Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV03011, Date: 2024-06-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV03011    Hearing Date: June 13, 2024    Dept: G

Defendant Girl Scouts of the United States of America’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons

Respondent: Plaintiff Jane JB Doe

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Girl Scouts of the United States of America’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This is an action for sexual abuse and assault. In 2019, Plaintiff Jane JB Doe joined Troop 78394 of Defendant Girl Scouts of Greater Los Angeles (Girl Scouts LA). During Doe’s time with Troop 78394, Brittany Boyd served as a leader for the teenage girls. Doe alleges Boyd showed a special interest in Doe by repeatedly sitting with Doe, touching Doe’s thighs, hugging Doe, giving Doe gifts, and repeatedly messaging Doe. From January to March 2023, Doe alleges Boyd sexually assaulted Doe on multiple occasions before troop meetings. Doe also alleges Boyd took Doe to a hotel in February 2023 and forced Doe to participate in sexual activities. In March 2023, Doe told Doe’s parents about Boyd’s alleged sexual assaults when they discovered text messages from Boyd on Doe’s phone. After Doe’s parents reported the incident to law enforcement, law enforcement had Doe call Boyd while they monitored the conversation in which Boyd allegedly admitted to sexual abuse. Boyd was then arrested.

On October 2, 2023, Doe, through guardian ad litem Jessica Corona, filed a complaint against Defendant Girl Scouts of the United States of America (Girl Scouts USA), erroneously named as “Girl Scouts of America,” and Does 1-100, alleging the following causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) negligent supervision, (3) sexual battery, and (4) sexual harassment.

On February 16, 2024, Doe filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Girl Scouts USA, Girl Scouts LA, and Does 1-100, alleging the same causes of action.

On March 28, 2024, Girl Scouts USA filed the present motion.

On April 15, 2024, Doe filed a motion to compel.

A hearing on the present motion and a case management conference are set for June 13, 2024. A hearing on Doe’s motion to compel is also set for July 2, 2024.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Doe requests the Court take judicial notice of Girl Scouts USA’s 2023 Blue Book pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h). Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h), the Court may take judicial notice of any “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” But while the Court may take judicial notice of the Blue Book’s existence, the Court may not take judicial notice of the truthfulness of any of the facts or propositions asserted in that document. (See LG Chem, Ltd. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 348, 362, fn. 7 [declining to take judicial notice of a company website’s contents in determining personal jurisdiction].)

Thus, the Court GRANTS Doe’s request as to the 2023 Blue Book’s existence but declines to take judicial notice of the truthfulness of facts or propositions contained within.

ANALYSIS

Girl Scouts USA moves to quash Doe’s service of summons on the grounds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Girl Scouts USA’s motion.

Legal Standard

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion . . . [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)

“When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the¿evidence that all necessary jurisdictional criteria are met.” (Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 1054-1055, quoting Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232-1233 (Ziller).) A plaintiff meets this burden by providing “competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documentary evidence.” (Id., at p. 1055, quoting Ziller, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1232-1233.)

“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445 (Vons Companies).) “A nonresident defendant may be subject to the¿general¿jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are ‘substantial . . .¿ continuous and systematic.’” (Ibid, quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437, 445-446.) “In that situation, the cause of action need not be related to the defendant's contacts.” (Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 266.) “Such a defendant's contacts with the forum are so wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a basis for jurisdiction.” (Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.)

“Specific jurisdiction results when the defendant's contacts with the forum state, though not enough to subject the defendant to the general jurisdiction of the forum, are sufficient to subject the defendant to suit in the forum on a cause of action related to or arising out of those contacts.” (Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569-570, quoting Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 536 (Sonora Diamond).) “Specific jurisdiction exists if: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits with respect to the matter in controversy; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum; and (3) the assertion of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.” (Id., at p. 570, quoting Sonora Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 536.) “[C]ourts must additionally evaluate ‘the burden on the defendant of appearing in the forum, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the claim, the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief within the forum, judicial economy, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.’” (Id., quoting Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 447-448.)

Discussion

As an initial matter, Doe argues Girl Scouts USA’s motion to quash should be denied as untimely as it is being heard more than thirty days after the notice of motion on March 28, 2024. (Opp., e.p., 2:9-13.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (b), a notice for a motion to quash must “designate, as the time for making the motion, a date not more than 30 days after filing of the notice.” But failure to do so does not provide the Court with grounds to deny the motion. (Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 969, fn. 4.) Thus, this argument is rejected as meritless and the Court now considers whether it has general or specific personal jurisdiction over Girl Scouts USA.

