Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV01930, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV01930    Hearing Date: June 4, 2025    Dept: G

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees

Respondent: Defendants Ford Motor Company and Puente Hills Ford

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $11,793.25.

BACKGROUND

This is a Song-Beverly action. Plaintiffs Adolfo Sandoval Sanchez (Sanchez) and Stephanie Chavez (Chavez) (collectively Plaintiffs) purchased a 2022 Ford Mustang (Subject Vehicle) for $98,439.04. Thereafter, Plaintiffs repeatedly presented the Subject Vehicle to Ford dealerships for repair during the warranty period.

On June 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants Ford Motor Company (FMC), Bluesky Diversified dba Puente Hills Ford (Puente) (collectively Defendants), and Does 1 through 10. On November 13, 2024, the parties settled the case for $222,434.00. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Defendants agreed that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.

On April 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the present motion for attorney fees. The hearing on the motion is scheduled for June 4, 2025.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff submits two evidentiary objections to exhibits attached to the Declaration of Hannah M. Biemann. Both objections are overruled.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $11,793.25.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), attorney fees are allowable as costs when authorized by contract or statute and may be awarded upon a noticed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(5).

A prevailing buyer in an action under the Song-Beverly Act “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

In determining what fees are reasonable, California courts apply the “lodestar” approach. (See, e.g., Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332.)  This inquiry “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (See PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)  From there, the “[t]he lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.)  Relevant factors include: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Analysis

Entitlement to Attorney Fees

On November 13, 2024, the parties settled the instant action for $222,434.00. (Kirnos Decl., ¶13.) Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and are entitled to attorney fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794 subdivision (d). (Kirnos Decl., ¶13.) Moreover, no party disputes that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and expenses as the prevailing party. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses.

Reasonableness of Attorney Fees

Plaintiffs seek attorney fees and costs totaling $15,636.65 consisting of $9,858.00 in attorney fees, a 0.3 lodestar multiplier for an additional $2,957.40, and $2,821.25 in costs and expenses. (Kirnos Decl., ¶2.)

The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The party seeking fees bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.)

An attorney's testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records or billing statements, and there is no requirement that such records or statements be offered in evidence. (Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.)  Ascertaining the fee amount is left to the trial court’s sound discretion. (Ketchum, supra 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)  Moreover, “[t]here is ‘no mathematical rule requiring proportionality between compensatory damages and attorney's fees awards’, [Citation], and courts have awarded attorney's fees where plaintiffs recovered only nominal or minimal damages.”  (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 421.)

Here, Attorney Roger Kirnos (Attorney Kirnos), the managing partner at Knight Law Group LLP (Knight Law) has been an attorney since 2012 and has extensive experience with the Song-Beverly Act and other consumer statutes. (Kirnos Decl. ¶¶ 23-24.) Attorney Kirnos worked on this case for 0.7 hours billing at a rate of $550 per hour. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Attorney Armando Lopez is an associate who was admitted to the California State Bar in 2018.  (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 28a.) Attorney Lopez worked on this case for 0.2 hours at a rate of $375 per hour in 2023 and 3.1 hours billing at a rate of $400 per hour in 2024. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Attorney Angelia Zamudio is an associate who was admitted to the California State Bar in 2023. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 28b.) Attorney Zamudio worked on this case for 0.7 hours billing at a rate of $295 per hour. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Attorney Chris Swanson is a partner who was admitted to the California State Bar in 2011. (Kirnos Decl., ¶28c.) Attorney Swanson worked on this case for 0.7 hours billing at a rate of $500 per hour in 2023 and 4.5 hours billing at a rate of $575 per hour in 2025. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Attorney Jeffery Mukai is a senior attorney who was admitted to the California State Bar in 2010. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 28d.) Attorney Mukai worked on this case for 1.9 hours billing at a rate of $495 per hour. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Jacqueline Martinez is a law clerk who graduated from law school in 2020 and joined the Knight Law in 2023. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 28e.) Martinez worked on this case for 3.0 hours billing at a rate of $175 per hour. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Attorney Russell Higgins is an associate who was admitted to the California State Bar in 2003. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 28f.) Attorney Higgins worked on this case for 2.9 hours billing at a rate of $550 per hour. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Attorney Thach Tran is an associate who was admitted to the California State Bar in 2016. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 28g.) Attorney Tran worked on this case for 2.7 hours billing at a rate of $425 per hour. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Attorney Zachary Powell is a senior attorney who was admitted to the California State Bar in 2015. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 28h.) Attorney Powell worked on this case for 1.0 hours billing at a rate of $425 per hour. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Luis Pagola Rios is an attorney at Castillo Law, a firm with which Knight Law contracts for attorney and law clerk services. Attorney Pagola is admitted to the Puerto Rico bar in 2023. Attorney Pagola worked on this case for 0.6 hours billing at a rate of $200 per hour. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Patricia Cortazar is a paralegal at Knight Law who worked on this case for 1.8 hours billing at a rate of $145 per hour. (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.)

