Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV02790, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23PSCV02790 Hearing Date: January 13, 2025 Dept: G
Plaintiff Jose Ines Garcia Mendoza’s Motion for Leave to File A First Amended Complaint
Respondent: Defendant General Motors LLC
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff Jose Ines Garcia Mendoza’s Motion for Leave to File A First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff Jose Ines Garcia Mendoza is ordered to file the proposed First Amended Complaint separately with the Court forthwith.
BACKGROUND
This is a Song-Beverly action. In December 2022, Plaintiff Jose Ines Garcia Mendoza allegedly entered into a warranty contract with Defendant General Motors LLC (General Motors) by purchasing a 2021 Chevrolet Silverado. Subsequently, Garcia Mendoza alleges the vehicle presented with serious defects including transmission, engine, emission, structural, and electrical system defects.
On September 12, 2023, Garcia Mendoza filed a complaint against General Motors and Does 1-10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of express warranty pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act, (2) breach of implied warranty pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act, and (3) violation of section 1793.2, subdivision (b) of the Song-Beverly Act.
On November 19, 2024, Garcia Mendoza filed the present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for January 13, 2025, along with a post-mediation status conference/trial setting conference.
ANALYSIS
Garcia Mendoza seeks leave to file a First Amended Complaint (FAC) that alleges additional facts regarding the subject vehicle and includes four additional causes of action for breach of express warranty pursuant to the California Uniform Commercial Code, breach of implied warranty pursuant to the California Uniform Commercial Code, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Garcia Mendoza’s motion.
Legal Standard
“A court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) The court’s discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendments of the pleadings. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) “A motion to amend a pleading before trial must . . . [s]tate what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and [s]tate what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a).) The declaration must also specify the amendment’s effect, why it is necessary and proper, when the facts supporting the amended allegations were discovered, and why the request was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b).)
If the party seeking the amendment has needlessly delayed, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the court has the discretion to deny leave to amend. (See Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation. (Solit v. Tokai Bank, Ltd. New York Branch (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448.)
Discussion
In this case, Garcia Mendoza’s counsel provides the effect of the proposed FAC is to allege additional facts regarding the subject vehicle’s history as a dealer-owned vehicle, in compliance with Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez). (Yang Decl., ¶ 6-18.) Garcia Mendoza’s counsel also states the additional causes of action have the purpose of providing an alternative basis for Garcia Mendoza’s standing in this action. (Yang Decl., ¶ 19-21.) Although Garcia Mendoza’s counsel does not explicitly state why these amendments are necessary and proper and when the supporting facts were first discovered, it appears counsel proposed this amendment based upon the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rodriguez on October 31, 2024. (Yang Decl., ¶ 7, 21.)
In opposition, General Motors argues Garcia Mendoza unjustifiably delayed because Garcia Mendoza could have alleged the additional causes of action in the original Complaint. (Opp., p. 4:1-5:16.) But the fact that Garcia Mendoza could have brought these causes of action in the initial Complaint does not render the delay to do so unreasonable or needless on its own. In fact, Garcia Mendoza did have a legitimate reason to delay considering the pending decision in Rodriguez. Further, the court finds such a delay does not unfairly prejudice General Motors. While General Motors argues such prejudice exists because the proposed amendments will require additional discovery, they fail to quantify the costs of such additional discovery. (Opp., p. 8:1-13, 9:1-10.) To the extent General Motors also challenges the legal viability of the proposed FAC, these arguments are best raised in a separate motion. (Opp., p. 9:12-11:6.)
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Garcia Mendoza’s motion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Garcia Mendoza’s motion for leave to file a FAC is GRANTED and Garcia Mendoza is ordered to file the proposed FAC separately with the court forthwith.