Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV01673, Date: 2024-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV01673, Date: 2024-02-15 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV01673 Hearing Date: February 15, 2024 Dept: G

Defendant Teamsters Local 396 TCWH’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Jay Phillips

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Teamsters Local 396 TCWH’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED IN PART with twenty (20) days leave to amend as to the First Cause of Action and without leave to amend as to the Third Cause of Action. Furthermore, the Demurrer is OVERRULED IN PART as to the Second Cause of Action.

BACKGROUND

This is a wrongful termination action. In 1976, Plaintiff Jay Phillips joined Defendant Teamsters Local 396 TCWH (Teamsters) and was first elected as president in 2006. In August 2022, the Teamsters’ current secretary-treasurer decided to resign, and the Teamsters’ leadership had initially agreed to appoint Phillips as the new secretary-treasurer. But while Phillips had initially received assurances of support from a majority of the Teamsters’ executive board, the board refused to appoint Phillips to the position after some of the board members raised concerns over Phillips’ age. Instead, the board selected another individual, Victor Mineros, as the new secretary-treasurer.

Following Mineros’s appointment, Phillips alleges another Teamsters member responsible for documenting campaign contributions came to Phillips and reported that Mineros had been accepting cash from outside vendors in violation of union election rules and making campaign contributions in excess of the allowed amounts. Upon learning this, Phillips advised the member to make a report with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) or the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS). When Mineros learned what Phillips advised, Phillips alleges Mineros began retaliating against Phillips by reducing Phillips’s responsibilities and access to the Teamsters’ Covina office. On December 28, 2022, Mineros terminated Phillips’ employment with the Teamsters.

On June 5, 2023, Phillips filed a complaint against the Teamsters and Does 1-25, alleging the following causes of action: (1) whistleblower retaliation, (2) discrimination on the basis of age, (3) discrimination on the basis of medical condition, (4) breach of implied-in-fact contract, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

On October 11, 2023, Phillips filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendants alleging the same causes of action minus the fourth and fifth causes of action.

On November 13, 2023, the Teamsters filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing, the Teamsters’ counsel met and conferred telephonically with Phillips’s counsel and was unable to reach a resolution. (Moorhead Decl., ¶ 2.)

A hearing on the demurrer and case management conference are set for February 15, 2024.

ANALYSIS

The Teamsters demur to Phillips’ entire FAC. For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS the Teamsters’ demurrer to Phillips’s first cause of action with leave to amend and third cause of action without leave to amend. Furthermore, the court OVERRULES the demurrer to Phillips’s second cause of action.

Legal Standard

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

Whistleblower Retaliation (First Cause of Action)

The Teamsters argue Phillips’ first cause of action for whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim because it is preempted by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). The court agrees.

Legal Standard

“A state action is preempted wherever it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (Screen Extras Guild, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1017, 1022 (Screen Extras Guild), quoting Brown v. Hotel Employees (1984) 468 U.S. 491, 501.) Substantive preemption applies when a “state law regulates conduct that is actually protected by federal law” and “[i]n such cases, state action is preempted, without balancing state and federal interests, by direct operation of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.” (Id., at p. 1023.)

Discussion

In this case, the Teamsters argue Phillips’ first cause of action is preempted by the LMRDA as recognized in Screen Extras Guild. There, our supreme court held a former union business agent’s action for wrongful termination against the agent’s union-employer was preempted by the LMRDA. (Id., at p. 1032.) In finding substantive preemption applied, the court noted the LMRDA was enacted by Congress “to ensure that unions are democratically governed and responsive to the will of their memberships.” (Id., at p. 1024.) Because the LMRDA allows elected union officials to fire management or policymaking employees, allowing wrongful termination claims “to proceed in the California courts would ‘restrict the exercise of the right to terminate which Finnegan [v. Leu (1982) 456 U.S. 431, 441] found [to be] an integral part of ensuring a union administration’s responsiveness to the mandate of the union election.’” (Id., at p. 1028, quoting Tyra v. Kearney (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 921, 927.)

In opposition, Phillips attempts to distinguish Screen Extras Guild on the grounds that it dealt with a wrongful discharge case while the present case involves whistleblower allegations. In arguing this distinction is controlling, Phillips cites Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, Office & Food Warehouse Union, Local 952 (9th Cir. 1986) 783 F.2d 1356 (Bloom). There, the Ninth Circuit held a wrongful discharge action against a union was not preempted by the LMRDA where the employee alleged the termination occurred after the employee refused to illegally alter the minutes of a union meeting. (Id., at p. 1362.) The Ninth Circuit determined the state’s interests in preventing wrongful discharge for refusing to commit a crime was greater than the federal interest and that “[p]rotecting such a discharge by preempting a state cause of action based on it does nothing to serve union democracy or the rights of union members.” (Ibid.)