Based on the stated experience of each respective attorney and prevailing rates of similar cases, the Court finds the hourly rates are reasonable. However, Defendants raise valid arguments regarding excessive billing for unreasonable work and unnecessary billing related to internal and clerical tasks.

Reductions

As Defendants point out, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks attorney fees for intake work to assess representation even though Knight Law advertises free consultations. (Opposition, 10:20-22.) Specifically, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks $110.00 to “review intake materials for the purpose of assessing representation.” (Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.) The court determines that FMC should not be responsible to pay for time spent on the intake process for the case.  Those are fees the court finds would not have been charged to the client, Plaintiff.  Accordingly, the court reduces the attorney fees award by $110.00.

Defendants argue that the hours billed in relation to the present motion are unreasonable, especially because 3.50 of those hours are for anticipated events such as reviewing the opposition, drafting a reply, and appearing for the hearing. (Opposition, 10:28-11:1; Kirnos Decl., Exhibit A.) Attorney Swanson’s declaration accompanying Plaintiffs’ Reply indicates that he spent 0.5 hours reviewing the opposition, 1.1 hours drafting the reply, and he anticipates spending 1 hour to attend the hearing. As previously stated, Attorney Swanson bills $575 per hour. Therefore, the attorney fees for the previously anticipated work is reduced from $2,012.50 for 3.5 hours of work billed at a rate of $575.00 to $1,495.00 for 2.6 hours of work billed at a rate of $575. Accordingly, the court reduces the attorney fees award by $517.50.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s use of eleven (11) different timekeepers resulted in inefficiency and redundant tasks. (Opposition, 11:27-28.) The court does not view eleven (11) different timekeepers as inefficient and redundant on its face.  Upon review of the time entries by  Plaintiffs’ counsel and Defendants’ objections to them, the court finds that eleven (11) different timekeepers did not result in inefficiency or redundant tasks. The only instance of possible redundancy that the court found was a communication between Attorney Kirnos and Attorney Mukai on April 8, 2024 and April 9, 2024, in which Attorney Mukai requested a case assessment in preparation for mediation. This task was billed by each attorney.  Accordingly, the court reduces the attorney fees award by the value of the double-billed time entry, $258.50.

Finally, Defendants argue that the court should reduce another $427.50 billed for clerical tasks billed by trial attorneys and senior attorneys with high hourly rates. (Opposition, 13:1-3.) Upon review of the time entries by Plaintiffs’ counsel and Defendants’ objections to them, the court finds that many of the clerical tasks to which Defendants object include billable work. Therefore, the court makes no reduction here.

Considering the reductions described above, the total amount of attorney fees is reduced to $8,972.00 ($9,858.00 - $110.00 - $517.50 - $258.50= $8,972.00).

Lodestar Enhancement

Plaintiff requests a lodestar enhancement multiplier of 0.3 given the contingent risk and the delay in payment. In whether to apply a multiplier, the California Supreme Court has given clear guidance for the trial courts to follow.

“Of course, the trial court is not¿required¿to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof. In each case, the trial court should consider whether, and to what extent, the attorney and client have been able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment, e.g., because the client has agreed to pay some portion of the lodestar amount regardless of outcome. It should also consider the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency risk, extraordinary skill, or other factors under¿Serrano III. We emphasize that when determining the appropriate enhancement, a trial court should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar. The factor of extraordinary skill, in particular, appears susceptible to improper double counting; for the most part, the difficulty of a legal question and the quality of representation are already encompassed in the lodestar. A more difficult legal question typically requires more attorney hours, and a more skillful and¿experienced attorney will command a higher hourly rate.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp.1138–1139.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel does not provide a compelling argument as to why they should be awarded a lodestar multiplier. Additionally, it does not appear that any exceptional skill was used in achieving the settlement. Therefore, the court finds that an enhancement multiplier is not warranted in this case.

Costs

Civil Code “[s]ection 1794, subdivision (d), permits the prevailing buyer to recover both ‘costs’ and ‘expenses.’”  (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137, original italics.)  Moreover, if the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-74.)

Here, the costs and expenses provided in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Costs filed on April 17, 2025 appear reasonable and recoverable on their face. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ costs are unsubstantiated and unreasonable because Plaintiff did not provide invoices or receipts. (Opposition, 15:8-13.) However, a verified memorandum of costs generally satisfies the moving party’s burden of establishing costs necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ requested costs of $2,821.25 are GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees, costs, and expenses is GRANTED n the amount of $11,793.25 ($8,972.00 + $2,821.25 = $11,793.25).