Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV03141, Date: 2024-11-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV03141, Date: 2024-11-18 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV03141 Hearing Date: November 18, 2024 Dept: G

Defendants Kiewit Corporation, Kiewit-Parsons, Kiewit Infrastructure West Co., and Parsons Construction Group, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiffs Alicia Olivares, Stephanie Watkin, Amaris Violet Gutierrez, Abel Valentino Gutierrez, and Angelina Victoria Gallegos

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

This is a wrongful death action arising from a motor vehicle collision. In November 2022, Alberto J. Gutierrez was the passenger of a 2006 GMC Sierra that was travelling eastbound on Route 66 in Glendora near the intersection of Hunters Trail. As a result of the allegedly narrow construction of the road, Alberto Gutierrez’s truck was forced off the road by a vehicle in the other lane and collided with a wall on the southside of the roadway. Alberto Gutierrez was killed after the impact caused the truck to flip over.

On October 10, 2023, Plaintiffs Alicia Olivares, individually and as successor in interest to Alberto Gutierrez; Stephanie Watkin, individually and as successor in interest to Alberto Gutierrez; Amaris Violet Gutierrez, by and through Watkin as guardian ad litem; Abel Valentino Gutierrez, by and through Watkin as guardian ad litem; and Angelina Victoria Gallegos, individually and as successor in interest to Alberto Gutierrez (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Defendants City of Glendora (the City), Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LA Metro), the Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority (Foothill Gold Line), Kiewit Corporation (Kiewit), Fernando Vasquez Barrera, and Does 1-200, alleging the following causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) dangerous condition of public property, (3) negligence per se, (4) loss of consortium, (5) wrongful death, and (6) survival.

On December 8, 2023, Plaintiffs amended the Complaint to replace Doe 1 with Defendant Kiewit-Parsons and Doe 2 with Defendant Kiewit Infrastructure West Co. (Kiewit West). On December 11, 2023, Plaintiffs amended the Complaint to replace Doe 3 with Defendant Parsons Construction Group Inc. (Parsons).

On February 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the City, LA Metro, Foothill Gold Line, Kiewit, Vasquez Barrera, and Does 1-200, alleging the same causes of action.

On February 20, 2024, LA Metro filed a cross-complaint against Vasquez Barrera and Does 1-10, alleging causes of action for (1) indemnification, (2) apportionment of fault, and (3) declaratory relief. On the same day, Foothill Gold Line also filed a cross-complaint against Vasquez Barrera and Does 1-10, alleging causes of action for (1) indemnification, (2) apportionment of fault, and (3) declaratory relief.

On March 6, 2024, Kiewit, Kiewit-Parsons, Kiewit West, and Parsons (collectively, Kiewit-Parsons Defendants) filed a cross-complaint against Vasquez Barrera and Roes 1-50, alleging causes of action for (1) equitable indemnity, (2) implied indemnity, (3) comparative fault, and (4) declaratory relief.

On April 22, 2024, the court sustained the Kiewit-Parsons Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC in part with leave to amend.

On May 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against the same defendants alleging the same causes of action. On September 18, 2024, the court sustained demurrers by LA Metro, Foothill Gold Line, and the Kiewit-Parsons Defendants to the SAC with leave to amend in part.

On October 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) against the same defendants alleging the following causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) dangerous condition of public property, (3) negligence per se, (4) wrongful death, and (5) survival.

On October 22, 2024, the Kiewit-Parsons Defendants filed the present motion and their counsel attempted to meet and confer telephonically with Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Fersch Decl., ¶ 4.)

A hearing on the present motion is set for November 18, 2024, along with a case management conference.

ANALYSIS

The Kiewit-Parsons Defendants move to strike punitive damages from Plaintiffs’ TAC. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS their motion, with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

Legal Standard

Motion to Strike

Upon a party’s motion or the court’s own motion, the court may strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

An immaterial or irrelevant allegation includes “(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense,” “(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense,” or “(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10.)

Punitive Damages

Civil Code section 3294 allows punitive damages when a plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) For the purposes of determining punitive damages, malice is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Lastly, fraud is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) “In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.) Furthermore, “[p]unitive damages may not be pleaded generally.” (Ibid.)

Discussion

In this case, Plaintiffs allege all Defendants “owned, created, maintained, constructed, designed, approved of and built, the dangerously and unlawfully narrow two eastbound lanes in violation of the standards set forth in the California Highway Design Manual and the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Controls.” (TAC, ¶ 17, 19.) Plaintiffs allege these actions were carried out with conscious disregard for the safety of Alberto Gutierrez as they “were aware of the probable dangerous consequences of their negligence and they willfully and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (TAC, ¶ 77.) But these conclusory allegations are insufficient as they fail to allege any facts demonstrating how Kiewit-Parsons Defendants knew there would be dangerous consequences” for negligently designing a road that did not meet state standards.

Furthermore, it is not enough for Plaintiffs to allege the Kiewit-Parsons Defendants consciously disregarded the risks of danger in designing and constructing the subject roadway. They must demonstrate such actions were despicable conduct that is “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) In Schreefel v. Okuly (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 818, the court held a railroad’s failure to deploy warning or signal lights at an intersection was not sufficiently malicious because there was nothing to suggest the “crossing itself was particularly unusual or vision of oncoming trains was obstructed.” (Id., at p. 828.) The court there also distinguished that case from another case where punitive damages were found to be proper as the railroad had there had actual knowledge of how dangerous the railroad crossing was. (Ibid, citing Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 600, 608-609.) Here, no such facts are adequately alleged with sufficient detail.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the Kiewit-Parsons Defendants’ motion with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Kiewit-Parsons Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages from the TAC is GRANTED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.