In response, the Teamsters argue Screen Extras Guild explicitly rejected the preemption standard used in Bloom. But while Screen Extras Guild did note Bloom failed to conduct the proper preemption analysis as weighing the state interests versus federal interests is not proper in determining the applicability of substantive preemption, the court refused to “speculate as to whether the Bloom court reached the right conclusion regarding LMRDA preemption.” (Screen Extras Guild, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1025, fn. 5.) In arguing the opposite, Phillips claims Screen Extras Guild supported the Bloom decision by stating “The Bloom court properly analyzed the state claim in terms of its relation to the purposes of the LMRDA. Not only would the state action not inhibit ‘union democracy,’ it concluded, but preemption would deprive the plaintiff of any viable remedy, and thus frustrate the very purposes of the Act.” (Id., at p. 1049 (dis. opn. of Arabian, J.).) But Phillips misconstrues the legal effect of this language as it comes from a dissenting opinion and thus is not binding on this court.

Nevertheless, the court finds Bloom inapplicable here. While the plaintiff in Bloom was fired for refusing to engage in illegal activity, Phillips does not allege Phillips was fired for refusing to engage in illegal activity. In applying Bloom, other state courts have limited its application to cases where the union employee had refused to participate in criminal conduct or reported such conduct. In Montoya v. Local Union III of the Intern. Broth. Of Elec. Workers (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) 755 P.2d 1221, the Colorado Court of Appeals adopted “the Bloom exception to federal preemption to the extent a claim is based on an employee's unwillingness to aid his superior in the violation or concealment of a violation of a criminal statute.” (Id., at p. 1224.) In applying it, the court held the LMRDA did not bar plaintiff’s action for wrongful discharge where plaintiff refused to participate in embezzlement of union funds. (Ibid.) In Henry v. Laborers’ Local 1191 (Mich. 2014) 848 N.W.2d 130, the Michigan Supreme Court applied Bloom to a case where the union employees alleged they were fired for reporting crimes committed by union officials. (Id., at p. 296.) While the court acknowledged this went beyond Bloom, the court held it was a “distinction is without a difference because . . . the union employer is retaliating against employees and, in doing so, trying to shield alleged criminal misconduct from union rank-and-file membership and the public.” (Ibid.)

In Dzwonar v. McDevitt (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) 791 A.2d 1020 (Dzwonar), the plaintiff alleges the plaintiff was fired by a union after objecting to alleged violations of the LMRDA that the union was committing. (Id., at p. 167-168.) But there, the court applied Bloom and held plaintiff’s retaliation action was preempted by the LMRDA as “[t]here is no suggestion in this record that defendants’ activity was criminal in nature. Rather, this case involves, at most, the federal regulatory scheme and the union’s own internal operating policies.” (Id., at p. 173.) Here, the court finds the facts of the present case most resemble Dzwonar. Like the plaintiff there, Phillips has failed to allege how Mineros engaged in criminal conduct and instead alleges Mineros violated the Teamsters’ own election rules. (FAC, ¶ 25.) Because Phillips has failed to allege how Mineros’s actions were criminal, Bloom is inapplicable here and the court is bound to follow Screen Extras Guild.

Accordingly, because Phillips’s retaliation claim as presently alleged is preempted by the LMRDA, the court SUSTAINS the Teamsters’ demurrer with leave to amend.

Age Discrimination (Second Cause of Action)

The Teamsters contend Phillips’s second cause of action for age discrimination fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim because Phillips failed to allege an adverse employment action. The court disagrees.

Legal Standard

Government Code section 12940, subdivision (a) prohibits employment discrimination on the grounds of “race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, reproductive health decision-making, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or veteran or military status of any person.” To establish a prima facie claim of discrimination, plaintiff must allege “that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)

Discussion

In this case, Phillips alleges the Teamsters subjected Phillips to adverse employment action by failing to elect Phillips to the position of secretary-treasurer. (FAC, ¶ 44.) The Teamsters contend their board’s election of a different candidate does not qualify as an adverse employment action because courts do not consider such elected leadership roles to be employment positions for purposes of discrimination claims. In support of this claim, the Teamsters rely on nonbinding federal cases that interpret Title VII. But the Teamsters fail to point to any binding California authority on this issue or establish why federal court interpretations of employment pursuant to Title VII are relevant here. (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 984 [“[F]ederal court interpretations of Title VII are helpful in construing the FEHA only when the relevant language of the two laws is similar.”].)

Accordingly, because the Teamsters fail to develop this argument, their demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Medical Condition Discrimination (Third Cause of Action)

The Teamsters maintain Phillips’s third cause of action for discrimination on the basis of medical condition fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. Phillips states Phillips has no opposition to the Teamsters’ demurrer on this ground and does not request leave to amend. Accordingly, the Teamsters’ demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Teamsters’ demurrer to Phillips’s FAC is SUSTAINED IN PART with twenty (20) days leave to amend as to the first cause of action and without leave to amend as to the third cause of action. The demurrer also is OVERRULED IN PART as to the second cause of action.