenging. (Opp., p. 6:9-17.) Instead, it appears Cyprus’s counsel only billed $1,378.00 for preparing the Complaint in the present action including $275.00 for 1.1 hours spent by Musat on preparing the summons, the Complaint, and associated forms for filing and service on February 8, 2023; $451.50 for 0.7 hours spent by Taylor drafting and finalizing the Complaint on February 8, 2023; $451.50 for 0.7 hours spent by Taylor reviewing the drafted Complaint and sending a copy of the Complaint to client on February 23, 2023; and $200.00 for 0.8 hours spent by Musat on preparing the summons and Complaint for service on February 23, 2023. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 2.) The court does not find these expenses unreasonable and denies JLR’s requested reduction.

With regards to discovery responses, JLR contends Cyprus’s counsel billed a total of $6,209.00 to draft discovery responses. (Opp., p. 6:18-7:3.) This amount includes $3,805.50 for 5.9 hours spent by Taylor on reviewing discovery requests (0.4 hours), reviewing files and documents (0.5 hours), drafting and preparing responses to JLR’s form interrogatories (1.8 hours), preparing responses to 48 special interrogatories (1.7 hours), and preparing responses to 41 requests for production of documents (1.5 hours) on June 15, 2023; $2,128.50 for 3.3 hours spent by Taylor on reviewing  discovery requests (0.4 hours), reviewing files and documents (0.5 hours), drafting and preparing responses to JLR Puente Hills’s form interrogatories (0.8 hours), preparing responses to 29 special interrogatories (1.1 hours), and preparing responses to 16 requests for production (0.5 hours) on June 15, 2023; and $275.00 for 1.1 hours spent by Musat on preparing and serving discovery responses on Defendants on June 15, 2023. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 3.)

Although the court does not find these expenses unreasonable, the court declines to award the $2,128.50 requested for responding to discovery requests from JLR Puente Hills. Although this request does not explicitly state it was incurred in responding to JLR Puente Hills’s discovery requests, it mentions one of the responses was to JLR Puente Hills’ form interrogatories while the $3,805.50 request references a response to JLR’s form interrogatories. And even if the other discovery requests responded to were not from JLR Puente Hills and were instead from JLR, this entry would then be duplicative of the prior request for $3,805.50. Under either circumstance, the court finds this cost is inappropriate.

“When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of San Francisco (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133.) “Such fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both causes of action in which fees are proper and those in which they are not. [Citation.] Apportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units.” (Bell v. Vista Unified School District (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687.) Here, Cyprus did not bring Song-Beverly Act claims against JLR Puente Hills and instead sought a separate cause of action for negligent repair against JLR Puente Hills. Furthermore, the present motion is brought only against JLR, not JLR Puente Hills. Thus, to the extent the $2,128.50 request is seeking attorney fees for time spent responding to discovery requests from a different defendant not subject to Cyprus’s statutory Song-Beverly Act claims, these costs are not awardable against JLR. Accordingly, the court reduces Cyprus’s requested attorney fees by $2,128.50.

As to discovery requests, JLR contends Cyprus’s counsel billed $5,805.00 to draft general discovery requests. (Opp., p. 7:11-19.) This amount includes $3,805.50 for 5.9 hours spent by Taylor on reviewing files and documents (0.6 hours), drafting and preparing Cyprus’s form interrogatories (0.3 hours), preparing 31 special interrogatories (1.1 hours), preparing 37 requests for production (1.3 hours), and preparing 165 requests for admission (2.6 hours) for JLR on September 1, 2023; $1,999.50 for 3.10 hours spent by Taylor on drafting and preparing Cyprus’s form interrogatories (0.3 hours), preparing 18 special interrogatories (0.8 hours), preparing 22 requests for production (0.9 hours), and preparing 33 requests for admission (1.1) for JLR Puente Hills on September 6, 2023; and $175.00 for 0.7 hours spent by Musat on preparing and serving discovery requests on September 6, 2023. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 5.) Although the court does not find the time spent on discovery requests for JLR to be unreasonable, the court again declines to award $1,999.50 in fees for time spent on discovery for JLR Puente Hills for the same reasons noted above.

