Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV03271, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV03271, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV03271 Hearing Date: March 28, 2024 Dept: G

Defendant Associated Pomona Teachers’ Demurrer to Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Pomona Unified School District

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Associated Pomona Teachers’ Demurrer to Complaint is STAYED pending the resolution of Plaintiff Pomona Unified School District’s breach of contract claims before the Public Employment Relations Board.

Upon the lifting of the stay, the Court will SUSTAIN Defendant Associated Pomona Teachers’ Demurrer and grant Plaintiff Pomona Unified School District leave to amend the Complaint with allegations regarding its claims before the Public Employment Relations Board.

BACKGROUND

This is an action for breach of contract. From 2010 to 2022, Plaintiff Pomona Unified School District (PUSD) entered into a series of agreements with Defendant Associated Pomona Teachers (APT) in which PUSD agreed to cover APT’s release time costs in exchange for receiving reimbursements from APT. In 2019, PUSD alleges APT owed PUSD a debt of $226,031 for release time costs that APT allegedly failed to reimburse. In October 2019, APT’s president, Dorothy Kim-Perez, allegedly promised to satisfy the full debt after APT sold their headquarters. In October 2020, PUSD alleges APT made a partial payment and failed to satisfy its release time debt in full.

On October 23, 2023, PUSD filed a complaint against APT and Does 1-20, alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) account stated, and (3) declaratory relief.

On February 16, 2024, APT filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing, APT’s counsel met and conferred telephonically with PUSD’s counsel and was unable to reach a resolution. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 2.)

A hearing on the demurrer is set for March 28, 2024, along with a case management conference.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

APT requests the court take judicial notice of a series of collective bargaining agreements between PUSD and APT pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h). Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h) allows the court to take judicial notice of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” While PUSD objects to these requests, it fails to demonstrate there is any reasonable dispute with regards to the accuracy and authenticity of these documents. Furthermore, the court may also take judicial notice of the official acts of a public school district. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); see also Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 175, 183.)

Thus, APT’s request is GRANTED.

ANALYSIS

APT demurs to PUSD’s entire Complaint on the grounds that PUSD failed to exhaust administrative remedies. For the following reasons, the court STAYS the present action.

Legal Standard

Demurrer

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

“[W]here an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act.” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292.) Pursuant to the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA), the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) has exclusive jurisdiction over determining whether a charge of unfair labor practices is justified. (City of San Jose v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (2010) 49 Cal.4th 597, 603-604, citing Gov. Code, § 3541.5.) Its exclusive jurisdiction covers “activities arguably protected or prohibited by’ the governing labor law statutes.” (City of San Jose v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (2010) 49 Cal.4th 597, 604.) In ruling on a demurrer “where the only question is PERB’s jurisdiction, what matters is whether the underlying conduct on which the suit is based—however described in the complaint—may fall within PERB's exclusive jurisdiction.” (El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 946, 954, fn. 13.)

Discussion

In this case, APT argues their alleged conduct arguably violates the EERA. Specifically, they point to Government Code section 3543.6, subdivision (c), which prohibits an employee organization from “[r]efus[ing] or fail[ing] to meet and negotiate in good faith with a public school employer of any of the employees of which it is the exclusive representative.” They argue that their alleged refusal to completely reimburse PUSD for release time costs could constitute a per se refusal to negotiate with PUSD. In opposition, PUSD argues the present case involves a simple contract dispute for failure and refusal to pay debt and is unrelated to labor matters. They also point to Government Code section 3541.5, subdivision (b), which states the PERB “shall not have the authority to enforce agreements between the parties, and shall not issue a complaint on any charge based on alleged violation of any agreement that would not also constitute an unfair practice under this chapter.”

In interpreting Government Code section 3541.5, subdivision (b), the court in Fresno Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 259 (Fresno Unified) noted “the ‘initial determination’ of an unfair practice must be by the board even though the practice might also violate the terms of a contract; but the board is not permitted to bootstrap its jurisdiction by deeming mere contractual violations to be unfair practices.” (Id., at p. 264.) The Fresno Unified court also noted Labor Code section 1126 allows a breach of a collective bargaining agreement to be litigated by courts. (Ibid.) After a lengthy analysis aimed at harmonizing these two provisions, the Fresno Unified court came to the conclusion that courts have “concurrent jurisdiction” with the PERB over alleged breaches of a collective bargaining agreement. (Id., at p. 274.) In exercise of this concurrent jurisdiction, the court recommended trial courts stay breach of contract counts pending the PERB’s resolution of any unfair practice issues that may exist. (Ibid.)

Here, the court finds Fresno Unified controlling. Although APT attempts to split PUSD’s common counts and declaratory judgment causes of action from PUSD’s breach of contract action, the court disagrees. “In deciding whether something is an unfair labor practice, and whether PERB consequently has exclusive jurisdiction to hear a matter [Citation], we consider the underlying conduct on which the suit is based rather than a superficial reading of the pleadings.” (Teamsters Local 2010 v. Regents of University of California (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 659, 669.) In this case, PUSD’s account stated cause of action and declaratory judgment cause of action are both derivative of PUSD’s claim that APT breaches its agreement to reimburse PUSD for release time costs. (See Complaint, ¶ 20-22, 25.)

Furthermore, it is well established that these claims are remedies rather than independent causes of action. (See Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 173 [“[I]njunctive and declaratory relief are equitable remedies, not causes of action.”]; Maselli v. E.H. Appleby & Co. (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 634, 637 [“where the common counts follow a count wherein all of the facts on which plaintiff's demand is based are specifically pleaded and the common counts upon their face make it clear that they are based upon the same set of facts, the common counts are to be considered not as different causes of action, but as alternative methods of pleading the plaintiff's right to recover the money judgment he seeks.”].)

While PUSD is correct in arguing the PERB lacks jurisdiction to address a pure breach of contract claim, the Complaint alleges APT breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Complaint, ¶ 16.) The Complaint also alleges APT reneged on its promise to make payments in full. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) These allegations suggest APT failed to negotiate with PUSD in good faith by agreeing to reimburse PUSD and then failing to do so. Because such a failure could constitute an unfair practice pursuant to Government Code section 3543.6, subdivision (c), the PERB is not divested of its jurisdiction. But as outlined in Fresno Unified, the remedy for a party’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a stay rather than dismissal.

Accordingly, the court STAYS the present action pending the resolution of PUSD’s breach of contract claims before the PERB. Upon the lifting of stay, the court will SUSTAIN APT’s demurrer and grant PUSD leave to amend the Complaint with allegations regarding its claims before the PERB.