Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV00552, Date: 2023-08-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV00552, Date: 2023-08-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV00552 Hearing Date: August 15, 2023 Dept: G

Plaintiffs Jessica Leyva and Freddie Gallegos’s Demurrer to the Answer to Complaint of Defendant Clorinda Ramirez

Respondent: Defendant Clorinda Ramirez

Plaintiffs Jessica Leyva and Freddie Gallegos’s Demurrer to the Answer to Complaint of Defendant Robert Ramirez

Respondent: Defendant Robert Ramirez

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiffs Jessica Leyva and Freddie Gallegos’s Demurrer to the Answer to Complaint of Defendant Clorinda Ramirez is SUSTAINED IN PART with ten (10) days leave to amend as to the third, seventh, eighteenth, twenty-second, and twenty-third affirmative defenses and OVERRULED IN PART as to the fourth, eleventh, and thirteenth affirmative defenses.

Plaintiffs Jessica Leyva and Freddie Gallegos’s Demurrer to the Answer to Complaint of Defendant Robert Ramirez is SUSTAINED IN PART with ten (10) days leave to amend as to the third, seventh, eighteenth, twenty-second, and twenty-third affirmative defenses and OVERRULED IN PART as to the fourth, eleventh, and thirteenth affirmative defenses.

BACKGROUND

This is an action arising from a landlord-tenant dispute. On May 1, 2022, Plaintiffs Jessica Leyva and Freddie Gallegos entered into a written lease agreement with Defendant Sandra Cody (Cody) for a property in La Puente. The La Puente property, consisting of a main house and a separate shed, is allegedly owned by Defendants Clorinda Ramirez (Clorinda) and Robert Ramirez (Robert, collectively the Ramirez Defendants). Plaintiffs allege that Cody was related to the Ramirez Defendants and was responsible for acting as the La Puente property’s landlord and manager. While Plaintiffs shared the common areas of the main house with Cody’s son, Defendant Jake Davis (Davis), Plaintiffs lived in the converted shed.

In June 2022, police arrested Davis after Plaintiffs reported Davis for illegal activity at the La Puente property. Subsequently, tensions increased between Plaintiffs and Cody as Cody allegedly attempted to get Plaintiffs to leave and restricted their access to the common areas the main house. Plaintiffs allege their own living accommodations in the shed were not code compliant. Plaintiffs further allege that the main house was also in an uninhabitable state with the presence of trash, urine, feces, drug and alcohol paraphernalia, and rodents. Plaintiffs also allege they were falsely accused of harassing Cody’s mother, Defendant Grace Margaret Figueroa (Figueroa), who also lived at the La Puente property in the main house as pretext to justify their eviction.

On February 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Ramirez Defendants, Cody, Figueroa, Davis, and Does 1-100, alleging the following causes of action: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, (2) breach of the warranty of habitability, (3) private nuisance, (4) defamation, (5) negligence, (6) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), (8) negligence per se, (9) unpermitted/illegal unit in violation of common law, (10) intentional influence to vacate, and (11) retaliatory eviction.

On June 12, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the present demurrers to the Ramirez Defendants’ (hereafter, Defendants) answers. Prior to filing on June 7, Plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to meet and confer telephonically with Defendants’ counsel but was unable to get in contact with them. (Partiyeli Decl., ¶ 3.)

A hearing on the demurrers is set for August 15, 2023, along with a case management conference.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs demur to Defendants’ third, fourth, seventh, eleventh, thirteenth, eighteenth, twenty-second, and twenty-third affirmative defenses raised in their answers. For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS Plaintiffs’ demurrers to Defendants’ third, seventh, eighteenth, twenty-second, and twenty-third affirmative defenses with leave to amend and OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendants’ fourth, eleventh, and thirteenth affirmative defenses.

Legal Standard

An answer to a complaint must include “[t]he general or specific denial of the material allegations of the complaint controverted by the defendant” and “[a] statement of any new matter constituting a defense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (b).) The same pleading of ultimate facts rather than mere legal conclusions required in a complaint is also required in pleading an answer. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimi (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.) Defenses must be separately stated and refer to the causes of action to which they answer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (g).)

A plaintiff can demur to an answer on the ground that “[t]he answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).) “Generally speaking, the determination whether an answer states a defense is governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a complaint states a cause of action.” (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal. App. 2d 725, 732.) “The determination of the sufficiency of the answer requires an examination of the complaint because its adequacy is with reference to the complaint it purports to answer.” (Id., at p. 733.)

Third Affirmative Defense (Waiver)

Plaintiffs argue Defendants’ third affirmative defense of waiver fails to allege sufficient facts to state a defense and is uncertain. The court agrees.

In this case, Defendants state Plaintiffs “have waived and/or released their rights to maintain the action filed in this case. (Clorinda Answer, p. 3:27-4:1; Robert Answer, p. 3:26-28.) However, Defendants fail to allege any fact that establishes how Plaintiffs waived or released their claims against Defendants. In Defendants’ oppositions, they also fail to explain how these causes of action were waived. Thus, Defendants’ third affirmative defense is uncertain and inadequately pled.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendants’ third affirmative defense is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Fourth Affirmative Defense (Laches)

Plaintiffs contend Defendants’ fourth affirmative defense of laches fails to allege sufficient facts to state a defense. The court disagrees.