Administrative and Routine Tasks

JLR next contends Cyprus’s counsel overbilled for administrative or routine tasks. First, JLR contends Cyprus’s counsel billed $2,926.00 for eleven (11) time entries dealing with preparing CMC statements and CMC hearing appearances from March 28, 2023, to July 12, 2023. (Opp., p. 7:4-10.) This amount includes $258.00 for 0.4 hours spent by Taylor on reviewing the court’s CMC notice, drafting a CMC notice for Defendants, and drafting memo for file on June 6, 2023 (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 3); $451.50 for 0.7 hours spent by Taylor on checking trial calendar, drafting and preparing a CMC statement, and drafting and preparing a notice of posting jury fees on June 28, 2023 (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 4); $64.50 for 0.1 hours spent by Taylor on reviewing JLR’s CMC statement and notice of jury fees posting on June 29, 2023 (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 4); $322.50 for 0.5 hours spent by Taylor on drafting meet and confer correspondence for CMC on July 5, 2023 (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 4); $64.50 for 0.1 hours spent by Taylor on reviewing responses to meet and confer correspondence for CMC on July 6, 2023 (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 4); and $1,032.00 for 1.6 hours spent by Taylor on preparing for attending CMC hearing on July 12, 2023 (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 4). Although JRL contends it was unreasonable for Cyprus’s counsel to bill these items at a partner’s rate, the court disagrees since Taylor was the only attorney listed in the billing statements for Taylor’s firm. Thus, the court finds these expenses reasonable and declines to make JLR’s requested reductions.

Second, JLR contends Cyprus’s counsel billed $626.50 to associate new counsel in the present mater. (Opp., p. 7:20-8:2.) This amount includes $451.50 for 0.7 hours spent by Taylor drafting a “NOA” to transfer the case to co-counsel and $175.00 for 0.7 hours spent by Musat on preparing the notice for service and counsel’s files for transfer on November 1, 2023. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 5.) Although JLR contends an attorney would never bill their clients for this time, JLR fails to cite to any evidence or authority that establishes such an expense is inappropriate. Thus, the court finds these expenses reasonable and declines to make JLR’s requested reductions. Third and last, JLR contends Cyprus’s counsel billed $3,350.00 for largely administrative tasks and client communications from May 28, 2024, to September 24, 2024. (Opp., p. 8:16-21.) But JLR fails to identify the specific billing entries that are problematic. Because the court is not in a position to guess which entries JLR is referencing, this requested reduction is also denied.

Present Motion

JLR last contends Cyprus’s counsel overbilled for the present motion. (Opp., p. 8:22-28.) Specifically, Cyprus’s counsel requests $6,490.00 in fees that includes $440.00 for 0.8 hours spent by Rotman drafting a declaration and exhibits for the present motion on December 16, 2024 (Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1, p. 11); $55.00 for 0.1 hours spent by Rotman reserving a hearing date for the present motion on December 16, 2024 (Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1, p. 12); $2,695.00 for 4.9 hours spent by Rotman on drafting the present motion and its supporting papers on December 17, 2024 (Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1, p. 12); $550.00 for an anticipated 1.0 hours spent by Rotman in reviewing JLR’s opposition (Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1, p. 12); $1,650.00 for an anticipated 3.0 hours spent by Rotman drafting a reply to JLR’s opposition (Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1, p. 12); and $1,100.00 for an anticipated 2.0 hours by Rotman for attending the hearing on the present motion (Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1, p. 12). The court agrees these amounts are excessive and reduces the request to 3.0 hours for drafting the present motion, 1.0 hours for drafting the reply, and 0.5 hours for attending the hearing at Rotman’s hourly rate of $550 for a total reduction of $4,015.00.

Reasonableness of Multiplier

Cyprus’s counsel maintains they are entitled to a multiplier of 1.5. (Motion, p. 13:6-14:20.) They maintain such a multiplier is appropriate based on the contingent risks inherent in pursuing this case. The factors that courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132).

Here, while Cyprus’s counsel point to the contingent nature of the present fee award, they fail to establish how any of the other factors in Ketchum support the award of a multiplier. Thus, the court declines to award a multiplier. Following the reductions listed above (totaling $8,143.00) and reductions to the hourly rates of Mellgren, Evans, and Zaki (totaling $1,500.00[1]), the court will limit Cyprus’s attorney fees award to $34,513.50.

Costs

Cyprus also requests the court award in $2,515.95 in costs pursuant to memorandums of costs filed August 7, 2024, and August 8, 2024. Because JLR has not filed a timely motion to tax or strike such costs pursuant to Rule 3.1700, subdivision (b) of the California Rules of Court, the court awards the costs requested.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Cyprus’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $34,513.50 in attorney fees and $2,515.95 in costs.