Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV02358, Date: 2024-09-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV02358, Date: 2024-09-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV02358 Hearing Date: September 30, 2024 Dept: G

Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Expenses

Respondent: Defendant Hyundai Motor America

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Expenses is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $15,412.00 in attorney fees and $921.12 in costs.

BACKGROUND

This is a Song-Beverly action. In May 2020, Plaintiff Martha Gonzalez allegedly entered into a warranty contract with Defendant Hyundai Motor America (Hyundai) by purchasing a 2020 Hyundai Kona. Subsequently during the warranty period, Gonzalez alleges the vehicle exhibited numerous defects, nonconformities, maladjustments, or malfunctions.

On August 2, 2023, Gonzalez filed a complaint against Hyundai, Ontario Hyundai, and Does 1-40, alleging (1) breach of express warranty, (2) breach of implied warranty, (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2, and (4) negligent repair.

On January 17, 2024, counsel for the parties informed the court that the parties had reached a settlement. On July 29, 2024, Gonzalez filed the present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for September 30, 2024, along with an OSC Re: Dismissal.

ANALYSIS

Gonzalez moves the court for an award of reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $46,724.00 and costs in the amount of $921.12. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Gonzalez’s motion in the reduced amount of $15,412.00 in attorney fees and $921.12 in costs.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, a prevailing buyer “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) They have “the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) In granting their motion, “[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 (Morris), quoting Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Calculation of attorney fees begins with the lodestar approach in which the court fixes the lodestar at “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004, quoting Copeland v. Marshall (D.C. Cir. 1980) 641 F.2d 880, 891.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.) “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The factors to be considered include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)

“It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on “inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id., at p. 38.) But the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) And in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Discussion

In this case, Gonzalez argues Gonzalez is entitled to $23,362.00 in attorney fees with a lodestar enhancement of 1.0 for total fees of $46,724.00. In opposition, while Hyundai does not dispute Gonzalez is a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees, Hyundai argues Gonzalez’s requested attorney fees should be reduced to $4,530.00.

Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Gonzalez’s counsel requests hourly rates of $645 per hour for Norman F. Taylor. (Taylor Decl., ¶ 12.) In opposition, Hyundai argues these rates are “unrealistic and astronomical” while requesting a reduction to an hourly rate of $200 to $400. (Opp., p. 7:21-8:26.)

To determine if an hourly rate is reasonable, courts consider the rates of similar attorneys in the community as well as “the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Here, Taylor’s declaration provides an overview of Taylor’s experience and credentials. (Taylor Decl., ¶ 6-12.) According to Taylor’s declaration, Taylor has been litigating lemon law cases for thirty-seven years, starting in 1987, and has personally prosecuted over one hundred trials and arbitrations involving consumer warranty claims. (Taylor Decl., ¶ 6-7.) Taylor has also participated in the creation of jury instructions for Song-Beverly Act cases, authored books on warranty rights and litigation, been quoted as a lemon law expert in an automobile manufacturer’s magazine, and served as a settlement officer for lemon law cases. (Taylor Decl., ¶ 9-11.) Based on Taylor’s experience and the court’s own experience with the billing rates of Los Angeles-area counsel in similar lemon law cases, the court finds an hourly rate of $645 to be reasonable.

Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Gonzalez requests attorney fees for a total 45.1 hours spent by counsel and staff on this action including 30.6 hours for Taylor at an hourly rate of $645 and 14.5 hours for paralegal services at an hourly rate of $250. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 9.) In opposition, Hyundai contends these amounts are excessive and requests the reductions addressed below.

Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.) The court addresses the parties’ contentions below.

Prelitigation Work

Hyundai first contends the court should decline to award fees for 2.3 hours of prelitigation work that counsel spent on vetting Gonzalez’s case. (Opp., p. 5:15-6:5.) This includes 0.6 hours of prospective case review with Gonzalez, 1.3 hours of analyzing Gonzalez’s case, and 0.4 hours of case strategy planning. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1, p. 1 (9/15/2022, 11/9/2022).) But while Hyundai claims pre-litigation work spent on vetting a case is not recoverable, Hyundai fails to provide any legal authority in support of this assertion. Thus, the court declines to make the requested reductions for prelitigation work.

Clerical Tasks and General Overhead

Hyundai next contends the court should decline to award fees for 6.0 hours of paralegal work spent on clerical tasks and general overhead. (Opp., p. 6:8-7:1.) This includes 0.3 hours of document collection on June 21, 2023; 0.8 hours of document preparation on August 2, 2023; 0.6 hours of calendaring dates on August 11, 2023; 0.3 hours of calendaring and processing proofs of service on August 15, 2023; 0.3 hours of calendaring and processing proofs of service on October 13, 2023; 0.5 hours of preparing proofs of service and serving documents on October 20, 2023; 1.1 hours of preparing proofs of service and serving or e-filing documents on December 18, 2023; 0.4 hours of receiving and reviewing financial documents from client on December 19, 2023; 0.3 hours of setting up remote court appearance on January 15, 2024; 0.2 hours of calendaring court rulings on January 17, 2024; 0.6 hours of communicating with client and others for vehicle surrender on April 9, 2024; and 0.6 hours of communicating to get settlement funds released on April 25, 2024. (Taylor Decl., Ex. 1.)

Upon review of these entries, the court agrees these appear to be clerical work or secretarial tasks as opposed to legal work. Accordingly, the court agrees to reduce the time billed for paralegal work by 6.0 hours.

Excessive Hours for Routine Tasks

Hyundai contends Gonzalez’s counsel seeks excessive hours for routine tasks including 0.7 hours for case review and research on July 31, 2023; 0.7 hours for case review and correspondence to the client on August 2, 2023; 1.6 hours for review of discovery and drafting discovery responses on October 20, 2023; and 1.1 hours for compiling damages summary on October 31, 2023. (Opp., p. 7:3-9; Taylor Decl., Ex. 1.) Upon review of these entries, however, the court does not find they appear to be excessive and the court declines to make these requested reductions.

Time Billed for Instant Motion

Last, Hyundai contends Gonzalez’s counsel seeks excessive hours for the drafting of the present motion including 1.2 hours for auditing timeslips, 5.3 hours for drafting the present motion and counsel’s declaration, 4.0 hours for drafting a reply, and 3.0 hours for attending a hearing on the present motion. (Opp., p. 7:10-19; Taylor Decl., Ex. 1.) Given the routine nature of this motion and counsel’s significant Song-Beverly experience, the court agrees with Hyundai that the amounts sought are excessive.

Thus, the court reduces the hours requested to 2.0 hours for drafting the present motion and compiling timeslips, 1.0 hour for drafting a reply, and 0.5 hours for attending the hearing on the present motion for a total reduction of 10.0 hours.

Reasonableness of Multiplier

Gonzalez maintains Gonzalez is entitled to a 1.0 multiplier based on the contingent risks inherent in pursing this case and the public interests advanced by this case. (Motion, p. 14:5-17.) The factors that courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132).

Here, while Gonzalez points to the contingent nature of the present fee award, Gonzalez fails to establish how any of the other factors in Ketchum support the award of a multiplier. Thus, the court declines to award a multiplier.

Costs

Gonzalez also requests the court award costs in the amount of $921.12. Because Hyundai has not objected to or opposed the requested costs, the court awards costs in the amount requested.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Gonzalez’s motion for attorney fees and costs is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $15,412.00 in attorney fees and $921.12 in costs.