General Jurisdiction

In this case, Doe argues the Court has general jurisdiction over Girl Scouts USA because they have substantial, continuous, and systematic contact with California. (Opp., e.p. 6:5-6.) While Doe concedes a California court has not examined a similar scenario involving the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Girl Scouts USA, Doe argues the Court should follow the example of Steir v. Girl Scouts of USA (D.N.H. 2002) 218 F.Supp.2d 58 (Steir).

In Steir, a federal district court found Girl Scouts USA had continuous and systematic contacts with New Hampshire because the local chapter at issue in that case existed as an arm of Girl Scouts USA, carried out Girl Scouts USA’s goals and purposes, and could not exist without Girl Scouts USA’s approval as Girl Scouts USA exercised “considerable control over regional councils.” (Id., at p. 64.) But here, Doe fails to carry the evidentiary burden of establishing Girl Scouts USA exercises the same level of control over Girl Scouts LA. While Doe requested the Court take judicial notice of Girl Scouts USA’s policies and procedures contained within the 2023 Blue Book, the Court is unable to do so for the reasons noted above. And, to the extent Doe relies on factual background allegations in Doe’s FAC (Opp., e.p. 7:15-22), the allegations of the unverified pleadings alone are insufficient to defeat a challenge to personal jurisdiction as “plaintiff must support its allegations with ‘competent evidence of jurisdictional facts.’” (See Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 393 (Rivelli), quoting In Re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110 (Automobile Cases).)

In a declaration, Doe’s guardian ad litem, Jessica Corona, states Doe was a member of Troop 78394 and Girl Scouts USA. (Corona Decl., ¶ 6.) Corona states Doe had to sign up through Girl Scouts USA’s website for some troop activities including selling Girl Scout cookies and purchasing merchandise. (Corona Decl., ¶ 7.) Corona also states all troop activities and documents that were provided had Girl Scouts USA’s emblem and insignia. (Corona Decl., ¶ 8.) Last, Corona states at least one of the troop leaders attended annual meetings of the “national organization.” (Corona Decl., ¶ 9.)

Nevertheless, the court finds these facts do not establish how Girl Scouts USA exercised control over Troop 78394 or Girl Scouts LA. Instead, the facts merely suggest an affiliation which is insufficient to establish continuous and systematic contacts. For example, in Steir, the court noted that merely receiving revenue from cookie and uniform sales in New Hampshire would be insufficient to establish general jurisdiction and instead focused on the nature of Girl Scouts USA’s control over the local Hew Hampshire chapter. (Steir, supra, 218 F.Supp.2d at p. 64.)

Doe also argues Girl Scouts LA’s contacts with California can be imputed to Girl Scouts USA through the alter ego or agency theory. (Opp., e.p. 8:4-19.) To establish the existence of an alter ego, “there must be such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist.” (Sonora Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 538.) And “there must be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, a subsidiary may be treated as the agent of the parent corporation if the parent “exercised pervasive and continuous control over [the subsidiary’s] day-to-day operations that went beyond the normal parent-subsidiary relationship.” (BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 421, 433.) Here, as noted above, Doe failed to provide any evidence establishing Girl Scouts USA’s ownership or control over Girl Scouts LA.

Accordingly, the court finds Doe failed to establish a basis for the Court to exercise general jurisdiction over Girl Scouts USA.

Specific Jurisdiction

Doe next contends the Court has specific jurisdiction over Girl Scouts USA because they purposefully availed themselves of the laws of California. (Opp., e.p. 9:13-16.) But like Doe’s general jurisdiction argument, this argument also relies on the rejected request for judicial notice and unverified allegations of the FAC as opposed to admissible and competent evidence. Because Doe failed to provide evidence that establishes Girl Scouts USA availed itself of California law and aimed its conduct at the state, Doe cannot establish specific jurisdiction.

Continuance for Leave to Amend

Last, Doe maintains the Court should grant leave to amend for Doe to allege additional jurisdictional facts. (Opp., e.p. 11:17-19.) The court determines, however, that leave to amend would be futile as Doe can only defeat Girl Scouts USA’s motion with evidence of jurisdictional facts, not unverified pleadings. (See Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.) The court also notes that Doe did not request a continuance to conduct further jurisdictional discovery. (See Automobile Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.) As such, Doe failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish the Court has personal jurisdiction over Girl Scouts USA.  Therefore, the motion by Girl Scouts USA is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Girl Scouts USA’s motion to quash Doe’s service of summons is GRANTED.