“A defendant must demonstrate three elements to successfully assert a laches defense: (1) delay in asserting a right or a claim; (2) the delay was not reasonable or excusable; and (3) prejudice to the party against whom laches is asserted.” (Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Internat., Ltd. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1157.) While Defendants do not allege any facts in support of this affirmative defense, they contend it is supported by the allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Here, Plaintiffs allege the La Puente property was neglected for the past several years. (Complaint, ¶ 46.) Furthermore, while Plaintiffs moved into the property in May 2022, they did not commence this action until February 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 55.) Thus, there are sufficient facts for Defendants to argue Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in asserting this action.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendants’ third affirmative defense is OVERRULED.

Seventh Affirmative Defense (Estoppel)

Plaintiffs maintain Defendants’ seventh affirmative defense of estoppel fails to allege sufficient facts to state a defense and is uncertain. The court agrees.

“In order to assert equitable estoppel, the following four elements must be present: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct be acted on, or must so act that the party asserting estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” (Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1250.)

As with Defendants’ third affirmative defense of waiver, Defendants fail to allege any facts establishing estoppel. In Defendants’ oppositions, they also failed to point to any facts in the Complaint that support this affirmative defense and instead refer to their own denial. Thus, without any additional facts establishing how Plaintiffs should be estopped from bring this action, this affirmative defense is uncertain.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendants’ seventh affirmative defense is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Eleventh Affirmative Defense (Negligence of Another)

Plaintiffs argue Defendants’ eleventh affirmative defense of negligence of another is uncertain. The court disagrees.

In this case, Plaintiffs argue “it cannot be ascertained what ‘entity or individual’ is alleged to have been careless or negligent.” (Dem, p. 8:18-20.) However, Defendants do specify that the entity who was negligent or careless was not them. Plaintiffs provide no authority that requires Defendants to identify each and every person or entity who could have negligently contributed to Plaintiffs’ damages.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendants’ eleventh affirmative defense is OVERRULED.

Thirteenth Affirmative Defense (Violation of Covenants and Conditions)

Plaintiffs contend Defendants’ thirteenth affirmative defense based on Plaintiffs’ own alleged violation of lease covenants or conditions is uncertain. The court disagrees.

Here, Plaintiffs contend it is unclear which Plaintiff allegedly violated covenants and conditions of the lease agreement. While Clorinda’s Answer refers to “Plaintiffs” in this defense, Robert’s Answer only refers to “Plaintiff.” (Robert Answer, p. 5:17-22.) However, it is clear from context that this defense refers to both Plaintiffs as the answer states this defense affects “damages to which Plaintiffs are entitled, if any.” (Robert Answer, p. 5:21-22.) Moreover, Plaintiffs’ own Complaint also makes the same mistake and refers to both Plaintiffs in the singular form. (Complaint, ¶ 85, 133, 134, 180, 181, 196.

Plaintiffs also contend it is unclear how Plaintiffs violated the covenants or conditions of the lease agreement. However, Defendants do specifically allege Plaintiffs violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, Plaintiffs have not established this affirmative defense is uncertain.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendants’ thirteenth affirmative defense is OVERRULED.

Eighteenth Affirmative Defense (Legal Justification or Privilege)

Plaintiffs maintain Defendants’ eighteenth affirmative defense of legal justification or privilege fails to allege sufficient facts to state a defense and is uncertain. The court agrees.

In this case, Plaintiffs maintain it is unclear what legal justification and privilege Defendants are asserting in this defense. While Defendants maintain in their oppositions that these justifications come from their denial of allegations that they breached a duty or failed to perform, these allegations were not included in their affirmative defense. Furthermore, they failed to identify what privileges they are asserting as well. Thus, this defense is uncertain.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendants’ eighteenth affirmative defense is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense (Failure to Perform)

Plaintiffs argue Defendants’ twenty-second affirmative defense of failure to perform is uncertain. The court agrees.

Here, Plaintiffs argue it is unclear what obligation Plaintiffs failed to perform pursuant to the lease agreement. Defendants’ affirmative defense does not specify these failures. Additionally, Defendants’ opposition just states the ultimate facts were pled and restates the affirmative defense without identifying any such facts. Thus, this defense is uncertain.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendants’ twenty-second affirmative defense is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense (Material Breach)

Plaintiffs contend Defendants’ twenty-third affirmative defense of material breach fails to allege sufficient facts to state a defense and is uncertain. The court agrees.

Here, Plaintiffs contend it is unclear what material breach Plaintiffs committed. Defendants’ affirmative defense does not identify any actual breach. Additionally, as with the twenty-second affirmative defense, Defendants’ opposition just states the ultimate facts were pled and restates the affirmative defense without identifying any such facts. Thus, this defense is uncertain.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendants’ twenty-third affirmative defense is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ demurrers to Defendants’ Answers are SUSTAINED with ten (10) days leave to amend as to the third, seventh, eighteenth, twenty-second, and twenty-third affirmative defenses.

The demurrers are OVERRULED as to the fourth, eleventh, and thirteenth affirmative defenses.